



In this Essay, Professor Schultz develops a vision of social justice
grounded in the redistribution and restructuring of paid work. Work is a
site of deep self-formation offering rich opportunities for human flourishing
or devastation. Although society has been slow to understand the signifi-
cance of paid work to women, research suggests that women who work for a
living are better off than other women in many ways. Currently, however,
transformations in the structure of work are increasing insecurity and deep-
ening inequality for all but those at the top; many once privileged workers
now face conditions akin to those that women and disadvantaged men have
long confronted. These trends demand political attention. Professor Schultz
urges that we remake law and culture to create a world in which everyone has
the right to participate meaningfully in life-sustaining work, with the social
support necessary to do so. She calls upon feminists to forego narrow identity
politics in favor of joining with a broad array of other groups to fashion a
social order in which work provides a foundation for egalitarian conceptions
of citizenship and care.
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INTRODUCTION
When I was a girl, I dreamed of being a writer, an actress, or a mis-
sionary. I took it for granted that I would have a child along with my
career one day. Not everyone shared this assumption. In college, I was
shocked when my mother suggested I couldn't go to law school, because I
would soon marry and have a baby; working families like ours couldn't
afford to waste such an expensive education on a woman. But, I recall
asking, why couldn't I still be a lawyer if I had a family? Wasn't my
brother planning to have both a career and a family? If he could find a
wife who would help him raise his children, couldn't I find a partner who
would do the same? Couldn't we find people to help us while our chil-
dren were young, people who saw nurturing children as their calling just
as I was beginning to see cause lawyering as mine? After all, I dared,
hadn't mom worked while we were growing up, just like dad-not simply
because we needed the money, but also because she needed to do some-
thing she could call her own in the wider world, something that made her
feel like she was more than just somebody's wife, somebody's mother?
And hadn't she, in fact, reaped those rewards from working, even if some
people had looked down on her work?
The answer to all these questions turned out to be yes, not only for
me and my mother, but for most women of our era. When I went to law
school, I discovered feminism and realized that there was a language-an
entire social movement-devoted to providing women with affirmative
answers to these questions. Yet even though almost all women are now
combining careers with raising families or caring for others (like many
men), not everyone has access to equal work, and not all working people
have access to the good life. All my adult life I have been part of the
1882 [Vol. 100:1881
LIFE'S WORK
feminist movement, at both the professional and the most deeply per-
sonal levels, because I believe it is imperative to create a world in which
all women and men can pursue their chosen callings and all working peo-
ple can live with justice, equality, and dignity. I have been privileged to
call this my life's work.
In this Essay, I elaborate on the concept of a "life's work" to describe
some of the central elements of a utopian vision in which women and
men from all walks of life can stand alongside each other as equals, pursu-
ing our chosen projects and forging connected lives. In the process, we
come to view each other as equal citizens and human beings, each enti-
fled to equal respect and a claim on society's resources because of our
shared commitments and contributions. As individuals, our work pro-
vides us with a forum to realize at least some of our aspirations, to form
bonds with others, to serve society, and to project ourselves into the
larger world beyond our own families and friends. It also provides us with
the wherewithal to sustain ourselves, economically and socially, so that we
may enter into intimate relationships with the security that permits us to
love (and leave) freely, without need of recompense. This world of equal
citizenship, stable community, and a strong, secure selfhood for everyone
is the world I believe feminism was born to bring into being.
Recently, however, a number of feminists and liberals have begun to
move away from such a vision; some even associate an emphasis on equal
work with conservatism. Some feminist legal scholars now advocate pay-
ing women to care for their own families in their own households; many
seem to have given up on achieving genuine gender integration of the
work done in both households and workplaces. Some liberal thinkers
urge that we provide everyone a guaranteed income or capital allotment;
they believe tying the distribution of social goods to work interferes with
individual freedom and choice. The presence of these discourses has
moved me to articulate a feminist vision of the significance of paid work
to the good life, to equality, and to women. I agree that it is vitally impor-
tant to create society-wide mechanisms for allocating the costs of house-
hold labor and for allowing people to realize their preferences. But, un-
less we pay attention to the institutional contexts through which
housework is valued and individual choice realized, stubborn patterns of
gender inequality will continue to reassert themselves-including the
gender-based distribution of work that is at the root of women's disadvan-
tage. In the search for social justice, separatism simply won't suffice.
In my view, a robust conception of equality can be best achieved
through paid work, rather than despite it. Work is a site of deep self-forma-
tion that offers rich opportunities for human flourishing (or devasta-
tion). To a large extent, it is through our work-how it is defined, dis-
tributed, characterized, and controlled-that we develop into the "men"
and "women" we see ourselves and others see us as being. Because law's
domain includes work and its connection to other spheres of existence,
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the prospect of who we become as a society, and as individuals, is shaped
profoundly by the laws that create and control the institutions that gov-
ern our experiences as workers. I believe that it is only by recognizing the
formative power of such forces that we can imagine and invent ourselves
as full human agents.
This subject is enormous and I cannot hope to do it justice here. I
will sketch, in a very preliminary way, four key themes. Part I discusses a
theme to which I have already alluded: the notion that people are
shaped deeply by our work. Our historical conception of citizenship, our
sense of community, and our sense that we are of value to the world all
depend importantly on the work we do for a living and how it is organ-
ized and understood by the larger society. In everyday language, we are
what we do for a living.
As I show in Part II, our society has been slow to understand this
fundamental feature of socialization to be true for women (although we
believe it is true for men). Our views of women have been distorted by
family-wage ideology, "the sex/gender/family system that prescribes earn-
ing as the sole responsibility of husbands and unpaid domestic labor as
the only proper long-term occupation for women."1 Family-wage think-
ing has left us with a mythologized but misleading image of women as
creatures of domesticity-and not of paid work. This view inhabits labor
economics, anti-discrimination law, and even some strands of feminist
thought. In policy terms, it finds expression in the proposition that it is
women's position within families, rather than the workworld, that is the
primary cause of women's economic disadvantage, and hence should be
the primary locus for redistributive efforts.2 This view is both empirically
inaccurate and theoretically counterproductive; it reifies gender-based
patterns of labor and perpetuates class bias. I will argue that we must
move beyond family-wage thinking and instead adopt strategies that pro-
mote gender integration across both paid and unpaid work in order to
improve the lives of women, men, and children from all social and eco-
nomic walks of life.
As Part III shows, social justice now demands our deepest attention
to work, because the conditions of work are changing profoundly in ways
that threaten the social and political order for all but those at the very
top. At risk are the conditions that allow people to form stable lives and
identities through their work. As multinational corporations seek more
flexible forms of production and labor around the globe, more and more
people face greater insecurity and reduced opportunities to shape their
lives around a coherent narrative involving steady, life-sustaining work.
Many white men now confront some of the same problems women (and
marginalized men) have long faced.
1. Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare
1890-1935, at 53 (1994).
2. See id. at 53-59.
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These trends present deep challenges, but they also provide us with
the opportunity to reshape social life by democratizing work. Some have
suggested that we should abandon our historic emphasis on work and
create alternative paths to the good life. But, as I shall argue in Part IV,
paid work is the only institution that can be sufficiently widely distributed
to provide a stable foundation for a democratic order. It is also one of
the few arenas in which diverse groups of citizens can come together and
develop respect for each other due to shared experience. Ordinary citi-
zens understand the significance of work very well. Over the past thirty
years, people from all walks of life-racial and ethnic minorities, the
poor, women of all races, the aging, and people of all different physical
abilities and sexualities, to name but a few-have demanded equal work,
for themselves and for the sake of their children.
But employment discrimination law alone will not get us where we
need to go. Despite some considerable achievements, this body of law is
simply not capable of generating the structural transformations necessary
to create the conditions in which work can provide the basis for equal
citizenship for all. To move forward, we must craft a new language that
expresses ordinary people's understandings of why work matters. We
must remake our laws and culture to create a world in which everyone has
the right to participate in the public world of work, with all the social
support that that entails; we must also demand conditions for work that
are sustainable over the course of a lifetime. Along with life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness, it is time to insist: "We have a right to a life's
work."
This project will require a more ambitious reimagining of the rela-
tionship between the state and the market-and a more ambitious set of
politics-than feminists sometimes propose. Paid work has the potential
to become the universal platform for equal citizenship it has been
imagined to be, but only if we ensure meaningful participation in the
workforce by attending to the specific needs of various social groups and
individuals. In the past, legal efforts to achieve equality focused on pro-
tecting people from identity-based discrimination; we have tended to take
the number and quality of jobs, job-holding services, wages, and working
conditions produced by the market as a neutral baseline to which no one
is to be denied access because of group status. But in order to make paid
work the basis for equal citizenship, we will have to take steps to ensure
that what the market produces is both substantively adequate and univer-
sally available for everyone. This means that, in the future, we will have to
supplement employment discrimination law with measures like job-crea-
tion programs, wage subsidies, universal child care and health care pro-
grams, enhanced employee representation, and a reduced workweek for
everyone. To achieve such reforms, feminists must move beyond an iden-
tity politics that presses for cultural recognition and revaluation of "wo-
men's experience." We must join forces with a broad array of groups-
including the labor movement-not simply to advance each other's inter-
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ests, but to fashion a shared interest in creating a social order in which
work is consistent with egalitarian conceptions of citizenship and care.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF WOR
In the United States (perhaps even more than in other Western de-
mocracies), work has been fundamental to our conception of the good




At least since the Industrial Revolution, work has been a central
foundation for our notion of citizenship. Historically and theoretically,
what we have called for in citizens is the perceived capacity for "indepen-
3. There are, of course, many controversies about how to define work. For an
overview of definitions and controversies in historical development, see generally Keith
Thomas, Introduction to The Oxford Book of Work at xiii-xxiii (Keith Thomas ed., 1999)
(providing an historical overview of how and why society developed various definitions of
work). In this Essay, I sidestep these controversies and focus on work performed for pay.
That does not mean I believe this is the only or even the truest definition of "work" in a
more abstract sense. Feminists have insisted that unpaid housework and child care is
"work," and I agree. But, part of my purpose here is to emphasize the value of paid work to
women and to feminism-indeed, to the project of securing a more robust conception of
equal citizenship generally-and to link that point to the changing plight of workers in the
new economy for purposes of proposing a direction for a forward-thinking feminist
politics.
4. Placing value on work has deep roots in Western civilization. See Anthony
Kronman, Meaningful Work 15-20 (Feb. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review). According to Kronman, the idea that work can possess intrinsic
value was made possible by the Judeo-Christian tradition. With the story of divine creation
and humankind's fall from paradise, the realm of necessity-work-became imbued with a
spiritual significance that was unimaginable for the ancient Greeks. In Kronman's
account, the Judeo-Christian belief in the historicity of the world made possible the idea of
human agency-the view that people could act upon the world, by working on it, to
complete God's work. See id. This concept of human agency through work had radical
implications, for "it implied that all human labor-notjust the holy labor of monks but the
most mundane activities of ordinary men and women too-might be viewed as possessing a
spiritual value of its own." Id. at 24. This understanding brought a new possibility for
egalitarianism, for if we are all capable of working for the glory of God, then, "[w]hy
should some . . . be freed from the necessity of work by arranging things so that they are
able to live off the work of others?" Id. at 18. Despite its religious foundations, Kronman
emphasizes, the notion of work as meaningful still retains its force in the political societies
of the West. See id. at 27.
5. After I had substantially completed this Essay, I discovered Kenneth L. Karst's
wonderful piece, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 Cornell L.
Rev. 523 (1997). Karst powerfully describes the importance of work to personal identity, to
the creation of communities, and to the prospect of a united and equal citizenry-just as I
aspire to do here. See id. at 530-33. Karst also proposes recognizing a set of rights to
work, see id. at 553-59, although we part ways somewhat with respect to how to deal with
the gendered allocation of labor as will become clear below, see id. at 566-70 (arguing in




dence."6 This, in turn, has been linked to the capacity to earn one's own
living. 7 With the transition from an agricultural to an industrial econ-
omy, the conditions for securing a living changed, and so did the material
basis for independence. As America transformed from a nation of small
proprietors to a nation of wage earners, the image of a rights-bearing
citizen changed from one who owned a farm or family business to one
who went out to work for someone else.8 This shift entailed a transvalua-
tion of both citizenship and labor: With the enfranchisement of proper-
tyless men, the independence associated with political virtue no longer
resided in owning productive property, but instead in owning the right to
sell one's own labor.9
This shift created a complex legacy. On the one hand, the abolition
of slavery and the establishment of paid work as the foundation for citi-
zenship reinforced the market-oriented definition of self-ownership that
became the cornerstone of laissez-faire ideology.1 0 Freedom of labor be-
came associated with freedom of contract, an association that limited
rights for working people."l In addition, the "independence" of newly-
enfranchised wage earners drew on an image of "dependence," not only
of slaves but of all women, whose work in the home freed men to partici-
pate in wage work for the hours demanded by the new industrial order.
12
At the same time, the shift to wage labor created a public rhetoric
that acknowledged the dignity of labor and, by extension, of all working
people. As "freedom to work" became a more important cultural ideal
than "freedom from work," even a menial laborer could feel equal (if not
superior) to patrician nonproducers.13 Thus, even as it fed on a market
definition of free labor, the turn toward wage labor carried a subversive
potential for a more expansive conception of rights. Because, at least
theoretically, anyone could work for wages-including women-paid
work opened up the possibility of a more universal platform for political
rights. Furthermore, if women and youth could work in factories, earn-
6. See Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican
Party Before the Civil War at xii-xiii (1995); Alice Kessler-Harris, A Woman's Wage:
Historical Meanings and Social Consequences 31-32 (1990); Carole Pateman, The
Patriarchal Welfare State, in Democracy and the Welfare State 231, 238 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1988).
7. See Judith N. Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion 64 (1991).
8. See Foner, supra note 6, at xii-xv.
9. See id.; William E. Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1,
19-21 (1999) (hereinafter Forbath, Equal Citizenship].
10. See Foner, supra note 6, at xii-xvii; Forbath, Equal Citizenship, supra note 9, at
18-20.
11. See Foner, supra note 6, at xvi-xvii; cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(associating freedom of labor with freedom of contract).
12. See Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage, Labor, Marriage, and
the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation 175-217 (1998); Nancy Fraser & Linda
Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19
Signs 309, 314-19 (1994).
13. Foner, supra note 6, at xxiii-xxiv.
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ing and keeping their own wages, over time this might erode the patriar-
chal authority of the male head-of-household in both the home and the
polity. Finally, of course, for both men and women, working for someone
other than one's kin freed people to organize collectively to improve
their situation. "Free labor was wage labor," insisted Samuel Gompers,
"and should organize as such, seeking security of employment and
favorable wages and working conditions, not the utopian dream of eco-
nomic autonomy. 1 4 As the corporation replaced the independent pro-
ducer as the driving force of the economy, independence came to mean
control over the conditions and compensation for work rather than self-
employment, and paid work became the foundation for citizenship.
The promise of equal citizenship grounded in paid work has not
been realized. Still, diverse social movements have struggled continu-
ously to make good on that promise. At crucial times in our history, in-
cluding the New Deal, the labor movement, the civil rights movement,
and strands of the women's movement have championed an affirmative




Just as paid work has been a crucial component of citizenship, it has
also been an important building block for community. Working for a
living provides people with a sense of belonging and contributing some-
thing of value to a group larger than ourselves or our loved ones: The
rhythms, social relationships, and institutions of work provide important
foundations for community stability. For the privileged among us, it is
easy to take for granted-indeed, not to notice-the shoring up of our
neighborhoods and networks that flows from the fact that we and our
friends and fellow residents go to work each day. The work of social
scientists such as William Julius Wilson has begun to make this process
visible. "When work disappears," the neighborhood institutions that sus-
14. Id. at xxxviii.
15. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 209-51; Shklar, supra note 7, at 79-88; Forbath,
Equal Citizenship, supra note 9, at 25-60, 85-89. Some scholars have argued that a
universal right to work was an important part of the New Deal-although much of that
agenda went unrealized. See Philip Harvey, Securing the Right to Employment: Social
Welfare Policy and the Unemployed in the United States 3-4, 18-20, 99-117 (1989).
Indeed, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1944 State of the Union address called upon
Congress to create an "economic bill of rights." Id. at 4. The first two items on the agenda
were (1) "[t]he right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms
or mines of the Nation;" and (2) "[t]he right to earn enough to provide adequate food and
clothing and recreation." Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of
the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), in 13 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt
32, 41 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).
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tain social integration and strengthen the capacity to socialize children
also tend to crumble.
1 6
Wilson shows that, like the residents of Marienthal, Austria, who
were studied in 1930 when their factory shut down, many inner-city re-
sidents who lack access to steady jobs have become politically and socially
inactive as they have lost a sense that they can be efficacious in the world.
This does not mean that the unemployed no longer believe in the values
of work and discipline. With the loss of opportunity for stable employ-
ment and community institutions, they have difficulty holding on to the
belief that they can realize those values in their own lives.1
7
Poor inner-city people are not the only ones who withdraw from
community life when they lose their jobs. In sociologist Richard Sen-
nett's new book, The Corrosion of Character, middle-aged, affluent white
men who were "downsized" from theirjobs as IBM programmers similarly
withdrew from civic life:
Formerly town aldermen and school board members, they have
now dropped out from pursuing these offices. They aren't
afraid of holding up their heads in the community, since so
many people in . . . town have been dismissed by IBM or suf-
fered financially as shop owners and tradesmen from the shake-
up. They've just lost interest in civic affairs. 18
Having lost their place in the workworld, these men are lost to the larger
world. Nor is such a loss of self simply a male phenomenon. Amartya
Sen cites evidence that unemployment is particularly hard on young wo-
men, who may experience even more severe self-esteem and demoraliza-
tion problems (as well as more difficulty reentering the labor market)
than their male counterparts. 19 There is also extensive evidence that ma-
16. William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban
Poor 61-65 (1996). As Wilson puts it:
[Wiork is not simply a way to make a living and support one's family. It also
constitutes a framework for daily behavior and patterns of interaction because it
imposes disciplines and regularities. Thus, in the absence of regular
employment, a person lacks not only a place in which to work and the receipt of
regular income but also a coherent organization of the present-that is, a system
of concrete expectations and goals. Regular employment provides the anchor for
the spatial and temporal aspects of daily life. It determines where you are going
to be and when you are going to be there. In the absence of regular employment,
life, including family life, becomes less coherent.
Id. at 73.
17. See id. at 73-78; Jay MacLeod, Ain't No Makin' It: Aspirations and Attainment in
a Low-Income Neighborhood 217-31 (1995) (noting how inner-city unemployment
corrodes family and neighborhood networks).
18. Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of
Work in the New Capitalism 130 (1998); see also Susan Faludi, Stiffed: The Betrayal of the
American Man 61-66 (1999) (describing unemployment's social and psychological impact
on white, middle-aged, college-educated men).
19. See Amartya Sen, The Penalties of Unemployment 14 (Banca D'Italia, Working
Paper No. 307, 1997) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Arthur H. Goldsmith
et al., The Psychological Impact of Unemployment and Joblessness, 25 J. Soc-Econ. 333,
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ture women who are not employed suffer greater problems with low self-
esteem-as well as higher levels of depression and other serious health
problems-than do working women.
2 0
C. Identity
All of this underscores the third point, which is the importance of
work to our behavior, aspirations, and identity. Rosabeth Moss Kanter
opens her classic book, Men and Women of the Corporation, by noting:
The most distinguished advocate and the most distinguished
critic of modem capitalism were in agreement on one essential
point: the job makes the person. Adam Smith and Karl Marx
both recognized the extent to which people's attitudes and be-
haviors take shape out of the experiences they have in their
work.
2 1
Kanter shows, in brilliant detail, how jobs create people.22 In her ac-
count, people adapt their actions-indeed, even their hopes and dreams
and values-to function as well as possible within the parameters estab-
lished by their work roles. There is the manager whose need for trust in
an organization that cannot eliminate uncertainty leads him to hire
others just like him; yet exercising such social conformity in the selection
process undermines the very idea of a meritocracy on which the corpora-
tion and the manager's own legitimacy is founded.23 There is the secre-
tary whose higher-ups reward her for loyalty and "love" rather than per-
formance; yet, exhibiting the very traits and behaviors expected of such a
loyal subject-timidity, emotionality, parochialism, and praise addic-
tion-undermines the secretary's perceived professionalism and, hence,
her ability to move upward within the organization.
2 4
The process of adapting ourselves to our work roles does not stop at
the office door or factory gate. As human beings, we are not purely in-
strumental, and we cannot easily compartmentalize the selves we learn to
become during working hours. In fact, most of us spend more time work-
ing than doing anything else. So, it should not be surprising that the
strategies we use to succeed as workers become infused into our behavior,
349 (1996) (arguing that young females suffer more psychological scarring than males
from unemployment).
20. See Rosalind C. Barnett & Caryl Rivers, She Works, He Works: How Two-Income
Families Are Happy, Healthy and Thriving 28-29 (1996); infra notes 98-101 and
accompanying text.
21. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation 3 (1977)
[hereinafter Kanter, Men and Women].
22. See also Karst, supra note 5, at 530-33 (providing examples of how jobs shape
people's senses of ourselves, our habits, and other people's evaluations of us).




thoughts, feelings, and senses of ourselves-our very beings-with real
spillover effects in our so-called "private" lives.
25
Consider one of my favorite films, The Remains of the Day.2 6 Anthony
Hopkins plays Mr. Stevens, the head butler to an English nobleman, Lord
Darlington. Mr. Stevens's tragedy is that he so faithfully adheres to the
ethic of steadfast, loyal service to his master (and, he believes, his nation)
that he cannot even question, let alone condemn, the lord's deepening
collaboration with the Nazis-a collaboration which ultimately disgraces
the estate. At the same time, Mr. Stevens's self-effacing, dignified service
as a butler so suffuses his sense of self that he cannot bring himself to
even feel, let alone express, his growing love for the house's headmistress.
A great butler, he is caught in a dilemma of duty that tragically under-
mines his capacity to serve his master, or even his own heart, in a deeper,
fuller way.
Although there is tragedy in this account of work's influence, there is
also reason for hope. If people's lives can be constrained in negative ways
by their conception of their occupational roles, they can also be reshaped
along more empowering lines by changing work or the way it is struc-
tured or understood. The literature is filled with examples of people
whose lives have been transformed in positive ways through their work.
One powerful set of stories comes from women who entered the skilled
trades in the 197 0s, when affirmative action opened nontraditional ca-
reers to women for the first time. When these women were stuck in low-
paying, dead-end jobs, they showed no real commitment to work. But
when new lines of work opened up to them, many women aspired for the
first time to take up jobs they had never previously dreamed of doing.
2 7
Although many of the women took their new jobs out of financial need,
the jobs quickly became more than a paycheck; the women felt they had
come into their own at last.28 For many, the positive effects of their new
25. The influence of the "public" industrial order on our innermost "private" selves is,
of course, one of the themes of the sociological classics. See generally C. Wright Mills,
White Collar at ix-xx (1953) (showing how the shift to white-collar occupations
profoundly influenced twentieth-century personality); William H. Whyte Jr., The
Organization Man (1956) (showing how the ideology of belonging to the corporation
captured middle-class managers and reshaped social life in the 1950s).
26. The Remains of the Day (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1993).
27. For a fuller elaboration of this point, see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About
Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title
VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Defense, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1749, 1829-32 (1990)
[hereinafter Schultz, Telling Stories] and sources cited therein; see also Susan Eisenberg,
Electrician, in Hard-Hatted Women: Stories of Struggle and Success in the Trades 216,
224 (Molly Martin ed., 1988) ("Whenever I have strong thoughts about giving up the work,
though, I realize it is more than the high pay that keeps me there. There's something
about the work and the culture that has crept into my bones.").




work roles on their self-esteem permeated their identities, and they found
the courage to change and grow in other aspects of their lives.
29
As these examples suggest, it is not only academics and filmmakers
who have stressed how important our work is to our identity. Ordinary
folks have said so in their own words, as Studs Terkel's marvelous oral
history of working people confirms. 30 As he notes in his introduction:
"This book, being about work, is, by its very nature, about violence-to
the spirit as well as to the body.... It is, above all (or beneath all), about
daily humiliations."3 1 Yet, work also provides a foundation for our
dreams: "It is about a search, too, for daily meaning as well as daily
bread, for recognition as well as cash, for astonishment rather than tor-
por; in short, for a sort of life rather than a Monday through Friday sort
of dying."
32
For better or worse, the people in Terkel's book-like people every-
where-testify that work matters. Whether they feel beaten down by it,
bored by it, or inspired by it, it affects who they are profoundly. They ask
someone, "Who are you?," and they answer, "I'm an autoworker," or "a
nurse." Most fundamentally, they define ourselves in terms of the work
they do for a living.
3 3
II. WOMEN As INAUTHENTIC WORKERS
The idea that work shapes identity may not be controversial when
applied to men who work in high-status occupations. We understand that
"the job makes the man." However, we almost never assume that the
same is true of women. Despite women's presence in the paid labor force
in overwhelming numbers, we still tend to see women as inauthentic
workers. It is not simply conservative dogma, but also anti-discrimination
law and even some strands of feminism that have embraced this view.
In the conventional conception of femininity, women are first and
foremost committed to domesticity-as wives, mothers, daughters, sisters,
general nurturers, and providers of care and cleanup. Sometimes, this
connection is portrayed as natural and essential, either biologically en-
dowed or so deeply ingrained in our psyches that it would be almost im-
possible to change. In other theories, it is learned through early child-
hood socialization or constructed through mass culture (such as the
29. As machinist Sue Doro put it, "Being in the trades taught me to be stronger....
[I] t gave me a sense of self-worth. Working with machinery also gave me a feeling of power
that I had never experienced before." Sue Doro, Machinist, in Hard-Hatted Women:
Stories of Struggle and Success in the Trades, supra note 27, at 254, 261.
30. See Studs Terkel, Working: People Talk About What They Do All Day and How
They Feel About What They Do (1974).
31. Id. at xi.
32. Id.
33. Or the lack thereof. As Carol Sanger pointed out to me, even the desperate (or
defiant) response "just a housewife" reveals the significance of paid work to our sense of
ourselves and our understanding of how others see us.
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media). But even in the versions in which women's attachment to home
and hearth is seen as acquired rather than given, that attachment is seen
as fixed firmly in place long before women ever begin working (or search-
ing for work). If women's domestic orientation is fixed by the time we
enter the labor force, then women's actions, aspirations, and self-under-
standings cannot and will not change much in response to our exper-
iences in the world of paid work.3 4 Thus, in the conventional view, paid
work neither creates nor offers any hope of relief from the material and
other disadvantages that mark women's lives.
A. Human Capital Theory
The starkest example of this conventional thought is found in
human capital theory in economics. In Gary Becker's work, for example,
women's disadvantaged position in the workplace stems not from discrim-
ination, but from women's alleged "comparative advantage" at housework
and child care.3 5 Because women are better than men at these tasks,
Becker and other human capital theorists contend, we look for jobs
which more easily accommodate "our" responsibility to perform them.
3 6
In the face of embarrassing evidence that traditionally female jobs do not
penalize women less for discontinuing or dropping in and out of the la-
bor market than do traditionally male jobs-indeed, Paula England's
work suggests that women's jobs pay less at every stage of the life cycle
than men's do3 7-human capital theory was in danger of being discred-
ited. Then, Becker added a more refined explanation: In order to con-
34. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1817.
35. Gary Becker, A Treatise on the Family 22 (1981) [hereinafter Becker, Treatise]
("If women have a comparative advantage over men in the household sector when they
make the same investments in human capital, an efficient household with both sexes would
allocate the time of women mainly to the household sector and the time of men mainly to
the market sector.").
36. In some early versions of human capital theory, this implied that women looked
for jobs with lower depreciation of human capital during childbearing years, so that they
would suffer a lesser penalty for dropping out of the workforce to raise young children.
See Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings
of Women, 82J. Pol. Econ. S76, S94 (1974); Solomon William Polachek, Occupational Self-
Selection: A Human Capital Approach to Sex Differences in Occupational Structure, 63
Rev. Econ. & Stat. 60, 62-63 (1981). Alternatively, it implied that women looked for jobs
with higher starting wages, but lower rates of appreciation, so that they could earn
relatively more in their early years of working before they dropped out of the workforce to
care for their families. See Harriet Zellner, The Determinants of Occupational
Segregation, in Sex, Discrimination, and the Division of Labor 125, 133-43 (Cynthia B.
Lloyd ed., 1975); cf. Becker, Treatise, supra note 35, at 25 (arguing that "the market wage
rates of married men will exceed those of married women, partly because women spend
more time in the household and invest more in household human capital"); Victor R.
Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic Equality 4 (1988) (arguing that "[w]omen's weaker
economic position results primarily from conflicts between career and family, conflicts that
are stronger for women than for men").
37. See Paula England, Comparable Worth: Theories and Evidence 25, 52 (1992)
[hereinafter England, Comparable Worth]; Paula England, The Failure of Human Capital
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serve energy for our family duties, women look for jobs that require less
effort. Because such jobs are overcrowded or because those who do them
are less productive, thejobs pay less. As a result, women earn lower wages
than men, which only increases the incentive for a couple to invest more
in developing the man's skill in connection with paid work, while al-
lowing the woman's human capital to stagnate as she becomes more em-
broiled in running the household.
38
There are a number of problems with human capital theory, not
least of which is a lack of empirical support.3 9 Sociological research sug-
gests that women's lower pay is due mainly to the fact that we are segre-
gated into separate-but-less-remunerative occupations, firms, and jobs
40
(and even to the fact that we are often paid less than men in the same
Theory to Explain Occupational Sex Segregation, 17 J. Hum. Resources 358, 369 (1982)
[hereinafter England, Failure of Human Capital Theory].
38. See Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3J.
Lab. Econ. S33, S52 (1985) [hereinafter Becker, Human Capital] (claiming occupational
segregation by sex and the accompanying wage disparities occur because "married women
seek occupations and jobs that are less effort intensive and otherwise are more compatible
with the demands of their home responsibilities"); see also Fuchs, supra note 36, at 60
(arguing that women's wages are lower because "women who devote a great deal of time
and energy to child care and associated housework are often less able to devote maximum
effort to market work").
39. For recent reviews of empirical evidence casting doubt on human capital theory,
see Samuel Cohn, Race and Gender Discrimination at Work 80-88, 122-26 (2000);Jerry A.
Jacobs, Revolving Doors: Sex Segregation and Women's Careers 39-44, 58-60, 148-50,
169-74 (1989); Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Gender & Racial Inequality at Work 50-51,
132-34 (1993); Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. Rev.
707, 718-34 (2000).
40. "Sex segregation in employment has come to represent the dominant . . .
explanation in the sociological literature for the male-female earnings gap." Tomaskovic-
Devey, supra note 39, at 111. For estimates of the degree of the male-female wage gap
attributable to segregation, see id. at 121, 123 (estimating from a 1989 random sample of
North Carolina workers and jobs that 77% of all women would have to change to sex-
atypical jobs to achieve sex integration, and that at least 56% of the male-female earnings
gap was attributable to such sex segregation of jobs); see also Women, Work and Wages:
Equal Pay for Jobs of Equal Value 33-37 (Donald J. Treiman & Heidi I. Hartmann eds.,
1981) (citing estimates showing that between 30% and 71% of the wage gap is attributable
to the segregation of occupations, depending on the level of detail of the occupational
classification used in the analysis). It is well known that estimates that are based on the use
of occupation-level data (such as Treiman & Hartmann's) are biased downward, because
even many apparently-integrated occupations remain highly segregated at the firm level,
and especially at the job level. See, e.g., Francine D. Blau, Equal Pay in the Office 73
(1977) (reporting substantial sex segregation among firms even within the same
occupation); William T. Bielby & James N. Baron, Men and Women at Work: Sex
Segregation and Statistical Discrimination, 91 Am. J. Soc. 759, 775-77 (1986) (reporting
that among workers in a large sample of California firms, only 36.5% of women workers
would have to switch to a sex-atypical situation to achieve sex integration if aggregate
occupational data were used, but 75% would have to do so if the 645 detailed occupations
were used, and an overwhelming 96% would have to do so if job-level data within firms
were used).
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jobs) 4 1t-not to the fact that we have more family responsibilities. Wo-
men do bear a heavier family load, but this family load does not account
for women's job segregation and the accompanying wage gap: Research
shows that a woman's likelihood of moving in or out of a male-dominated
as opposed to a female-dominated field, 42 or holding ajob in such a field
at any given time,4 3 does not vary significantly based on such family-re-
lated characteristics as marital status, parental status, or number of chil-
dren. Thus, contrary to the predictions of human capital theory, women
are not selecting female-dominated fields to accommodate family respon-
sibilities. In fact, female-dominated jobs are not on the whole more fam-
ily-friendly than male jobs; this is part of the myth that justifies paying
women lower wages, an inaccuracy that pay equity advocates have been
struggling for so long to dispel.
44
Nor, as Becker has more recently suggested, is women's lower pay
explained by the fact that we look for jobs that require less effort in order
to conserve energy for "our" family responsibilities. In fact, Denise Bielby
and William Bielby have found that, on average, women report working
harder than men (despite women's general tendency to underestimate
41. See Kimberly Bayard et al., New Evidence on Sex Segregation and Sex Differences
in Wages from Matched Employee-Employer Data 40-41 (National Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 7003, 1999) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding
that contrary to previous studies, a substantial portion of the wage gap is attributable to pay
differences between men and women in the same jobs that may violate the Equal Pay Act).
42. See Jacobs, supra note 39, at 148-50 (finding that women's probability of moving
across sex-typed occupational boundaries does not vary significantly by age, marital status,
parental status, or number and ages of children); Rachel A. Rosenfeld, Job Changing and
Occupational Sex Segregation: Sex and Race Comparisons, in Sex Segregation in the
Workplace: Trends, Explanations, Remedies 56, 72-77 (Barbara F. Reskin ed., 1984)
(confirming that, for both black and white women, the likelihood of changing the sex-type
of their occupations was independent of marital status and whether they had interrupted
their careers to care for children).
43. See Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 39, at 43, 50-51 (reporting that women's
probability of holding a female-dominated job is not significantly associated with the
presence of children and, in fact, "women with children are slightly more likely to be in
gender-balanced jobs"); Andrea H. Beller, Occupational Segregation by Sex:
Determinants and Changes, 17J. Hum. Resources 371, 383 (1982) (finding that sex-type of
employment does not vary according to marital status or number of children); Mary
Corcoran et al., Work Experience, Job Segregation, and Wages, in Sex Segregation in the
Workplace: Trends, Explanations, Remedies, supra note 42, at 171, 188 (reporting that
sex-type of employment is not significantly related to continuity of labor force
participation); England, Failure of Human Capital Theory, supra note 37, at 367-68
(1982) (finding that sex-type of employment does not vary according to marital status or
continuity of labor force participation).
44. See England, Comparable Worth, supra note 37, at 14; see also Selmi, supra note
39, at 731-32 (noting that female-dominated jobs are not necessarily more compatible with
family responsibilities than other jobs). Indeed, one study finds that as the percentage of
women in a field rises, the jobs have less flexibility and fewer unsupervised breaks. See
Jennifer Glass, The Impact of Occupational Segregation on Working Conditions, 68 Soc.
Forces 779, 780 (1990).
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their achievements or degree of effort) .4 5 Women with preschool-age
children do work less hard than other women at their paid jobs, but they
still work as hard as men without children-who earn considerably
more. 4 6 More recent analyses confirm these results and report that, over-
all, the impact of household and family arrangements on work effort and
work commitment is nonexistent or small.47 Thus, women's heavier fam-
ily obligations are not what is driving job segregation; many single
mothers really need the higher income associated with male jobs. In-
deed, causation may well run in the reverse direction: Women may take
on more housework and childcare because we are segregated into lower-
paying, lower-status jobs-a position which deprives us of the ability to
obtain more egalitarian arrangements for household labor.48
These empirical problems point to fundamental theoretical
problems with human capital theory. The theory centers around the
claim that a gender-based division of labor is more efficient than one in
which household partners share both roles, 49 but the theory says nothing
45. See Denise D. Bielby & William T. Bielby, She Works Hard for the Money:
Household Responsibilities and the Allocation of Work Effort, 93 Am. J. Soc. 1031,
1034-35, 1043, 1055, 1057 (1988) [hereinafter Bielby & Bielby, She Works Hard]; see also
William T. Bielby & Denise D. Bielby, Telling Stories About Gender and Effort: Social
Science Narratives About Who Works Hard for the Money, in Economic Sociology at the
Millennium 3-4 (Mauro F. Guillen et al. eds., forthcoming 2001) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (citing empirical research showing that employed women work at their jobs as
hard as or even harder than men).
46. See Bielby & Bielby, She Works Hard, supra note 45, at 1048.
47. See Peter V. Marsden et al., Gender Differences in Organizational Commitment:
Influences of Work Positions and Family Roles, 20 Work & Occupations 368, 384 (1993);
William T. Bielby et al., Who Works Hard for the Money? "Efficiency Wages," Work
Organization, and Gender Differences in the Allocation of Work Effort 2 (Aug. 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
48. Cf. Cynthia Cockburn, Machinery of Dominance: Women, Men, and Technical
Know-How 230-31 (1985) (arguing that the nature of workplaces and work relations
perpetuates the sex-based division of labor, which benefits men by eliminating women as
workplace competitors, thus ensuring that they will provide domestic services at home);
Juliet B. Schor, The Overworked American 84, 94-99 (1992) (arguing that women's
exclusion from the labor market and society's failure to collectivize housework have
artificially devalued homemakers' time, an inefficiency which along with the sex
segregation of work has kept the level of household labor performed by women artificially
high); Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1816 (arguing that sex segregation does
not result because women's commitment to family life leads them to choose marginalized
female-dominated jobs, but rather because labor markets and workplaces are structured in
ways that disempower women from aspiring to the higher-paying jobs that would raise the
opportunity cost of time spent on housework).
49. As feminist economists have pointed out, the assumption ofjoint utility obscures
the skill and power differentials that result over time in traditional relationships. Is it really
better, in the long run, for the one sacrificing the development of job market potential
(and the cultural capital, political influence, and marital bargaining power that so often
accompanies it) to specialize in a form of labor-caring for one's own children-that will
become obsolete over time? See Marianne A. Ferber & Bonnie G. Birnbaum, The "New
Home Economics": Retrospects and Prospects, 4 J. Consumer Res. 19, 24 (1977). The
theory is also suspect on efficiency grounds. For example, there is evidence that some
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about why it should be women rather than men who, specialize in house-
work. Becker simply appeals to women's alleged comparative advantage.
But beyond nursing babies (a temporary phenomenon that many women
cannot do or decline to do anyway), it is difficult to see why women have
any inherent advantages at housework or even child care, unless one ap-
peals to unproven notions that they are simply more relational or nurtur-
ing than men, and as a result, better at caring for others.5 0 So the theory
ends up being circular: To explain why women earn lower wages, the
theory claims it is because we specialize in housework. Yet, there is noth-
ing to explain why they specialize in housework other than the fact that
they are female.
Even if women were somehow naturally better than men at caring for
others (a proposition which there is great reason to doubt), human capi-
tal theory would still need to explain why women should ply that skill in
the home rather than in the paid workplace. After all, many forms of
care can be (and are) bought and sold in the marketplace, just like other
services. Women's specialization in unpaid, home-based care only makes
sense if the men with whom they share resources can make more money
selling something other than the care Becker assumes women are better
at providing. Imagine a world, for example, in which women were supe-
rior at child care, but child care was organized as market work and paid
more highly than any other field. Under Becker's theory, wouldn't we
expect to see women out earning the big bucks by providing child care
for other people's children (in addition, perhaps, to their own), while in
heterosexual relationships, male partners stayed home and specialized in
less marketized forms of household work (perhaps odd jobs)? The point
is, once again, that Becker's theory is circular: It sets out to explain why
women earn lower wages, but ends up assuming the very gendered wage
structure it purports to explain. The theory asserts that women earn
lower wages because we specialize in housework. But there is nothing to
households-including lesbian ones-do not allocate labor along gendered lines. See
M.V. Lee Badgett, Gender, Sexuality, and Sexual Orientation: All in the Feminist Family?,
1 Feminist Econ. 121, 131 (1995); Lawrence A. Kurdek, The Allocation of Household
Labor in Gay, Lesbian, and Heterosexual Married Couples, 49 J. Soc. Issues 127, 135-36
(1993). Are lesbians really more inefficient than traditional straight couples, as Becker
contends? See Becker, Treatise, supra note 35, at 22-23 (claiming that "households with
only men or only women are less efficient because they are unable to profit from the
sexual difference in comparative advantage"). Or is there perhaps more motivation to
share household tasks more equitably so that both partners can develop their job potential
when there is often no need for either partner to fulfill a masculine breadwinner identity,
and no higher male wage to rely on?
50. Indeed, Becker suggests that just such a sociobiological advantage exists. See
Becker, Human Capital, supra note 38, at 21. For a review of the sociobiology literature
and a critique of the fashion in which it is sometimes used, see generally Gillian K.
Hadfield, Flirting With Science: Richard Posner on the Bioeconomics of Sexual Man, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 479 (1992) (reviewing Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason (1992) and noting
its use of "out-dated" notions of biological difference between genders).
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explain why housework is organized as unpaid labor as opposed to highly
paid market work other than the fact that it is women who do it.
B. Employment Discrimination Law
This circular, sexist line of reasoning is not confined to economics:
It is also invoked regularly in legal discourse. Indeed, this image of wo-
men as inauthentic workers pervades and constantly subverts women's
gains from employment discrimination law-the body of law that was sup-
posed to guarantee gender equality at work. In cases in which working
women seek to challenge their place in low-paying, dead-end jobs-such
as the infamous EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.5 1 case-employers argue,
and courts all too often accept as an excuse for job segregation, that wo-
men "lack interest" in the higher-paying, more desirable positions held by
men. 52 Sometimes this lack of interest argument draws explicitly on
human capital theory; sometimes it draws on less formalized notions that
women have been hard-wired by nature or programmed through nurture
to prefer "feminine" forms of work that are more consistent with mother-
hood.53 Whatever the causal mechanism, women's work preferences-
our understanding of ourselves and our place in the world as women-
are seen as fixed by forces that are ontologically and temporally prior to
our experiences in the world of paid work. Thus, as in human capital
theory, women's unequal place in the workplace has nothing to do with
the workings of labor markets or firms; employers simply honor our own
preexisting preferences.
5 4
As I have shown in more recent work, even sex harassment law cen-
ters around a stereotype of women as inauthentic workers. 55 In my view,
some men harass women because they see us as workplace rivals. They
intimidate and isolate us as a means of appropriating the best forms of
work for themselves; doing so ensures their superiority in politics, the
household, and other spheres of life. This theory takes seriously women's
position and potential power as workers, and shows how men seek to con-
trol it in order to promote their own advantage elsewhere. But this is not
51. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
52. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1776-1815 (analyzing courts'
acceptance of the lack of interest defense and the evidentiary and ideological factors that
contribute to judges' willingness to do so); see also Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson,
Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in
Title VII Cases ChallengingJob Segregation, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1073, 1095-1135 (1992)
(comparing judicial treatment of the lack of interest defense in race and sex
discrimination cases).
53. See Sandi E. Cooper, Women's History Goes on Trial: EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., Introduction to the Documents, 11 Signs 753, 757-66 (1986) (reprinting offer of
proof submitted by historian Rosalind Rosenberg in the EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. case).
54. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1800-05.
55. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1683
(1998) [hereinafter Schultz, Reconceptualizing Harassment].
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the conventional legal understanding of harassment. 56 In the conven-
tional view, men harass women because they see us as sexual or domestic
subordinates, a habit they allegedly acquired in the inegalitarian domes-
tic sphere that "spilled over" inappropriately into the neutral, un-
gendered world of work. 57 Once again, in the usual view, gender is cre-
ated in the domestic sphere; the workworld is merely a passive reflector of
inequalities already formed elsewhere.
58
C. Feminist Legal Thought
This failure to take women seriously as workers is such a deep part of
our history that it permeates our culture, our institutions, and our
thought-including feminist thought. In fact, a good deal of contempo-
rary feminist thought conceives of gender in terms of male-female rela-
tions constructed primarily (if not exclusively) through traditional heter-
osexual family and sexual relations. 59 To the extent that work enters into
the analysis, it is secondary. Patriarchal family and sexual arrangements
are understood to overflow into the realm of paid work by burdening
women with special family obligations or unique sexual vulnerabilities
that constrain our full commitment to working life.
1. Family-Based Strategies for Valuing Housework and Caregiving. - Con-
sider, for example, the current movement among legal feminists to assign
56. See id. at 1692-1710 (showing that sex harassment law as it has evolved in the
lower courts is based on a sexual paradigm that treats harassment as an expression of
men's sexual desire or dominance).
57. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women
220-21 (1977) (arguing that workplace sexual harassment is an expression of men's
eroticization of women's subordination); Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual
Harassment at Work, 6 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 335, 352-57 (1992)
(theorizing that workplace sexual harassment reflects the "sex-role spillover" of
inegalitarian views of women formed in the domestic sphere).
58. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Harassment, supra note 55, at 1761 n.409 (1998)
(summarizing and explaining the assumptions that underlie conventional understandings
of harassment).
59. For an analysis of such traditional heterosexist tendencies within feminist thought
and how they limit historical analysis, see Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics of
History (1988). For some classic examples of heterosexist tendencies within feminism, see
Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery 164-65 (1979) ("Sex is power is the foundation of
patriarchy. . . . Institutionalized sexism and misogyny-from discrimination in
employment, to exploitation throughout the welfare system, to dehumanization in
pornography-stem from the primary sexual exploitation of women in one-to-one
situations."); Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the
Sociology of Gender 169, 166 (1979) (tracing gender identity to the sexual division of
labor in the family); Mary O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction 8-18 (1981) (arguing
that the source of male domination lies in men's desire to transcend their alienation from
women's primary role in reproduction); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 Signs 515, 531-33 (1982) ("Women and
men are divided by gender, made into the sexes as we know them, by the social
requirements of heterosexuality, which institutionalizes male sexual dominance and
female sexual submission. If this is true, sexuality is the linchpin of gender inequality.").
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economic value to housework, child care, and other labor that people
provide for their families (or other loved ones) in their own homes.
60
This is a movement motivated by good intentions, including the feminist
impulse to honor and value what women do. Feminists in this movement
do not wish to naturalize the gender-based division of labor; their stated
goal is to expose and remedy it. Yet, in the service of such worthy goals,
some in this movement promote analyses and policies that reproduce the
very gender-based patterns of labor that create women's disadvantage.
Following human capital theorists, for example, some feminist scholars
argue that women's economic disadvantage arises from their primary
commitment to their families-rather than from sexist dynamics in labor
markets and firms. From there, the feminists propose reforms to value
"women's" domestic labor, just as we do "men's" wage labor, in an effort
to compensate women for child care and housework.6 1
No self-respecting feminist could be against "valuing housework,"
and I'm no exception. But that slogan obscures a host of troubling insti-
tutional questions about how this should be done. It is vitally important
to acknowledge the hidden labor that is performed in households, and to
create society-wide mechanisms for allocating its costs rather than contin-
uing to impose them on individual family members (too often, wo-
men).62 One method of doing so is already being implemented on a
massive scale: collectivizing housework by converting it into employment.
60. For examples of work in this tradition, see Joan Williams, Unbending Gender
124-27 (2000) (advocating that wives receive a greater portion of husbands' income after
divorce as a way of recognizing women's greater contributions to housework and child
care); Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's
Work through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 17, 41-46 (1998)
(proposing premarital "security agreements" as a way of doing the same); Katharine B.
Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 65, 67 (1998)
[hereinafter Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts] (arguing that a homemaker's nonmonetary
contributions should be seen as part of a marital exchange with the husband's monetary
contributions and hence treated equally by judges in premarital contract cases); Katharine
Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1996)
[hereinafter Silbaugh, Labor into Love] (arguing that the legal system's failure to assign
economic value to housework harms the women who do it and that therefore housework
should be treated the same as paid work); see also Linda R. Hirshman & Jane E. Larson,
Hard Bargains: The Politics of Sex 280-83 (1998) (proposing the creation of a
"concubinage" contract that would compensate women for their unmarried sexual
relationships with men, which would extend the economic valuation of women's
household work to include sexual relations).
61. See Williams, supra note 60, at 124-31; Ertman, supra note 60, at 39-46; Silbaugh,
Marriage Contracts, supra note 60, at 108-09.
62. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and
Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 161-64, 231-33 (1995) [hereinafter Fineman, The
Neutered Mother] (arguing that the cost of supporting the work of caregivers should not
be allocated to private families, but should be borne instead by society as a whole); Eva
Feder Kittay, Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency 140-46 (1999)
(arguing that dependency work should not be underwritten by private family providers,
but should be supported instead by "public provision" that recognizes the indispensable
role of dependency workers and the importance of their participation as full citizens);
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A great deal of work once performed in private households has been
handed over to day-care providers, cleaning services, home health aides,
landscapers, and the like.6 3 Feminists could think creatively about how to
capitalize on this trend by supporting efforts to upgrade the pay, promo-
tional prospects, and working conditions associated with work once per-
formed by at-home spouses. Compared to marriage and intimate rela-
tionships, labor markets and workplaces are spaces in which it is easier for
workers to mobilize to obtain public accountability and protection. By
transforming at least some forms of household work into paid employ-
ment, we could more easily protect those who do the work from discrimi-
nation, unfair labor practices, wage and hour violations, adverse working
conditions, health and safety threats, and other problems on the job.
6 4
We could also make it easier for those who perform household labor to
engage in collective action to improve their situation. The recent victory
of 70,000 California home health care workers in organizing a union, for
example, holds promise for highlighting-and upgrading-the value of
service work.65 Such victories continue the work started by the compara-
ble worth campaigns of the 1980s.
6 6
Converting household work into paid employment not only provides
jobs for many people who need them, it also frees those who provide
unpaid family labor to pursue more fully for pay the work that suits them
best. Countless middle- and working-class families buy time or conve-
nience by purchasing such things as child care, cleaning services, dinners
from McDonald's, lawn mowing, haircuts, car repair, and other services
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare "Reform," 36 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 287, 290, 308-09 (1996) [hereinafter Fineman, Dependencies].
Although not all forms of household work create resources that benefit society as a
whole (such as those associated with elite forms of consumerism or "keeping up with the
Joneses"), some clearly do. Good child care, for example, creates a resource that is
essential to a well-functioning democracy: children who have the developmental capacity
to become adults who will engage in the rational, deliberative thought we hope will
characterize an informed citizenry. See Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the
Family 99-100 (1989); Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 Tul.
L. Rev. 955, 1021-25 (1993).
63. See Schor, supra note 48, at 85.
64. Of course, domestic workers are one of the two groups most frequently excluded
from labor law's protection; the other group is farmworkers. See Marc Linder, Farm
Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 Tex.
L. Rev. 1335, 1335-93 (1987) (discussing the exclusion of farm work from the Fair Labor
Standards Act); Peggie R. Smith, Regulating Paid Household Work: Class, Gender, Race,
and Agendas of Reform, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 851, 854 & n.13 (1999). Nonetheless, it still
seems more promising to organize paid domestic workers than unpaid spouses. For a
recent set of creative proposals for doing so, see Peggie R. Smith, Organizing the
Unorganizable: Private Paid Household Workers and New Approaches to Employee
Representation (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
65. See Vincent J. Schodolski, Union Signals a Health Trend: 75,000 Home-Care
Workers Organize in L.A., Chi. Trib., Feb. 26, 1999, at 3.
66. See Michael McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal
Mobilization 3-4 (1994) (discussing comparable worth and other work rights campaigns).
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that should count as commercialized forms of household labor.67 There
may, of course, be some forms of household labor that cannot or should
not be commodified. 68 There may also be some services that average- or
low-income people cannot afford. But, there is no reason why a commer-
cialization strategy must be limited to pure market forces. Some services
could be subsidized for those who cannot afford them, or even made
available for free to everyone (like public schooling, a now universal ser-
vice that was once provided exclusively within the family setting).
Despite the fact that converting household labor into paid work col-
lectivizes it and renders it more visible and publicly accountable, femi-
nists in the movement to value housework tend to shun this approach. 60
Instead, these feminists are proposing schemes to compensate women for
performing household labor in private homes. Some legal feminists ar-
gue that (heterosexual) women's household labor provides their male
partners with the time and resources to specialize in market work, and
thus the men should compensate the women.7 0 These feminists propose
marriage-based "joint property" schemes that redistribute income from
husbands (or sometimes higher wage-earners, assumed to be husbands)
to wives (or lower wage-earners, assumed to be wives) at divorce. 7 1 Other
feminists promote state-based "welfare" strategies in which the govern-
ment pays caregiver stipends that are not tied to paid employment, but
are instead intended to permit women to choose full-time or near full-
time homemaking and child care. 72 In joint property proposals the
67. See Schor, supra note 48, at 85.
68. See generally MargaretJane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849,
1885 (1987) (arguing that commodification can do violence to some relationships).
Consciously or unconsciously, some feminists may be motivated to seek compensation for
people who care for our own kin on the ground that contracting with outsiders to do such
work corrupts family relationships. But to the extent that concerns about commodification
are justified, we should be equally concerned about the possibility that paying family
members (such as spouses or relatives) to peform such labors will corrupt those same
intimate relationships.
69. Indeed, some feminists in this movement consider market-based strategies for
valuing household labor reprehensible. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 60, at 40-48
(associating the "full commodification strategy" with careerism, misogyny against
homemakers, classism, and the decline of feminism).
70. See id. at 124-31.
71. I draw here on a term that has become popular in the literature. See Reva B.
Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household
Labor, 1850-1880, 103 Yale L.J. 1073, 1076 (1994) (defining "joint property" claims as
"wives' claims to marital assets to which husbands otherwise had tile"); see also Williams,
supra note 60, at 124-27 (advocating ajoint property strategy). For a sympathetic account
of the historical origins of joint property strategies, see Siegel, supra, at 1112-88
(describing nineteenth-century joint property demands).
72. Economist Barbara Bergmann has coined the term "full welfare strategy" to refer
to such proposals. Barbara Bergmann, Saving Our Children from Poverty: What the
United States Can Learn from France 123-24 (1996) [hereinafter Bergmann, Saving Our
Children]. Here I will simply use the term "welfare" to refer to both the relatively utopian,
generous versions of state compensation for housework and dependent care proposed by
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source of funding is the husband, while in welfare approaches it is the
state. But both strategies channel funds through the family unit to pay
women to keep house and care for our own kin.
Wittingly or unwittingly, advocates of these family-based approaches
replicate some of the same conservative assumptions that have been used
traditionally to justify women's disadvantage. Indeed, feminists in this
movement tend to rely on the human capital literature to assert that it is
women's disproportionate responsibility for housework and child care
that accounts for our lower wages and our inferior position in the
workforce. 73 Unfortunately, many of these feminists seem unaware of (or
uninformed about) the body of sociological work that casts doubt on the
validity of human capital theory.7 4 Within the social sciences, the debate
some feminists, as well as the stingier version that has traditionally been available in the
United States.
73. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo and Child Custody, 1 Rev.
L. & Women's Stud. 135, 157 & n.99 (1992) [hereinafter Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings]
(citing Fuchs and Becker for the proposition that women's economic disadvantage is partly
attributable to women's greater commitment to children); Ertman, supra note 60, at 19
n.6, 41 n.94 (citing economist Victor Fuchs for the proposition that many women
participate in the workforce in marginalized ways in order to accommodate child care and
other homemaking needs, and citing Gary Becker to suggest that married women invest in
child care and homemaking while husbands invest in market work). Although some
feminists are critical of some aspects of human capital theory, many end up relying
explicitly or implicitly on the human capital proposition that women's lower status in paid
work is attributable mainly to our greater involvement in housework and child care.
Compare Williams, supra note 60, at 14 (criticizing human capital theory for using the
language of "choice" to describe women's lower position in the labor force), with id. at 14
(positing that women's lower status is a result of women's "choice to marginalize" at work
because they cannot satisfy employers' demanding work schedules and simultaneously
meet the demands of domesticity). See also id. at 82 (advocating the human capital
position that "'[c]hoosing' women's work typically allows workers to preserve dependable
amounts of time for family life, to be able to leave market work completely without
jeopardizing their ability to return, and to follow husbands without loss of investment in
human capital"); Gillian Hadfield, Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to
Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 Geo. L.J. 89, 89-96 (1993) (criticizing economists for
assuming that women's greater housework burden is normatively justified, but accepting
and even urging the legal system to act on the human capital assumption that housework
accounts for women's labor market disadvantage).
74. Most feminist scholars in the movement to value housework do not even cite the
relevant sociological literature. Others appear to misunderstand its implications. For
example, Joan Williams has argued:
[I]f one reads studies by labor economists and lawyers, on one hand, and by
family law scholars, on the other, a striking pattern emerges. The labor literature
often minimizes the impact of women's family work on their market work, while
the family-related literature documents it in detail. Both use accurate data; they
just focus on different groups. Labor economists focus on women who perform
as ideal workers, often in traditionally male jobs. These women's workforce
participation often is not affected by their "second shift" of family work. The
family literature focuses on homemakers and women who work part-time, whose
workforce participation clearly has been affected by the division of labor at home.
Williams, supra note 60, at 15. This analysis is flawed. The research that shows that sex
segregation in employment is not attributable to women's family responsibilities is not
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is between conventional economists-who pin women's plight on our
family roles-and feminist sociologists (and sociologically-inclined econo-
mists)-who have produced evidence that discriminatory workplace dy-
namics are a more fundamental cause. 75 The sociological literature
points toward a more contextual approach that rejects static family-based
conceptions of women's difference; it shows instead that socially-con-
structed features of the workworld help create the very gender differ-
ences (manifested in work aspirations, employment patterns, and familial
divisions of labor) that human capital theory attributes to women them-
selves. 76 Such an approach creates greater possibilities for change. If the
sources of women's disadvantage lie not in sociobiological forces that
limited to a study of women who work in male dominatedjobs. The research that Williams
refers to as the "labor" literature is not-and could not be-limited to a study of women in
male-dominated jobs. The very point of the research is to determine the validity of the
human capital prediction that women with family responsibilities are more likely than
those without to occupy (or move into) female-dominated fields. This could not be
accomplished by studying only women in male-dominated fields. See supra notes 42-43;
Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1819-20 nn.256-262. Nor is the research limited
to "women who perform as ideal workers." In addition to capturing women's level of
family responsibilities through such family-related characteristics as marital status and
presence and number of children, some of the studies include measures of the number of
weeks or hours worked or continuity of labor force participation. See Jacobs, supra note
39, at 149-50 (testing for weeks employed and hours worked per week); Belier, supra note
43, at 385 (finding that, even if women had been identical to men in terms of a number of
personal characteristics-such as marital status, number of children, number of weeks
worked, part-time versus full-time status, and whether the reason for working part-time was
"home specialization"-the probability that a woman would have worked in a male-
dominated occupation would have increased by only 1.1%); Corcoran et al., supra note 43,
at 187 (testing for extensive time out and frequent interruptions). Thus, the studies
include women working part-time or interrupting their employment, who are not
Williams' "ideal workers." See Williams, supra note 60, at 15.
75. See, e.g., Barbara Bergmann, The Economic Emergence of Women 88-114
(1986) (arguing against the human capital theories of "conservative economists" and
articulating alternative explanations for sex-segregation of employment); Jacobs, supra
note 39, at 169-73 (explaining how his findings cast doubt on human capital explanations
for sex segregation); Bielby & Bielby, She Works Hard, supra note 45, at 1055-56 (noting
how their findings discredit human capital theory); England, Failure of Human Capital
Theory, supra note 37, at 365-67 (analyzing national longitudinal survey data that refute
human capital theory predictions).
76. See, e.g., Cockburn, supra note 48, at 167-97, 229-35 (arguing that male
supremacy rests on men's appropriation of new technology and sex-segregating of
technological fields through informal workplace culture); Kanter, Men and Women, supra
note 21, at 151-59, 260-64 (arguing that jobs gender people and showing how work
organizations reward women for attitudes and orientations that block their progress, while
at the same time justifying women's low status as the result of preexisting gender traits);
Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 27, at 1824-39 (reviewing sociological evidence
showing that structural features of labor markets and work organizations disempower
women, and demonstrating how Title VII law solidifies these tendencies); see also Nancy
Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition 27-33
(1997) (arguing that the best way to address gender problems is to combine a broad social




commit women more heavily to child care and housework but instead in
the political economy of paid work, we can challenge the sex bias in alleg-
edly gender-neutral forces in labor markets and work places. We can cre-
ate more empowering gender arrangements by demanding work and
working conditions that will give women more economic security, more
political clout, more household bargaining power, and perhaps even
more personal strength with which to pursue our dreams.
By contrast, in the movement to value home-based labor, some of the
literature tends to reify traditional male-breadwinner, female-homemaker
patterns in a way that closes down, rather than opens up, strategies for
change. Much of the literature assumes that housework is, and will con-
tinue to be, "women's work." 77 To explain why housework remains
largely in the hands of women, it is sometimes posited that women care
more about children and associated housework, 78 or that because of cul-
tural standards that work against us in the marriage market, women find
it almost impossible to obtain the bargaining power necessary to enlist
men in a more egalitarian division of labor in the home.79 Although
such arguments may be intended to avoid the biological reductionism
implicit in Gary Becker's notion of comparative advantage, they still end
up serving the same essentializing function. By making traditional gen-
der-based arrangements for household labor appear inevitable, these ar-
guments make it seem impossible to reshape social life to structure family
life in more egalitarian ways. Indeed, in this literature, efforts to facilitate
greater male involvement in housework are sometimes rejected as liberal
escapism.8 0 Some feminists in this camp even go so far as to re-character-
ize the traditional male breadwinner, female homemaker form of mar-
riage as "egalitarian," while dismissing alternative arrangements
grounded in the gender integration of work.8 1 Instead, the only viable
77. See, e.g., Ertman, supra note 60, at 82 (noting that despite differences in several
legal feminists' approaches "to valuing women's work in the home," they all "assume that
women (or those who are gendered female) likely will continue to do most of the
homemaking and tailor their proposals accordingly"); Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts, supra
note 60, at 98 (citing studies showing that even employed women do more housework than
their male partners and arguing that it is unrealistic to believe feminists can redistribute
housework more equally between women and men); see also Siegel, supra note 71, at 1214
("Today, as in the nineteenth century, it is women who perform the work of the family,
women who seek to escape the work, and women who eke out a living performing the
work-for other women."). This assumption begins to border on a normative assumption
as scholars decry the fact that one group of women is pawning "their" housework onto
another group of women, without even considering the possibility that men might bear
their fair share.
78. See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 73, at 142-53 (arguing that
mothers have stronger emotional attachments to children than fathers).
79. See Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is there a Future for
Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 Va. L. Rev. 509, 546-49 (1998).
80. See Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts, supra note 60, at 98-99.
81. Wax, supra note 79, at 519 (arguing that "traditional marriage is probably the least
likely to provide persuasive evidence of marital inequality").
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approach becomes the separate-but-equal one of paying women to do
housework, while leaving unexamined the broader economic and politi-
cal forces which deprive women of the bargaining power necessary to ob-
tain a more egalitarian sharing of labor in their households, and which
prevent us from building a political system that provides the public sup-
port necessary for women and men to lead more balanced lives.
Rather than simply assuming that housework will remain in the
hands of women, a more dynamic approach would investigate whether
there have been shifts toward greater male involvement over time, or in
some households; and, if so, what factors have made the difference.
There is some evidence that households in which women are employed
have a more equitable division of labor than those in which women are
not employed.8 2 Studies have found that the greater the number of
hours a woman works at her job, and the higher her earnings are relative
to her husband's, the more likely it is that they will share household labor
more equally.8 3 Contrary to popular stereotype, moreover, working-class
husbands do not do less housework relative to their spouses in compari-
son with their better-educated, middle-class counterparts.8 4 For many
heterosexual women, regardless of social class, throwing oneself into paid
work and choosing a partner who works at a job for reasonable, flexible
hours might be a way to achieve a more equitable division of household
labor.
8 5
In fact, some of the sociological literature provides evidence that
things are starting to move in a generally more egalitarian direction.8 6
There is evidence that variation among couples is increasing, with some
82. Although the evidence is mixed, some studies do find that when wives enter the
labor force, their husbands modestly increase the amount of housework they do. More
studies suggest that employed women reduce the time they spend on housework
considerably, a reduction which results in more equal division of labor. See Beth Anne
Shelton & DaphneJohn, The Division of Household Labor, 22 Ann. Rev. Soc. 299, 307-08
(1996); Erik Olin Wright et al., The Non-Effects of Class on the Gender Division of Labor
in the Home: A Comparative Study of Sweden and the United States, 6 Gender & Soc'y
252, 260 & n.11 (1992) (citing such research).
83. See, e.g., Francine M. Deutsch et al., Husbands at Home: Predictors of Paternal
Participation in Child Care and Housework, 65J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1154, 1158
(1993); Shelton &John, supra note 82, at 304-09; Myra H. Strober & Agnes Miling Kaneko
Chan, Husbands, Wives, and Housework: Graduates of Stanford and Tokyo Universities, 4
Feminist Econ. 97, 121-23 (1998).
84. See Wright et al., supra note 82, at 268-75.
85. See Rhona Mahoney, Kidding Ourselves: Breadwinning, Babies, and Bargaining
Power 139-48, 218-21 (1995). Although Mahoney has referred to this strategy as
"marrying down," see id. (emphasis added), I think feminists might refer to it more
appropriately as "coupling up."
86. According to one researcher:
Recent studies have . . . begun to identify specific areas, such as child care, for
which men's contributions have increased substantially. A few studies have even
found that the total number of hours spent on all paid and unpaid labor (not
including child care) is now about equal between husbands and wives .... In
general, American women are likely to spend fewer hours than men on the job,
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men now making larger contributions to family work.8 7 Thus, focusing
exclusively on traditional tendencies may mask variation and change. In
recent decades, it seems clear that many men have become committed to
leading more balanced lives that include active care for their homes and
families, despite the fact that employers may penalize men more than
women for doing so. A recent study found that among Stanford gradu-
ates, for example, men who did fifty percent or more of the household
work suffered a substantial earnings penalty, compared to other working
men.8 8 By contrast, among women who did half or more of the house-
work, only those who worked part-time encountered an earnings penalty.
Contrary to human capital predictions, women who worked full-time ex-
perienced no earnings penalty for doing most of the housework or for
being mothers.
Despite the wage penalty they encountered, the Stanford husbands
who shared housework equally were happy with their household division
of labor. Perhaps surprisingly, the men who shared family tasks equally
with their wives were just as satisfied with their arrangements as the men
whose wives did all or more than half those tasks (about 85% of each
group, even among couples who had children). The wives of egalitarian
husbands were also significantly happier than their more overburdened
counterparts. Among couples with children, for example, 94% of the wo-
men who shared tasks equally with their husbands were satisfied with
their arrangements, compared to only 47% of the women who did more
than half the household work.8 9 These findings are consistent with more
recent research, which suggests that it is not so much the absolute
amount of housework, 'but the inequity in the division of labor that con-
tributes the most to women's unhappiness. 90
2. Joint Property Proposals. - Such research casts doubt on the wis-
dom of family-based strategies that promote the continuation of a tradi-
tional division of labor. Feminist joint property proposals, for example,
share with human capital theory the assumption that the home and the
workplace are separate realms in which people can invest their energies,
and American men are likely to put in fewer hours than women on domestic
labor, but the total number of hours is converging....
Scott Coltrane, Family Man: Fatherhood, Housework, and Gender Equity 52 (1996)
(internal citations omitted); see also Schor, supra note 48, at 103-04 (citing evidence that
at least in some households, "there are signs that men are doing more").
87. See Coltrane, supra note 86, at 199-207. In one recent study, a quarter of the
men spent more time in household tasks than their wives, and an equal number of the
women spent more time working for pay than their husbands. See Barnett & Rivers, supra
note 20, at 178.
88. See Strober and Chan, supra note 83, at 108.
89. See id. Even among mothers who were full-time homemakers, and who might be
expected to be content with more traditional arrangements, fully 40% said they would
prefer to change their arrangement.
90. See Chloe Bird, Gender, Household Labor, and Psychological Distress: The




and that most women have male partners who can and will "support" us
adequately through wage work while we specialize in home production.
But this is fantasy.9 1 The majority of married women work for a living;
92
their paid work is indispensable to their families' well-being. Families
headed by one adult are also on the rise, with female-headed households
representing almost a quarter of all families with children. 93 In addition,
same-sex marriages have become more visible (if not more prevalent).94
Today, in the United States, more women (and men) live outside the
bonds of traditional marriage than at any previous time in American his-
tory.9 5 Indeed, there is some evidence that marriage has become a luxury
that low-income people cannot afford. 96
In the face of these trends, it is futile to attempt to revive the family-
wage system by trying to get individual men to pay their partners for tak-
ing care of the house and children. Nor should feminists desire such a
revival. As Martha Fineman has emphasized, this strategy privileges the
traditional heterosexual family, a declining family form that feminists
should be wary of reviving.97 Women receive plenty of pressure to marry
and serve their husbands in mainstream culture: Why should feminists
provide even more encouragement for women to invest in patriarchal
relationships? The truth is that women cannot afford to specialize in
homemaking at the expense of paid employment. The overwhelming
majority of women need-and want-to have jobs and children at the
same time. This is not an irrational choice or one made simply out of
financial need. A large body of literature shows that working women are
better off than full-time homemakers, as measured by a woman's physical
and psychological well-being. For women, time spent on housework, and
91. See Roberta Spalter-Roth & Heidi Hartmann, Gauging the Consequences for
Gender Relations, Pay Equity, and the Public Purse, in Contingent Workers: From
Entitlement to Privilege 69, 71 (Kathleen Barker & Kathleen Christensen eds., 1998).
92. See Arne L. Kalleberg et a]., Nonstandard Work, Substandard Jobs: Flexible Work
Arrangements in the U.S. 4 (1997) (noting that in two-thirds of married couples with
children, both parents are employed).
93. See id. at 4-5. Single mothers are even more likely than other women to be
employed year-round, full-time. See id. at 49-50 (showing that 72.1% of all single mothers
work in regular full-time jobs, compared to 65.7% of all women).
94. See Steve Friess, Gay Couples Aim to Be Counted: "Unmarried Partners" to Be
Used in Census, Sun-Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale), Mar. 6, 2000, at lB.
95. See Heidi I. Hartmann, Changes in Women's Economic and Family Roles in Post-
World War II United States, in Women, Households, and the Economy 33, 37-39 (Lourdes
Beneria & Catharine R. Stimpson eds., 1987); David Popenoe & Barbara Dafoe Whitehead,
The State of Our Unions: The Social Health of Marriage in America (June 1999) <http://
marriage.rutgers.edu/> (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
96. See Popenoe & Whitehead, supra note 95 (noting that unmarried cohabitation, as
an alternative to marriage, is more common among the "disadvantaged").
97. See Fineman, Dependencies, supra note 62, at 299-304 (explaining why policies
involving traditional family structures do not meet women's needs).
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an unequal division of household labor are associated with higher levels
of depression,9 8 anxiety, and other symptoms of psychological distress.99
In addition to the evidence that full-time homemaking can be detri-
mental, there is also affirmative evidence that paid work has positive
health effects on women (as on men). Rosalind Barnett and Caryl Rivers
review this literature in their book, She Works, He Works.100 They cite a
national longitudinal study which found that women who participated in
paid work reported better physical health and fewer emotional problems
than non-employed women.1 01 According to Barnett and Rivers:
The research is proving conclusively that paid work is good
for women. In scientific research, the more that findings can be
replicated, the more reliable they are; and these findings dove-
tail with many other studies, including the one that was the basis
for our previous book, Lifeprints. Funded by the National Sci-
ence Foundation, it studied 300 adult women and showed that
working women are significantly higher in well-being than
nonemployed women. Research clearly shows that work offers
women a chance for heightened self-esteem, a buffer against de-
pression, and enhanced mental and physical health. And this
isn't just true for women in high-powered jobs. Working-class
women get the emotional and physical benefits of working, ac-
cording to psychologists Sandra Scarr and Deborah Phillips of
the University of Virginia and Kathleen McCartney of the Uni-
versity of New Hampshire: 'Surveys of working class mothers,
with jobs as waitresses, factory workers and domestics, show that
these women are quite committed to their jobs, satisfied with
their diverse roles, and would not leave the labor force even if
they did not need the money.'
Work, they say, offers these women adult companionship,
social contacts, and connection with the wider world that they
cannot get at home.
10 2
98. See Bird, supra note 90, at 41; Shelton & John, supra note 82, at 315-16.
99. See Barnett & Rivers, supra note 20, at 34-38; Grace K. Baruch, The Psychological
Well-Being of Women in the Middle Years, in Women in Midlife 161, 170-73 (Grace
Baruch & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1984); Nancy E. Betz & Louise F. Fitzgerald, The
Career Psychology of Women 192-93 (1987).
100. See Barnett & Rivers, supra note 20, at 29.
101. See Ingrid Waldron & Jerry A. Jacobs, Effects of Labor Force Participation on
Women's Health: New Evidence from a Longitudinal Study, 30J. Occupational Med. 977,
981-82 (1988); see also Elaine Wethington & Ronald C. Kessler, Employment, Parental
Responsibility, and Psychological Distress, 10J. Fam. Issues 527, 532 (1989) (finding in a 3-
year study of 745 married women that those who engaged in paid work had better
emotional health than women who were not employed).
102. Barnett & Rivers, supra note 20, at 29; see also Carol Sanger, Separating from
Children, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 375, 481-83 (1996) ("It appears that mothers work for many
of the same reasons as fathers do: to provide or supplement family income, to achieve a
sense of self-worth and financial independence, to accomplish a goal in a chosen area of
interest, and for the satisfactions of adult contact and interaction.").
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Sociologist Myra Marx Ferree, a leading researcher in this area, confirms
these results for working-class women. She has found that even "among
working-class women, being employed is associated with greater happi-
ness." 103 According to Ferree, " [w]orking-class women are not 'more sat-
isfied' with full-time housework," whether they are compared to working-
class employed women or to middle-class housewives. 10 4 Thus, contrary
to an argument that is sometimes made by legal feminists in the move-
ment to value housework, 10 5 " [ t]he inference that the demonstrably less
attractive jobs potentially open to a working-class woman make her more
likely to appreciate staying home is clearly undermined by [the] data."
10 6
For those of us who study work, such findings are not surprising.
Housework may offer those who do it some autonomy. But, at least as
housework is presently organized, that autonomy is offset by isolation
from peers, the inherent monotony and repetitious quality of some as-
pects of the work, and a lack of control that comes from feeling that one
is always "on call."1 0 7 If one compares housework to paid work, it be-
comes apparent that full-time homemaking is the only job in which the
worker is expected to be on duty twenty-four hours a day. Our labor laws
limit working hours for all other forms of work, and with good reason:
People need relief not only from sheer overwork, but also from the pres-
sure that comes from having no other activity with which to "buffer" our-
selves from the stress of any endeavor. Some of this research suggests
that the greatest benefits accrue to women (as well as men) who combine
paid work with family commitments.10 8 Indeed, buried beneath the argu-
ments decrying women's "double day" lies a vibrant literature that em-
phasizes the pleasure and power of multiple roles.10 9 Acknowledging the
benefits of multiple roles does not mean denying that many women (and
103. Myra Marx Ferree, Class, Housework, and Happiness: Women's Work and Life
Satisfaction, 11 Sex Roles 1057, 1068 (1984) [hereinafter Feree, Class, Housework, and
Happiness].
104. Id. at 1073.
105. See Joan Williams, Implementing Antiessentialism: How Gender Wars Turn into
Race and Class Conflict, 15 Harv. BlackLetterJ. 41, 49-50, 55-57 (1999).
106. Ferree, Class, Housework, and Happiness, supra note 103, at 1068.
107. Barnett & Rivers, supra note 20, at 34-38.
108. See id. at 111-12; Baruch, supra note 99, at 170-78 (concluding that women with
the highest level of well-being were employed, married, and had children); Faye J. Crosby,
Juggling: The Unexpected Advantages of Balancing Career and Home for Women and
Their Families 86-87 (1991); cf. David L. Chambers, Accommodation and Satisfaction:
Women and Men Lawyers and the Balance of Work and Family, 14 L. & Soc. Inquiry 251,
252 (1989) (finding that of all female lawyers, married women with children were most
satisfied).
109. See, e.g., Stephen R. Marks, Multiple Roles and Role Strain: Some Notes on
Human Energy, Time and Commitment, 42 Am. Soc. Rev. 921, 921-36 (1977) (proposing
a theory that takes into account the energy-producing as well as energy-consuming aspects
of multiple roles); Peggy A. Thoits, Multiple Identities and Psychological Well-Being: A
Reformulation and Test of the Social Isolation Hypothesis, 48 Am. Soc. Rev. 174, 174-79
(1983) (concluding that social isolation decreases psychological well-being, whereas
multiple roles or "identities" provide an actor with "purpose, meaning, direction, and
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men) may experience an overload, but it does suggest that feminists
should not focus exclusively on the hardships associated with juggling
work and family: We should also be mindful of the rewards. 110
It also suggests that feminists should be wary of paths to "valuing
housework" that encourage women to concentrate on housework and
child care at the expense of a deep commitment to paid work. In light of
the importance of wage earning to citizenship in our history, solutions
that focus on spousal income-sharing inevitably cast the husband (or
higher-earning spouse) as the "boss," and the homemaker (or the lower-
earning spouse who is presumed to do most of the housework) as the
employeeI1 1 -a dependency relation that is difficult enough to transpose
into the family, but made even worse by the fact that in this context, the
"employee" is stripped of the social recognition, the peer solidarity, and
the potential for collective organizing that have characterized most em-
ployees in traditional paid workplaces. 12 As Rhona Mahoney has empha-
sized, women are better off if we bring to our intimate relationships an
independent means of economic wherewithal and social support that can
provide us with an external source of bargaining power, an alternative
avenue for self-esteem and solidarity, and a credible (and real) potential
for exit.
113
Although some feminists oppose a collectivization strategy because
they believe it promotes class bias, 114 joint property proposals merely in-
troduce a different-and more problematic-form of class bias. As
Martha Fineman has emphasized, such marriage-based approaches fail to
provide for those who perform housework outside the bounds of the
traditional heterosexual family,' 15 such as never-married mothers and gay
and lesbian partners, who are a growing proportion of all families. Al-
though this is obviously a heterosexist omission, it is a class-based omis-
sion as well: Never-married mothers face perhaps the highest burdens of
care and have the lowest level of resources of all demographic groups;
guidance"); see also Crosby, supra note 108, at 84-110 (explaining the practical and
psychological benefits of combining paid work and parenting).
110. See Crosby, supra note 108, at 59-110.
111. Cf. Siegel, supra note 71, at 1192-93 (arguing that after the Civil War, as
industrialization and wage work took greater hold in the economy, feminists began to
articulate joint property proposals in terms of the market idiom of compensation from the
husband/boss to the wife/employee).
112. See Kittay, supra note 62, at 141-43 (arguing that a family-based system, such as a
joint property proposal, requires one spouse wealthy enough to compensate the caregiving
spouse while placing that spouse at an extreme disadvantage with respect to bargaining
power and exit options).
113. See Mahoney, supra note 85, at 44-45.
114. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 60, at 162-63 (apparently assuming that a
collectivization strategy must involve moneyed women hiring private nannies and
housekeepers, and arguing that there is race and class bias implicit in such arrangements).
115. See Fineman, Dependencies, supra note 62, at 300, 302-04.
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lesbian couples, too, earn less than their heterosexual married counter-
parts (due to sex discrimination in earnings).
116
In addition, although joint property proponents often argue that
housework should be placed on an equal footing with wage work,' 17 they
do not actually propose that homemakers be treated the same as those
who perform such services for a living. For example, some feminists in
this tradition consider it inappropriate (perhaps even offensive) to pay a
homemaker-spouse the same wage as a paid housekeeper. 118 Instead,
joint property feminists tie homemakers' pay to their spouses' income-a
methodology that introduces severe class bias. The wife of a high-level
executive who gets one-half his earnings for caring for the house and kids
is paid much more than the wife of a janitor, for example, even though
both wives may be doing essentially the same work.11 9 The executive's
wife would also earn a considerably higher wage than her own hired
116. See Marieka M. Klawitter and Victor Flatt, The Effects of State and Local
Antidiscrimination Policies on Earnings for Gays and Lesbians, 17 J. of Pol'y Analysis and
Mgmt. 658, 662 (1998) ("Gender still has a large impact on earnings, and its effects are
doubly felt within same-sex couples."); id. at 670 (showing how female same-sex couples
earn less than married couples); see also M. V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual
Orientation Discrimination, 48 Indus. & Lab. Rel Rev. 726, 737 (1995) (showing that
lesbian and bisexual women earn 12% to 30% less than heterosexual women, although this
number declines "greatly in size and significance when occupation and a selection bias
correction are taken into account").
117. See Williams, supra note 60, at 231 (arguing that "[e]qual-parenting policies
should . . . focus as much on entitlements for caregivers as on entitlements for workers"
and should "avoid eliminating entitlements for caregivers in the name of equal-parenting
goals"); Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts, supra note 60, at 70 (arguing that we should put
"home labor on an equal footing with wage labor").
118. Reva Siegel's piece contains some wonderful historical illustrations of this
attitude. See Siegel, supra note 71. She relates, for example, how Anna Howard Shaw,
then president of the National American Woman Suffrage Association, drew on joint
property advocacy to argue for the economic value of a wife's household labor. Shaw not
only argued that a wife's labor was worth more than a hired housekeeper's; she defended
that view by suggesting that a "wife who presided over a complex of servants did no more
manual labor than the 'president of an insurance company,' but her work of
superintendence was as valuable as his." Id. at 1207. It is obvious that Shaw is drawing on
the class conventions of the day, in which wives were viewed as the superiors of the servants
they supervised. What may be less obvious is the irony involved. Typically, joint property
advocates argued that wives should be paid more than housekeepers on the ground that
the labor market embodied sex-discrimination against the latter-an anti-market view. See
id. at 1127-35. Yet, Shaw drew on the very market valuation that joint property advocates
condemned in arguing that a wife should be paid a manager's salary rather than a
servant's. In addition to the deep gender and class bias embedded in this comparison, it
probably also drew on emergent Taylorist notions of the superiority of mental as opposed
to manual labor. See infra note 287.
119. Indeed, there is evidence that poor wives and mothers have to work much harder
to care for their families, because they have to stretch their meager resources so thin. See
Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and Their Children, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 817,
829-30 (1994); Silbaugh, Labor into Love, supra note 60, at 71. In addition, they have to
protect their children from crime and other hazards that plague impoverished
neighborhoods. See Fineman, Dependencies, supra note 62, at 305.
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household workers, who do just as much work as she does. Joint property
proponents sometimes defend higher payments for spouses on the
ground that domestic workers are underpaid (which of course they
are).120 But the answer to this problem lies in collective solutions such as
unionization, affirmative action, pay equity, and wage subsidies for low-
wage workers-not in legitimating the class differential between domestic
workers and homemakers by paying the latter more for the same services.
Ultimately, then, despite the concern for working-class and poor wo-
men expressed by joint property proponents,12 1 marriage-based solutions
for "valuing housework" tend to replicate the same old class-based, family-
wage system upheld by conservatives and human capital theorists. Joint
property proponents argue that collectivizing housework creates class di-
visions between the women who hire out child care and household work
and the women who do such work for a living. 122 But, in reality, the
collectivization strategy may promote solidarity among high- and low-in-
come women, as working for a living provides both groups of women with
a common set of experiences that can bridge class differences and allow
women to identify with each other as working women. 123 At times in our
120. See, e.g., Ertman, supra note 60, at 21 (noting that feminists have criticized
proposals to value housework through replacement cost and even opportunity cost models
on the ground that such proposals fail to account for the benefits primary wage earners
reap from their spouses' services); Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's
Household Labor, Yale J.L. & Feminism 81, 120 (1997) (arguing that "there is a concrete
risk that the deflated wages of the paid domestic worker will be used to estimate the value
of unpaid work" by homemakers); cf. Siegel, supra note 71, at 1127-35 (documenting how
nineteenth-century joint property proponents used the fact that the labor market
discriminatorily depressed working women's wages as an argument for why homemakers
should not be paid a market wage).
121. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 60, at 150-76 (arguing that the "full-
commodification model" benefits privileged white women over white working-class women
and women of color); Ertman, supra note 60, at 54, 87 (arguing that proposed premarital
security agreements could benefit low-income women by reducing the marital debt
allocated to primary homemakers). But see id. at 21 n.13 (acknowledging that feminists of
color have criticized the assumption of an ideal worker-primary homemaker family as a
"white, middle- or upper-middle class template").
122. See Williams, supra note 60, at 162-63; cf. Siegel, supra note 71, at 1190
(characterizing nineteenth-century feminists' call to enable two-career marriage by
collectivizing housework as a move that introduced class distinctions among women).
123. Although there are many obvious differences in their situations, women from all
socioeconomic backgrounds experience many of the same forms of sex discrimination on
the job. For example, women from across the occupational and educational spectrum
experience gender-based limits on hiring and promotional opportunity and discriminatory
wages and working conditions (including harassment). See generally Jacobs, supra note
39, at 41 (showing that sex segregation affects women at all educational levels even though
it has declined the most in recent years among well-educated women); Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Harassment, supra note 55, at 1722-29 (documenting sex
discrimination and harassment against women who work in both low- and high-status
occupations). Furthermore, there is evidence that working for a living creates shared
interests among women, who unite across class boundaries to hold feminist views that are
significantly less likely to be held by homemakers. See infra text accompanying notes
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history, such cross-class alliances between women (and men) have oc-
curred. 12 4 In contrast, the family-wage system upon which joint property
proposals build was characterized by striking divisions among women.
The ideology of domesticity reconciled middle- and upper-class home-
makers to their position by encouraging them to make class- and gender-
based distinctions between themselves and working women-who were
not considered "true women." At the same time, it obscured the condi-
tions of women in the marketplace andjustified the exploitation of immi-
grant, African-American, and white working-class women as the predict-
able, even deserved, fate of those who dared to venture out of the proper
feminine sphere into the world of wage labor. 125 By encouraging middle-
class women to create identities based primarily in motherhood and do-
mesticity at the expense of paid work, contemporary joint property pro-
posals harken back to such nineteenth-century ideologies.
3. Traditional Welfare Strategies. - Joint-property approaches are not
alone in reproducing harmful gender- and class-based dynamics; tradi-
tional welfare strategies can be detrimental to women as well. Joint prop-
erty approaches rely on individual breadwinners to fund household la-
bor, while welfare strategies rely on the state. State funding is
advantageous for women, 126 because it frees them from serving individual
men and sheds class bias by funding household work at a uniform level
regardless of the earnings of the family members who support it. None-
319-320 (citing evidence that working women have been more likely than homemakers to
support a variety of feminist causes, including the Equal Rights Amendment).
124. Early in the twentieth century, for example, professional women united with
their working-class sisters to support labor struggles and other rights designed to promote
women's capacity for economic improvement and independence from men. See Nancy F.
Cott, The Grounding of Modem Feminism 23-36 (1987) (describing alliances between
labor movement, working-class women and more elite women activists in the suffrage
movement, who saw "wage-earners (especially trade unionists) [as] exemplars of
independent womanhood"). These same groups also worked together across class
boundaries to support women's sexual freedom and freedom of expression. See Christine
Stansell, American Moderns: Bohemian New York and the Creation of a New Century
73-144, 225-46 (2000) (describing similar cross-class alliances among feminists and
bohemians in Greenwich Village in the 1910s, who actively supported labor struggles, free
speech campaigns, birth control, and other campaigns to promote women's sexual
freedom and the freedom to pursue paid work); see also infra note 192 and accompanying
text (documenting cross-class alliances among women in Second Wave feminist
movements that emerged in the 1960s).
125. See Jonathan A. Glickstein, Concepts of Free Labor in Antebellum America
182-84 (1991) (noting that "the cult of domesticity" obscured the deplorable labor
conditions faced by many women and strengthened public inertia and apathy toward such
conditions by rationalizing labor exploitation of immigrant and free black women who
confirmed their lack of respectability by leaving their natural domestic sphere); Alice
Kessler-Harris, Women, 'Work and the Social Order, in Liberating Women's History 330,
333-37 (Berenice A. Carroll ed., 1976) (emphasizing that the ideology of separate spheres
legitimated the relegation of working-class women to low-paying menial jobs).
126. See, e.g., Fineman, Dependencies, supra note 62, at 299-304 (arguing that
caretaking should not be supported economically by husbands within traditional
marriage).
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theless, by paying women to stay home with their children rather than
providing real support for parents (especially single parents) to work at
paidjobs, welfare strategies still encourage women to invest in homemak-
ing and caregiving to the exclusion of their job skills-which may harm
women and their families in the long run. For this reason, in the wake of
changes to the traditional Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) system, 12 7 a number of feminists are proposing alternatives de-
signed to enable low-income mothers and fathers-along with their mid-
dle-class counterparts-to participate in parenting and paid work at the
same time, and to improve the status of the work they do.
Feminist economist Barbara Bergmann, for example, has criticized
the traditional AFDC program for creating a disincentive to employment
that hurts women in the long run. 128 She advocates a system more like
the French system, which eliminates this disincentive by providing single
parents with better support for working at a job while parenting. In
France, according to Bergmann, a single mother who takes a job can do
far better than her American counterpart-and better, too, than her
French counterpart who stays home full-time to care for her children. In
addition to receiving a comparatively higher wage than in the U.S. (due
to a higher minimum wage), the French mother who goes to work will
not lose her health insurance, and she will pay little or nothing for high-
quality child care that is coveted even by the middle classes. In France,
says Bergmann, "[a] single mother and her children do not have to live in
poverty. With a job, she can support them at a decent standard." 29
Bergmann's analysis shows that, despite its facial neutrality, the tradi-
tional American welfare approach has harmful class and gender effects.
Single mothers are likely to remain poor no matter what they do, whether
they work at paid jobs or not. In addition, Bergmann points out, paying
single mothers to care for their children raises demands to support mar-
ried middle-class women's homemaking, which only exacerbates class dif-
ferentials and further reinforces the gender-based division of labor.
1 30
To move the United States in a more promising direction, Bergmann has
proposed a program called "Help for Working Parents," which would
provide low-income parents (single or married) the resources to combine
paid work with parenting. The program would provide universal health
insurance (on a sliding scale), child care vouchers (for public or private
forms of child care), food stamps, and expanded housing assistance for
127. See infra note 203.
128. In the United States, under AFDC, according to Bergmann, a low-skilled single
parent had no incentive to leave AFDC for a paid job. After paying for child care, the
mother would earn no more-and might even earn less-than she did on welfare. In
addition, if she went out to work, she would lose her health insurance, and her job would
not be likely to provide it. The result is a real risk that a serious illness would place her
family in financial ruin. See Bergmann, Saving Our Children, supra note 72, at 12-13,
91-94.
129. Id. at 12.
130. See id. at 123-24.
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high-cost areas. Perhaps most importantly, it would also provide govern-
ment subsidies to bring individual earnings above the poverty level.
13 '
The proposal contemplates that, like most fathers, mothers will engage in
full-time work; however, full-time work is defined as thirty hours a week-
a substantial reduction from the current norm for American men and
women. 132
Feminist political theorist Nancy Fraser has also criticized the welfare
model for reasons that are remarkably similar to Bergmann's, despite
their different points of departure.' 33 Fraser even takes issue with a re-
markably utopian version of the welfare approach-one more generous
than we have come close to achieving in the United States-that she calls
a "Caregiver Parity" model. 134 As Fraser describes the model:
The point is to enable women with significant domestic respon-
sibilities to support themselves and their families either through
carework alone or through carework plus part-time employ-
ment .... Thus, childbearing, child rearing, and informal do-
mestic labor are to be elevated to parity with formal paid
labor....
To this end, several major new programs are necessary.
One is a program of caregiver allowances to compensate
childbearing, child rearing, housework, and other forms of so-
cially necessary domestic labor; the allowances must be suffi-
ciently generous at the full-time rate to support a family ....
Also required is a program of workplace reforms [to] facilitate
the possibility of combining supported carework with part-time
employment and of making transitions between different life-
states.
135
Like Bergmann, Fraser condemns even such a well-intentioned
model on the ground that it reinforces the gender-based division of labor
in ways that harm poor women the most, but ultimately hurt all women.
"Although the system of allowances-plus-wages provides the equivalent of
a basic minimum breadwinner wage, it also institutes a 'mommy track' in
employment-a market in flexible, noncontinuous full- and/or part-time
131. See id. at 124-30.
132. See id. Bergmann's program was developed jointly with feminist Heidi
Hartmann, the head of the Women's Public Policy Institute. See Barbara Bergmann &
Heidi Hartmann, A Welfare Reform Based on Help for Working Parents 1 Feminist Econ.
85 (1995).
133. Fraser criticizes what she calls a "Universal Breadwinner" model, which
encourages women to work the same full-time hours as men, on the ground that it
reinforces androcentric breadwinner norms and reduces time for leisure and civic activities
for everyone. See Fraser, supra note 76, at 51-55. Bergmann does not advance a similar
critique; her work might even be said to embody Fraser's Universal Breadwinner approach.
As I try to make clear in the text, however, I think Fraser and Bergmann are closer to each
other than they are to many other feminists. Both understand the significance of paid
work to women's lives; and both take seriously the need to dismantle gender-based
patterns of paid work in order to achieve a more egalitarian society.
134. See id. at 55.
135. Id. at 55-56.
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jobs [which] will pay considerably less even at the full-time rate than com-
parable breadwinner-track jobs."136 As a result, Fraser concludes, the
model will perpetuate current patterns of income inequality. Even
though the model, according to Fraser, aims to "make difference
costless," 137 the model actually promotes women's marginalization by re-
producing the link between caregiving and femininity, on the one hand,
and breadwinning and masculinity, on the other.'
38
Thus, both political theorist Nancy Fraser and economist Barbara
Bergmann are concerned that even a generous welfare model would rep-
licate the undesirable features of the old family-wage system. Both be-
lieve we can do better by creating social systems that enable people to
combine paid work with caregiving and improve and desegregate low-
wage work. Like Bergmann, Fraser advocates vigorous steps to eliminate
the gender segregation ofjobs and to provide generous social support for
job-holding. Her vision is similar to Bergmann's, except that Fraser ar-
gues explicitly for reducing the amount of time both men and women
devote to paid work so that we can all be more active participants in fam-
ily life, political activity, and civic endeavors. Fraser quotes approvingly
from the Swedish Ministry of Labor: "To make it possible for both men
and women to combine parenthood and gainful employment, a new view
of the male role and a radical change in the organization of working life
are required." 13 9 In such a world, the "employment sector would not be
divided into two different tracks; all jobs would be designed for workers
who are caregivers, too; all would have a shorter workweek than full-time
jobs have now; and all would have the support of employment-enabling
services."'140 Creating such a world would require us to dismantle the
gendered association of men with paid work and women with child care
and housework. It would require us to fully envision men as committed
caregivers and women as authentic workers-something which even
some feminists, let alone many other men and women, have not yet been
able to do.
This is unsurprising, for family-wage ideology is such a deeply-in-
grained part of our heritage that it remains difficult to recast women's
(and men's) roles as workers and citizens in such transformative terms.
As historian Linda Gordon has shown, even most late nineteenth and
136. Id. at 57.
137. Id. at 55.
138. As Fraser puts it:
By supporting women's informal carework, it reinforces the view of such work as
women's work and consolidates the gender division of domestic labor. By
consolidating dual labor markets for breadwinners and caregivers, moreover, the
model marginalizes women within the employment sector. By reinforcing the
association of caregiving with femininity, finally, it may also impede women's
participation in other spheres of life, such as politics and civil society.
Id. at 58.
139. Id. at 62.
140. Id. at 61.
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early twentieth-century women's rights activists who were instrumental in
creating the modem welfare state were "maternalists" who based their
approach on the family-wage system. 141 These feminists' acceptance of a
gendered system of labor limited their vision of "welfare" to a system that
paid women to stay home and take care of children (such a system was
understood to be temporary, anyway, since the beneficiaries were
imagined to be widows who would eventually remarry), rather than a sys-
tem that enabled both women-and men-to take care of their families
while at the same time engaging in paid work. Some reformers under-
stood that the family wage was a myth, and that "mothers' aid would be
only a poor substitute for insisting on decent wages" for working wo-
men. 14 2 But the most prominent activists' adherence to family-wage ide-
ology blinded them to the need for broader governmental policies that
would enable women to work to support families on our own, such as
better jobs and job training, wage subsidies, and collectivized child care.
It was left to less mainstream activists to call for these and other measures
that envisioned wage work as an important component of women's lives
and identities, and, more radical still, of their independence from
men.
14 3
4. The Legacy of Family-Wage Thinking. - Because of the close links
between work, citizenship, and identity, our historic failure to take wo-
men seriously as workers has prevented us from incorporating women as
full citizens or human beings. Even when we enact laws that recognize
and seek to equalize women's work roles, the remnants of family-wage
ideology creep into the law and deplete much of its transformative poten-
tial. This is not to say that legal reforms have not helped: They have, just
not enough. After thirty-five years of civil rights enforcement, many wo-
men are still scrambling for low-paying, often temporary or part-time,
jobs that don't come close to providing a living wage or decent bene-
fits. 1 44 We are left to patch together care for our children, catch as catch-
can, with little or no help from our employers or our government.
Whether we work in the highest echelons of the professions or the lowest
levels of service provision, our place toward the bottom of the hierarchy is
rationalized by denying our capacity for agency as workers. Highly-
trained professionals who are discriminatorily relegated to second-class
status or driven out of their fields altogether are labeled "mommy track-
ers," who decline the legitimate demands of the professions to fulfill their
141. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 53-59; see also Sonya Michel, The Limits of
Maternalism: Policies Toward American Wage-Earning Mothers During the Progressive
Era, in Mothers of a New World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States 277,
277-78 (Seth Koven & Sonya Michel eds., 1993) (discussing maternalist political activism).
142. Gordon, supra note 1, at 62.
143. See id. at 135-37, 142, 236-38.
144. See Kalleberg et al., supra note 92, at 1-3.
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natural domestic roles.1 45 Less privileged women (particularly women of
color) are not only described, but denigrated, as creatures of an inferior
culture-a characterization which serves to legitimate their low position
in the labor force.
14 6
Whether women's lack of agency as workers is romanticized as the
expression of middle-class domesticity or denigrated as the product of an
inferior culture, 14 7 the stereotype of women as inauthentic workers sup-
presses all the ways in which women's lives are fundamentally shaped-
and can be reshaped in more transformative ways-in connection with
our work.
III. CHANGES IN THE MAKING
Meanwhile, the organization and structure of work is changing in
dramatic, world-rupturing ways. We are living through a time when work-
ing life-and along with it, the rest of social life-is undergoing great
changes that are comparable in magnitude to the shifts of the Industrial
Revolution. As corporations seek more flexible forms of production and
labor around the globe, more and more people face greater job insecu-
rity and less ability to shape their lives through a coherent narrative in-
volving a commitment to work performed in stable settings over the
course of a lifetime. It isn't simply women, racial minorities, or other low-
wage workers who are experiencing the new insecurities: The changes
are affecting all but those at the very top. To put the point sharply, al-
most all workers are in danger of becoming "women," in the sense that
they are experiencing the problems and dilemmas that women have tra-
ditionally faced with respect to paid work.
145. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., The Part-Time Paradox: Time Norms, Professional
Lives, Family, and Gender 83, 86-87 (1999) [hereinafter, Epstein, Part-Time Paradox];
Fraser, supra note 76, at 57.
146. As Patricia Zavella has shown, for example, Chicana women are often depicted as
traditional and family-oriented, a characterization that draws on an essentialized notion of
Mexican-American culture and women's position within it in order to legitimate their
menial position in the labor force. See Patricia Zavella, Women's Work and Chicano
Families: Cannery Workers of the Santa Clara Valley 15 (1987) (noting that "the ideology
of family reinforce [s] Chicanas' subordination").
147. When it suits corporate interests, poor women are objectified as things, fit only
for the most menial types of labor. Mexican women in places like the Maquiladora plants
are reified as "nimble fingers," fit (indeed, made) for repetitive, mind-numbing, body-
destroying work, as recent work by Alicia Schmidt Camacho makes clear. Alicia Schmidt
Camacho, On the Borders of Solidarity: Race and Gender Contradictions in Contestations
to Global Capitalism 8-9 (Dec. 15, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review). Essentializing poor women of color as extensions of the machine or
expressions of the machine or the mop and pail is another way of suppressing their agency
as workers so as to deny room for empowerment.
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A. New Trends
The changes are too complex to describe fully here; and, of course,
to some extent, different things are happening in various sectors of the
economy. Nonetheless, some general trends are emerging.148 In the
transition to a global, service-based economy, the old large-scale bureau-
cratic institution that gave people the chance to move up on internal
career ladders, as they accumulated experience and seniority, is dying. In
its place, we are witnessing an emergence of newer organizations that are
transforming production and personhood along with it. The hallmark of
the new order is flexibility-the capacity to change quickly to new prod-
uct demands and changing business conditions. Corporations are going
"from fat to lean," as "assumptions have shifted away from 'big is better'
to 'smaller is beautiful'-and more flexible." 14 9 Many organizations have
eliminated middle-management and nonessential workers, subcontracted
out a variety of internal services, and begun to rely on overtime and con-
tingent workers instead of adding new full-time staff.150 "In place of orga-
nizations as pyramids, management wants now to think of organizations
as networks."
1 5 1
In the abstract, at least some of these changes have the potential to
be empowering. As the classic critiques of modern, large-scale organiza-
tions made clear, life in the bureaucratic office and Fordist factory could
be stultifying. At the top, the high degree of uncertainty made trust a
crucial component of managerial jobs. The need for trust bred discrimi-
natory pressures toward social homogeneity-as opposed to merit-in
hiring and promotion, and deadening pressures toward conformity-as
opposed to creativity-in performance. At the bottom, many people
stuck in dead-end jobs became dispirited and adjusted their aspirations
downward, which only served to rationalize their situation. Along the
way, the pyramid squeeze produced more qualified candidates than
openings, which permitted companies to bypass controversial candidates,
particularly those marked by gender, race, or class difference. The pow-
erless were caught in "highly routinized, rules-bound jobs," located "at
148. See Eileen Appelbaum & Rosemary Batt, The New American Workplace:
Transforming Work Systems in the United States (1994) (surveying innovations in
management methods and forms of work organization through 1994); Bennett Harrison,
Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility
(1994) (documenting new organization of firms, suppliers, and customers, and showing
that the new economy is not dominated by small firms); Rosabeth Moss Kanter, When
Giants Learn to Dance: Mastering the Challenge of Strategy, Management, and Careers in
the 1990s (1989) (discussing strategies to face these trends); Sennett, supra note 18
(arguing that the decline of stable employment threatens people's ability to form coherent
narratives for their lives).
149. Kanter, Men and Women, supra note 21, at 290.
150. See id.
151. Sennett, supra note 18, at 23.
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the periphery, in backwater positions not seen as critical for solving rele-
vant problems."
152
If this picture of the traditional corporation looks reactionary, the
Fordist factory looks even more retrograde. By subdividing the produc-
tion process into smaller and smaller units that required little thought or
judgment, managers learned that they could extract more and more pro-
ductivity out of those who did the work. In addition to forcing workers'
bodies into conformity with the discipline of the governing machinery
(whether through the line or through the operating system), manage-
ment could also impose the discipline of de-skilling by eroding the
craftworker's integrated knowledge of the production process as a
whole.
153
From this vantage point, it might appear liberating to kill off the
traditional hierarchical corporation, and replace it with decentralized in-
stitutions. In an ideal world, managers, once stripped of the formal au-
thority that their old hierarchical positions gave them, would have to earn
the respect of those they supervise in order to have influence and leader-
ship. Line-level workers would also face new incentives: Rather than
moving up along an internal career ladder mechanistically with the ac-
cumulation of seniority and minimally satisfactory performance, promo-
tions would depend on working harmoniously and productively with their
peers to produce better results. In fact, the reward for good performance
would not lie always in moving "upward," but instead in moving outward,
horizontally, to acquire deeper and richer knowledge of the business.
Through the experience of working together in teams and making lateral
enrichment moves, employees could regain the craft knowledge, collec-
tively, that management once stole from them. Rather than being drones
beholden to one organization or one narrow notion of vocation, people
would be free to become nomadic entrepreneurs, who move from firm to
firm and even position to position in order to exploit good opportunities
as they come along and diversify their "human capital" portfolio. Even
better, in this brave new world, both managers and workers would have to
shed themselves of prejudice and intolerance, for working harmoniously
with diverse groups of people would be a premium.
B. New Threats
Despite these rosy predictions, there are reasons to be concerned-
even alarmed-about the changes that are actually occurring. Among
those who are informed, powerful voices warn that the new trends harbor
some profoundly negative consequences for social and individual life.
Bennett Harrison and Richard Sennett, for example, have emphasized
152. Kanter, Men and Women, supra note 21, at 293.
153. See Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work
in the Twentieth Century (1974); Katherine Stone, The Origins of Job Structures in the
Steel Industry, 6 Rev. Radical Pol. Econ. 113, 115-23 (1974).
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the dark side of flexible capitalism, which they see as committed above all
else to the idea of reducing fixed labor costs in the name of facilitating
newness and change: "No long term."1 54 Harrison's work shows that,
contrary to popular pronouncement, there is no renaissance of small
firms that can be celebrated under the rubric, "Small is beautiful."
Instead, large firms are reorganizing by cutting their own core produc-
tion functions to the bone. and organizing decentralized networks that
they dominate-a phenomenon he calls "concentration without
centralization."'
155
In Sennett's view, this shift toward decentralization has not meant
greater freedom and autonomy for most workers, but simply a different,
and perhaps more debilitating, form of power and discipline. Many of
the commands people once negotiated with their immediate supervisors
have been embedded into systems technology or are simply handed down
in the form of directives from on high. In a reverse spin on the tradi-
tional trend toward ever finer divisions of labor, top management now
loads onto small work groups an ever-increasing, diverse set of tasks, in-
structing workers to meet unattainable goals without providing anyone to
train or supervise them in how to do so.
Nor does decentralization necessarily restore the craft element by
allowing workers to regain integrated knowledge of the process. All too
often, according to Sennett, even teamwork promotes a kind of "demean-
ing superficiality" as people are encouraged to develop "soft skills" that
remain on the surface of experience, rather than acquiring substantive
knowledge that deepens with accumulated engagement. 15 6 In some envi-
ronments, management's promises to take workers and their ideas seri-
ously have proven to be empty. At Subaru-Isuzu, for example, manage-
ment's egalitarian rhetoric was largely a facade. 15 7 Calling the workers by
the same title and having them all wear the same clothes and eat in the
same lunchroom did not produce equality. Team leaders often ruled dic-
tatorially and, on matters like work scheduling, associates' input was com-
pletely disregarded. Associates who attempted to provide input on such
issues were told that "[t] he company only takes input from Associates on
subjects the company chooses."' 58 Although the company was supposed
to provide a formal forum for discussing associates' suggestions, the time
was actually used by managers to announce productivity statistics from
the previous day-a practice that employees resented bitterly.
159
154. Sennett, supra note 18, at 22; see Harrison, supra note 148, at 8.
155. Harrison, supra note 148, at 9.
156. Sennett, supra note 18, at 98-99.
157. See Laurie Graham, On the Line at Subaru-Isuzu: The Japanese Model and the
American Worker 58-61 (1995).
158. Id.
159. See id. at 59-60. Ruth Milkman has documented similar dynamics at the
General Motors (GM) plant in Linden, New Jersey. See Ruth Milkman, Farewell to the
Factory: Auto Workers in the Late Twentieth Century (1997). After a major
reorganization that eliminated the jobs of many workers, GM promised a new company
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Some of the new forms of work organization can also have negative
consequences for employee solidarity. Rather than being a bottom-up
initiative that allows workers to participate more fully in production deci-
sions, teamwork is often part of a larger system designed to indoctrinate
workers into a carefully orchestrated, top-down organizational culture in
which workers compete with each other for management's favor. One
researcher found that "[p]eer pressure from other workers . . .took the
place of bosses cracking the whip... ; the fiction of cooperating employ-
ees served the company's relentless drive for ever greater productivity."' 6
Despite a benign image of teamwork as something that fosters harmoni-
ous relations among co-workers, teamwork can actually foster cut-throat
competition among teams and among individuals within teams-without
the traditional safeguards against harassment and discrimination that ac-
company more formal work structures.
More systematic empirical research documents other negative conse-
quences of the new forms of organization. Paul Osterman has studied
large private firms that adopted high performance practices such as self-
managed work teams, job rotation, quality circles (or other off-line prob-
lem-solving groups), and total quality management. Consistent with ex-
pectations, Osterman found that these practices had spread quickly in the
1990s. 16 1 Among economists and management experts, there was wide-
spread anticipation that these trends would prove to be win-win for both
culture in which workers would be treated with a new-found respect and would have a
major role in ensuring improved production. Despite the employees' excitement and
cooperation, these promises were quickly betrayed. The GM Employee Involvement
Groups, which brought together management and line workers in weekly, half-hour
meetings to discuss the worker's suggestions, were canceled after a short time. Even more
disappointing, workers found themselves being reprimanded if they dared to stop the
assembly line-despite the fact that the new training program had emphasized that they
should stop the line if they discovered an error or were unable to complete their assigned
task properly in their own work station. Shop-floor management found it difficult to shed
their autocratic ways, and most foremen went back to their old practices of humiliation
and abuse. See id. at 170-77.
160. Sennett, supra note 18, at 113. For example, Laurie Graham and her colleagues
at Subaru-Isuzu quickly discovered that internalizing the responsibilities of team
membership meant pushing oneself beyond all limits to keep up one's end of the bargain.
Resentment against slower workers was common and was implicitly encouraged by the
company's policies. Whenever a particular team had to stop the assembly line, for
instance, everyone in the plant was notified about which team had done so by a series of
musical notes that designated that team. See Graham, supra note 157, at 98-101. This
system created pressure to harass one's own team members into falling into line. During
the course of her observation, Graham even found herself participating in a scheme with
her co-workers to humiliate a fellow team member into carrying his weight in the
production process. See id.
161. In 1992, about 25% of all firms had involved at least half their core employees in
two or more of these practices; by 1997 this figure had grown to 38% (with the use of all
practices increasing, except teams, which remained stable). See Paul Osterman, Work
Reorganization in an Era of Restructuring: Trends in Diffusion and Impacts on Employee
Welfare 8 (April 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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management and employees. 16 2 Contrary to these predictions, however,
the productivity and quality gains associated with these innovations did
not rebound to the benefit of employees. Firms that had implemented
high performance practices in 1992 produced no wage gains for employ-
ees by 1997. Furthermore, the presence of these practices in 1992 was
actually associated with a higher probability of layoff for both workers and
managers in later years. 163 Thus, the firms did not provide job security as
a way of reciprocating the high degree of employee effort demanded by
the new work systems. To the contrary, such effort was met with restruc-
turing that harmed, rather than helped, incumbent workers.
In fact, according to many commentators, declining job security is
one of the hallmarks of the new economic order. Both job stability (the
tendency of workers to form long-term bonds with their employers) and
job security (workers' ability to remain in their jobs so long as their per-
formance is satisfactory) apparently have declined over the last two de-
cades.' 64 Many employees now feel more insecure about their jobs, and
for good reason: Involuntary job loss increased in the 1990s and im-
pacted roughly ten percent of the population. 165 Job displacement is not
limited to low-skilled workers. The 1990s saw a significant increase in the
risk of job loss for white-collar workers-including managers, whose rate
of job loss due to "position abolished" more than doubled. 166 Even in
today's red-hot economy, displaced workers face a hard time finding new
jobs. In a recent Economic Policy Institute study, more than one-third of
displaced workers were still out of work when interviewed one to three
years later. 67 Those who did manage to find new jobs earned less and
were less likely to retain health insurance. 68
The new economy forces everyone-even many once-secure work-
ers-to live with increased insecurity and inestimable risk. In such a cli-
mate, the cultural imperative is to keep moving and taking risks: Those
afraid to leap are said to deserve to be stuck. In this new organizational/
162. See Edward E. Lawler III et al., Employee Involvement and Total Quality
Management: Practices and Results in Fortune 1000 Companies 9-11 (1992).
163. See Osterman, supra note 161, at 11-13.
164. According to a recent study by the Economic Policy Institute, "[t]he share of
workers in 'long-term jobs' (those lasting at least 10 years) fell sharply between 1979 and
1996," from 41% to 35.4% (with most of the decline attributable to men; women's
situation remained fairly stable). Lawrence Mishel et al., The State of Working America,
1998-99, at 7 (1999). For a sophisticated discussion of the literature on contingent work
that also documents this change, see Katherine V. W. Stone, The New Psychological
Contract 15-24 (Jan. 31, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
165. The fact that this job loss rate was higher in the economic recovery years of
1993-95 than in the slump period of 1991-93, "suggests that the underlying structural rate
of job loss . . . accelerated in the 1990s." Mishel et al., supra note 164, at 235.
166. Id. at 236.
167. See id.
168. Displaced workers who did manage to find new jobs earned, on average, 14%
less; they were also 14% less likely to retain health insurance. See id. at 238-39 tbl.4.12.
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cultural economy, advancing age is associated with fearfulness and fixity.
Management argues that "older workers have inflexible mindsets and are
risk-averse, as well as lacking in the sheer physical energy needed to cope
with the demands of life in the flexible workplace." 69 The notion that
young workers are flexible, while older workers are rigid, provides an ide-
ological justification for targeting older workers for devaluation and dis-
missal. Accumulated experience is no longer seen as something that de-
serves respect and value. Instead, it is a sign of worthlessness which will
mark even well-off workers with the passage of time.
In addition to downsizing and eliminating clear internal career tra-
jectories, many corporations have turned to various forms of nonstandard
(sometimes called contingent) work. Many companies have converted
full-time positions into part-time, temporary, contract, or on-call jobs, or
outsourced them to "temp" agencies or subcontractors that offer lower
wages and no benefits, and other firms are creating these forms of em-
ployment at rapid rates. 170 Although some highly-educated workers may
enjoy the flexibility that such forms of contracting entail, it is a return to
Lochnerian formalism to refer to most of these contingent workers as
free agents or entrepreneurs. As two recent studies by the Economic Pol-
icy Institute show, most forms of employment that do not involve full-
time, year-round jobs are inferior to such standard jobs.17 1 Nonstandard
jobs are significantly less likely to provide health insurance or a pension;
they are more likely to be temporary, and they do not typically lead to
regular employment, at least with the same firm.1
7 2
Furthermore, most people who work in nonstandard jobs earn less
than regular full-time workers. 173 Both men and women in all types of
nonstandard work (except contracting) are more likely to receive pov-
erty-level hourly wages than workers with similar personal and job charac-
teristics employed in regular full-time jobs.174 Although most people who
work in nonstandard job arrangements are worse off than standard job-
169. Sennett, supra note 18, at 93.
170. In 1997, almost 30% of all workers "were employed in situations that were not
regular full-time jobs." Mishel et al., supra note 164, at 8.
171. See Kalleberg et al., supra note 92, at 6; Mishel et al., supra note 164, at 246-47.
Indeed, in one study, over half of on-call workers, company contract employees, and wage-
and-salary independent contractors surveyed in 1995 said they had worked for their
current employer in a different work arrangement immediately prior to their current
jobs-which suggests that they may have been victims of downsizing or other forms of
restructuring. See Kalleberg et al., supra note 92, at 41.
172. See Kalleberg et al., supra note 92, at 6; Mishel et al., supra note 164, at 246-47.
173. See Mishel et al., supra note 164, at 242-47. In the labor force as a whole, for
example, 35% of all women workers and 21% of men receive only poverty-level wages
(currently $7.63 an hour). Among nonstandard workers, 52% of all women and 33% of all
men earn such wages-evidence that the working poor are concentrated
disproportionately among nonstandard workers. See Kalleberg et al., supra note 92, at 16.
174. See Kalleberg et al., supra note 92, at 18-19 tbl.9.
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holders on a variety of dimensions, women of all races and minority men
tend to occupy the lowest-paying types of nonstandard jobs. 175
A second major characteristic of the new economic order is increas-
ing wage inequality. Despite some initial controversy about its existence,
the growth in the earnings gap between the highest- and lowest-paid
workers has by now been well-documented. 1 76 Between 1979 and 1990,
there was a sharp increase in the likelihood that a year-round, full-time
worker would have annual earnings below the poverty-level; 1 77 the same
trend also held for all workers. 178 This widening wage distribution oc-
curred throughout the economy-at least among men-in virtually every
occupation and industry and in both the manufacturing and service sec-
tors. Among women, the picture was more complicated: For better-edu-
cated women, wages increased, as discrimination and job segregation by
sex decreased. For less-skilled women, wages declined, although not as
steeply as for their male counterparts (who had farther to fall) . 1 79
According to recent research, the dramatic growth in wage inequal-
ity has continued into the 1990s, but its character has shifted. In the
1980s, there was a growing separation between top and middle earners
versus middle and bottom earners. But in the 1990s, the inequality was
generated by a divergence between the top and everyone else. 1 80 The
status of those in the middle deteriorated. According to the Economic
Policy Institute study, male white-collar wages have stagnated or de-
clined.' 8 ' Even "[w]omen workers in the middle and upper-middle part
175. For example, only 28% of the white men who work in nonstandard jobs work in
those types where people earn less, on average, than similar full-time workers. However,
fully 81% of all women do, including nearly identical shares of whites, blacks, and Latinos.
Men of color do a bit better than white women, but not nearly as well as white men: 53%
of black and 43% of Latino nonstandard male workers hold the lowest-paying types of
nonstandard jobs. See id. at 44.
176. See Harrison, supra note 148, at 189-91.
177. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Workers with Low Earnings: 1964 to 1990,
Current Population Reports, Consumer Income, series P-60, no. 178, at 5, 8 (1992).
178. See Lawrence Mishel &Jared Bernstein, The State of Working America, 1992, at
137 (1993). According to one exhaustive review:
Nineteen-hundred-seventy-three marked the end of rapid real earnings growth
and the beginning of slower growth bordering on stagnation. Nineteen-hundred-
seventy-nine marked the beginning of a sharp acceleration in the growth of
earnings inequality, particularly among men....
[T]he male annual earnings distribution has hollowed out, leaving larger
percentages of workers at the top and bottom of the distribution, and a smaller
percentage in the middle.
Harrison, supra note 148, at 193-94 (quoting Frank Levy & Richard Murnane, U.S.
Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A Review of Recent Trends and Proposed
Explanations, 30J. Econ. Literature 1333, 1371 (1992)).
179. See Rebecca M. Blank, It Takcs a Nation: A New Agenda for Fighting Poverty 61
(1997).
180. See Mishel et al., supra note 164, at 149.
181. According to the Economic Policy Institute study:
Many [relatively] high-wage workers, particularly men, failed to see real wage
improvements in the 1989-97 period. Male white-collar wages, including those
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of the wage distribution, who saw real wages rise significantly in the 1980s,
have experienced a sharp deceleration in the 1990s."182 Although a tight
economy brought wage increases in the last few years of the 1990s, as of
1999, the improvements of 1997-98 had still left wage trends in the 1990s
no better than they were for most workers in the 1980s. "To the extent
that the typical American family has been able to hold its ground, the
most important factor has been the large increase in the hours worked by
family members."
18 3
Like other concerned scholars and activists, I believe these changes
threaten the social order. Richard Sennett argues that a commitment to
work performed over the course of a life is a precondition to a stable
society and strong sense of self, and I think he is right. As the notion of a
career that progresses through a few institutions is eroding, as the mar-
shaling even of a single bundle of skills through the course of a life is
declining, as more and more people work harder and harder to have
fleeting associations with strangers in short-term jobs in new locations,
something vital is lost (and it is not simply wages). Working with one's
peers in pursuit of common goals is the structure upon which a vibrant
civic life rests. Stable work is the experience through which we create
coherent life stories. We need work to sustain ourselves and our loved
ones. We need to live free of the anxiety produced by not knowing when
one's next project-and paycheck-are coming, or whether they will
come at all.
In fact, when I read Sennett's new book, my reaction was: He's ex-
actly right. It is profoundly disheartening when people don't have work
they can count on to sustain a life. If we want to know what happens to
people who do not have access to steady work suited to their education
and abilities, all we have to do is look at the experience of women in the
era before the laws against employment discrimination were enforced.
Moving from one dead-end job to the next, they kept trying different
types of work as teenagers try on outfits, hoping one would finally allow
them to express their deepest selves. Even when women found work they
loved, it rarely paid enough to allow them to support themselves (let
alone their families). Sennett is simply telling us that many working peo-
ple now face the difficult circumstances women traditionally have en-
countered in connection with work.
The bad news is that these changes now threaten most Americans.
Even those who were not supposed to fail are falling victim to the new
insecurities. Yet, in another sense, this is also the good news. That these
for managers and technical workers, have been stagnant or have declined, and
the wages of male college graduates have stagnated and remain below their level
of the mid-1980s or early 1970s.
Id. at 119-20.
182. Id. at 1.
183. Id. at 2.
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changes affect so many middle-class people creates a greater possibility
for political change. The question is, what should we do?
IV. LIFE'S WORK
The changes we are witnessing present deep challenges, but they also
provide us with an opportunity to reshape social life by focusing on work.
There are many viable directions for change; but, from the vantage point
I have been describing, they all begin with paid work. Paid work is a
central social good, which must be reshaped and redistributed in order to
create more empowering life prospects and more egalitarian relations
throughout social life.18 4 For me, the most promising point of entry is to
ask: What would it take to make available to everyone full and equal par-
ticipation in decently-paid, life-sustaining, participatory forms of work in
which women and men from all walks of life can stand together as equals?
I realize that work alone is no panacea. It is the platform on which
equal citizenship should be built, not the entire edifice. Still, the impor-
tance of work to the future cannot be overemphasized; abandoning work
as a political and cultural ideal would be a serious mistake. People need
more than money or property: We need life projects. We need goals and
activities to which we can commit our hearts, minds, and bodies. We
need to struggle with our capacities and our limits, in sustained ways in
stable settings. We need to work alongside others in pursuit of common
goals. We need to feel that we are contributing to something larger than
ourselves and our own families. Most of us even need something that
requires regular rhythms and structure, and provides a mechanism for
deferring gratification. We need to feel that we are earning our keep-
that we have a source of wherewithal that is our own. We also need pub-
lic recognition for our labors. It is difficult to imagine any single activity
that can fulfill all these purposes for the vast majority of people other
than working. We have seen what happens to people when they don't
have work to give life structure and meaning, and it is not exemplary.
There is a reason why democratic societies have organized themselves as
employment societies.1 5 Paid work is the only institution that can be
sufficiently widely distributed to provide a stable foundation for a demo-
cratic order. It is also one of the few arenas-perhaps the only one-in
which diverse groups of people can come together and develop respect
for each other through shared experience.1 8 6 Can we think of a society
184. For other expressions of the importance of work to equal citizenship, see
Forbath, Equal Citizenship, supra note 9, at 90; William E. Forbath, Why is This Rights Talk
Different From All Other Rights Talk? Demoting the Court and Reimagining the
Constitution, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1771, 1783-85, 1793-1805 (1994) [hereinafter Forbath,
Rights Talk]; Karst, supra note 5, at 548-53.
185. See Pateman, supra note 6, at 258-59.
186. Professor Cynthia L. Estlund has long emphasized this theme. See Cynthia L.
Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law 3, 7-21 (Mar.
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review); Cynthia Estlund,
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anywhere in the world we would want to emulate in which most people
do not work for a living?
In contrast to such a work-centered approach, some important think-
ers have proposed that we abandon our historic emphasis on work and
create alternative paths to the good life. Bruce Ackerman and Anne Al-
stott envision a "stakeholder society," for example, in which investment
rather than working becomes the means of securing the good life.
Rather than making sure that each citizen has access to a decentjob, they
would distribute to each citizen a sum of money to invest. They believe it
is property that is crucial to citizenship, so it doesn't really matter
whether people have a vocation to which they can devote themselves, or
something else, such as a hobby, so long as they have an income and a
stake in the polity that provides it.187 Indeed, in rhetoric that harkens
back to nineteenth-century characterizations of paid work as wage slavery,
Ackerman and Alstott even hint that work is inconsistent with liberal no-
tions of freedom.'
88
Other thinkers have gone so far as to celebrate the end of work.
Feminist Carole Pateman has hinted, for example, that in the future,
democratic citizenship will not be premised on paid work. This is a good
thing, she suggests, for it alleviates the gender dilemma in that equation,
given that women have been associated with domesticity as opposed to
wage work and hence seen as incapable of equal citizenship. Rather than
addressing this predicament by democratizing work, Pateman suggests
that we resolve it by eroding men's attachment to wage work (as women's
attachment is presumed to have been), and basing citizenship on some-
thing like our common dependency, rather than on the notion that work
can ever make any of us "independent." 89
Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 Ind. L.J. 101, 112 (1995); see also Karst,
supra note 5, at 550-51 (arguing that the workplace has been a major institutional site of
social integration of various racial and ethnic groups).
187. See Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society 11 (1999).
188. Their sharpest criticism is reserved for those who advocate wage subsidies, which
they see as interfering with the freedom not to work. See id. at 207; see also Anne L.
Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 Yale LJ.
967, 971 (1999) (arguing that "[t]he case for employment subsidies rests on mistaken or
morally dubious claims about the intrinsic or instrumental value of paid work").
In my view, the claim that work interferes with freedom is mistaken. There is no
irreconcilable contradiction between Ackerman and Alstott's proposal to democratize
access to capital and a focus on democratizing access to paid work; measures to
universalize and improve the status of work could be supplemented with the central
features of the Ackerman/Alstott stake. In fact, I believe the stake would work very well as
a supplement to the work-centered measures I propose here. People could use their stakes
to invest in the education and training that would prepare them for the work they really
want to do; or they could use it to start their own businesses as a path to their life's work.
Furthermore, as Lucie White pointed out to me, the stake (like any other unconditional
cash grant) might function to increase workers' ability to leave undesirable jobs and to
create their own alternative institutions-both of which may be needed to give workers the
bargaining power to leverage the sorts of changes in working conditions I advocate.
189. See Pateman, supra note 6, at 258-59.
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Even though work alone can never make us independent, that does
not mean we can do without it. Ordinary people understand the signifi-
cance of work and have demanded access to work in broad, inclusive
terms. Indeed, over the past forty years, all the major social movements
have focused on obtaining equal access to work for those excluded from
its rewards. The civil rights movement's demand for jobs (along with
peace and freedom) found expression in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which promised to integrate African-Americans into all the best
forms of work in our economy. William Julius Wilson's current emphasis
on jobs for the dispossessed1 9 ° resonates with the language of the 1968
Kerner Commission Report, which pronounced unemployment one of
the most significant problems facing poor black communities.1 91 The
Kerner report emphasized male unemployment, but, even at the time,
women (of all races) were demanding to be taken seriously as workers.
The emphasis on work has been crucial to Second Wave feminism, which
was born in part out of the recognition that even relatively well-off, white
middle-class women were united with their minority, poor, and working-
class sisters in the experience of being marginalized in the world of
work-which in turn disempowered them in politics and in private life.
192
Older Americans have also demanded recognition as valid workers,
and they won it in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) .93 The ADEA protects their right to work for as long as they are
able, without being dismissed as less competent. Gay men, lesbians,
bisexuals, and transgendered-people have also been demanding equality
as workers. They have protested the ways in which they are all too often
driven out of their jobs once people discover or even suspect that they are
sexual minorities, a painful process that forces them to give up the occu-
pational identity they have worked so hard to achieve and has become so
much a part of them. 19 4 Gays and lesbians have won protection against
job discrimination in many states and cities, and they have come very
close to achieving federal protection through legislation such as the Em-
ployment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA).
195
190. See Wilson, supra note 16, at 228-35.
191. See United States Kerner Comm'n, Report of the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders 219-35, 251-65 (1968).
192. For accounts of Second Wave feminism, see Sara Evans, Personal Politics: The
Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left (1980); Jo
Freeman, The Politics of Women's Liberation: A Case Study of an Emerging Social
Movement and its Relation to the Policy Process (1975); Judith Hole & Ellen Levine,
Rebirth of Feminism (1971); Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (1986); Jane
Sherron De Hart, The New Feminism and the Dynamics of Social Change, in Women's
America: Refocusing the Past 493 (Linda K. Kerber & Jane Sherron De Hart eds., 3d ed.
1991).
193. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 228-34
(1983) (providing a history of the development of the ADEA).
194. See Stephen Leinen, Gay Cops 200-01 (1993).
195. See Thomas H. Barnard & Timothy J. Downing, Emerging Law on Sexual
Orientation and Employment, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 555, 557 (1999).
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Although women, racial and ethnic minorities, older people, and
sexual minorities are often characterized as "special interests," many of
the rights and remedies for which these groups have struggled have ex-
tended the benefits of work more broadly to other people as well. For
example, racial minorities' challenges to pencil and paper tests have ben-
efited disadvantaged whites, too, due to the strong correlation between
success on these tests and socioeconomic class. 196 Similarly, women's
challenges to height requirements have benefited many nonwhite men
who are shorter than the average white Anglo-Saxon Protestant male, just
as mothers' efforts to win more flexible work schedules to accommodate
parenting have benefited everyone who provides care-male and female,
father and mother, son and daughter. Gay men's efforts to challenge the
workplace harassment their heterosexual counterparts direct at them also
helps many women, too, because such challenges make it easier to see
that harassment can be motivated not simply by sexual desire, but by a
desire to exclude anyone who undermines the dominant composition
and image of the work.
197
The disability rights movement has also emphasized access to work,
and they won an important victory with the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA).198 At least potentially, the ADA represents an expansion of
the traditional civil rights paradigm: It recasts the demand for a "level"
playing field into a call for an "accessible" one.1 99 At the core of the ADA
is a revolutionary idea: People who have disabilities (or who are per-
ceived to have them) have the right to participate in the workforce just
like everyone else; and they must be considered for any jobs they can do
with reasonable modification or support from the employer. Disabled
people now reject the older, custodial stance "typically expressed in poli-
cies of segregation and shelter, of special treatment and separate institu-
tions."200 Like other Americans, they want the right to work, and they are
demanding that work-related organizations make way for them.
Once again, making way for "them" helps make way for all of us.
The ADA requires both structural transformations-such as building
196. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming
the Innovative Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 956-57 (1996).
197. See generally Schultz, Reconceptualizing Harassment, supra note 55, at 1774-89
(showing how male-on-male harassment fits into a larger understanding of workplace
harassment as a mechanism to protect the masculine image of the work projected onto it
by the dominant group).
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(9) (1994)
("[T]he continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice
denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue
those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United
States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and
nonproductivity.").
199. Paul Steven Miller, Disability Civil Rights and a New Paradigm for the Twenty-
First Century: The Expansion of Civil Rights Beyond Race, Gender, and Age, 1 U. Pa. J.
Lab. & Employment L. 511, 514 (1998).
200. Id. at 520 n.44 (internal citations omitted).
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ramps-and individual accommodation-such as allowing employees to
work around their treatment schedules. These changes can benefit all of
us, not simply those of us who meet the legal definition of "persons with
disabilities."20 1 People who push baby strollers or ride bicycles appreciate
ramps along with people in wheelchairs; and almost everyone can benefit
from flexibility in scheduling. Furthermore, the very notion of "them"
and "us" is an illusion when it comes to disability. If "disability" is defined
sufficiently broadly, as it should be,20 2 most of us will be disabled at some
point in our lives.
We can also view the transition from welfare to work as part of this
trend.20 3 I realize that the impetus for welfare-to-work programs has
come from the political right, who may not have the best interests of poor
people at heart.20 4 But it would be a mistake to attribute all of the new
201. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. But see Sutton v. United Airlines Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
488-89 (1999) (limiting the definition of disability). For an interpretation of Sutton and
other recent Supreme Court decisions that attempts to protect a broad vision of disability
rights while shielding employers from frivolous lawsuits, see Lauren J. McGarity, Note,
Disabling Corrections and Correctable Disabilities: Why Side Effects Might Be the Saving
Grace of Sutton, 109 Yale L.J. 1161 (2000).
202. See Iris Marion Young, Disability and the Definition of Work, in Americans with
Disabilities: Exploring Implications of the Law for Individuals and Institutions (Leslie
Francis & Anita Silvers eds., forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 9, on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (arguing that many workers who do not identify as disabled would benefit if
they joined with disabled people to demand more humane workplaces).
203. As most readers are undoubtedly aware, much of the traditional AFDC system is
in the process of being dismantled and replaced with a system that encourages, or even
requires, single parents to engage in paid work in order to collect benefits for their
children. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.), repealed the AFDC program and replaced it with a block grant program called
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) that gives wide discretion to the
individual states to design and administer their own welfare programs. Under TANF, states
are allowed to determine the standards for who is eligible for assistance, what type of
assistance will be given, how long assistance will be given, and the terms and conditions
under which assistance will be provided. For a description of new programs, see Blank,
supra note 179, at 83-132 (1997) (reviewing contemporary anti-poverty programs); Mark
Greenberg, Welfare Restructuring and Working-Poor Family Policy: The New Context, in
Hard Labor: Women and Work in the Post-Welfare Era 24, 24-47 (Joel F. Handler &
Lucie White eds., 1999) (same); see also Jonathan Zasloff, Children, Families, and
Bureaucrats: A Prehistory of Welfare Reform, 14 J.L. & Pol. 225, 295-306 (1998)
(analyzing the politics of some of the failures of recent welfare reforms). The literature
distinguishes between "work-fare" programs, in which those who have drawn welfare are
forced to work at jobs created for that purpose if they cannot find other employment, and
"welfare-to-work" programs, in which the state provides job search assistance and other
support services in an effort to help those who have collected welfare transition into steady
jobs. See Judith M. Gueron & Edward Pauly, From Welfare to Work 7-21, 97 (1991)
(outlining the main conclusions and policy implications of completed welfare-to-work
studies from the 1980s). Here I will be emphasizing welfare-to-work programs, which are
less punitive in nature.
204. See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Applying the Brakes to the Antiwelfare Juggernaut,
The Boston Globe, Nov. 16, 1995, at 19 (describing the then-pending welfare reform bill as
more concerned with budget cuts than welfare improvements).
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emphasis on work to conservatives alone. Some of the demand has come
from members of the working poor who do not receive welfare, and who
do not have the luxury of keeping a parent at home to take care of their
own children. They may understandably resent the fact that their hard-
earned tax dollars are used to support other parents who are not much
worse off than they are.20 5 In this sense, welfare entitlements have di-
vided the welfare class from other members of the working classes.
But even this view is too simplistic. It is not only resentful taxpayers,
but welfare recipients themselves who focus attention on work. Poor sin-
gle parents have long expressed a desire for work that will allow them to
support their children; they know that a decentjob is the only path that
provides real hope for their empowerment in the long run.20 6 Most peo-
ple who receive welfare payments have been working for pay all along, as
they must in order to ensure the survival of their families. 20 7 But, partly
because so many of them are women and racial minorities, single parents
have not been perceived as "authentic" workers who have the capacity to
contribute to productive endeavors beyond raising their own children.
Women who draw on welfare are overrepresented among classic contin-
gent workers, who fare worse on a variety of dimensions than people in
more permanent employment. 20 8 This is the legacy of the fact that our
welfare system has been based on a family-wage model that sees women as
205. See Katherine S. Newman, No Shame in My Game: The Working Poor in the
Inner City 98 (1999); Lillian B. Rubin, Families on the Fault Line: America's Working
Class Speaks About the Family, the Economy, Race, and Ethnicity 197-99 (1994).
206. See Newman, supra note 205, at 98-100; Wilson, supra note 16, at 67; United
States General Accounting Office, Welfare Reform: Information on Former Recipients'
Status, GAO/HEHS-99-48, at 24 (1999) (noting that studies of former welfare recipients
in two states showed that while former recipients "were more likely to experience some
deprivations after leaving welfare than while on welfare," a majority (76% and 68%)
"disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that 'life was better when you were
getting welfare'").
207. See Kathryn Edin & Laura Lein, Making Ends Meet: How Single Mothers
Survive Welfare and Low-Wage Work 6-7 (1997); Joel F. Handler & Yeheskel Hasenfeld,
We the Poor People: Work, Poverty, and Welfare 47-48 (1997).
208. See, e.g., Spalter-Roth & Hartmann, supra note 91, at 92-93 (showing that in
1990 14% of women who worked in contingent arrangements, compared to 3% of all
women in permanent full-time work and 6% of women in permanent part-time work,
relied on income from means-tested welfare benefits to supplement their earnings); id. at
85 (documenting a median hourly wage of $5.15 for contingent workers, compared to
$10.85 for full-time, year-round workers, and $8.74 for all workers in the sample); see also
supra note 173 and accompanying text (documenting similar results for nonstandard
workers). Note that unlike Kalleberg et al., who include regular part-time workers in their
definition of "nonstandard" employment, see Kalleberg et al., supra note 92, at 8, 71,
Spalter-Roth & Hartmann exclude them from their definition of "contingent" workers, on
the ground that part-timers who work for one employer are more likely to be involved in
stable jobs and less likely to face the "tenuousness" they see as the essence of contingent
employment. See Spalter-Roth & Hartmann, supra note 91, at 74-75. For a discussion of
methodological issues in measuring contingent work, see Stone, supra note 164, at 17-24.
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inauthentic workers and cannot imagine mothers in economically-power-
ful provider roles.
20 9
Even if many welfare-to-work programs have been adopted for the
wrong reasons, their existence does provide a political opening to turn
things around.2 10 Not only is paid work important to people's ability to
get ahead and their sense of community and self-esteem; it is also a more
easily politicized setting than the privatized home. By creating social sys-
tems that allow poor (and other) parents to combine caregiving with sta-
ble employment, we enable them to move into the workforce-a space in
which they can more easily engage in collective action to improve their
situation. 2 11 Perhaps this is why, all over the country, poor single parents
and their advocates are seeking to convert the duty to work into a right to
work, with all the social support necessary to make steady employment
possible.2 12 For instance, in one Wisconsin program, the state (or one of
the agencies with which it contracts) provides a remarkable array of ser-
vices designed to facilitate welfare mothers' successful transition to paid
work. 21 3 Everyone in the program who can work receives a job: Al-
though the ultimate goal is private-sector employment, the program pro-
vides a series of subsidized private- and public-sector jobs for those who
are not 'job ready."2 14 Clients receive job search assistance and job train-
ing. Those who land jobs are not abandoned; they continue to receive
job retention assistance and support. 21 5 They also continue to receive
payments for child care and health care, 216 and caseworkers help with
transportation. 21 7 Perhaps most importantly, the program provides siza-
ble wage subsidies to ensure that those who hold down a job earn more
than they did on AFDC.218 The provision of such services can be seen as
an expanded version of the Americans with Disabilities Act's call for ac-
cessibility: In order for paid work to be truly "accessible" to single par-
209. See supra notes 142-147 and accompanying text.
210. See Forbath, Equal Citizenship, supra note 9, at 11; see also Handler &
Hasenfeld, supra note 207, at 11-12.
211. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
212. Martha Fineman has already planted the idea that women and mothers have a
"right to work." Fineman, Dependencies, supra note 62, at 308-09; see Forbath, Rights
Talk, supra note 184, at 1804-05 (arguing for a right to work); Karst, supra note 5, at 529,
557-58 (same).
213. See Jason DeParle, Getting Opal Caples to Work, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1997,
(Magazine), at 33 [hereinafter DeParle, Opal Caples].
214. Id. at 35-36.
215. See id. at 35.
216. See id. at 33, 35.
217. See Jason DeParle, Symbol of Welfare Reform, Still Struggling, N.Y. Times, Apr.
20, 1999, at Al [hereinafter DeParle, Symbol of Welfare Reform].
218. Under AFDC, a mother with two children received $9,456 a year in cash and
food stamps. Under the plan, in 1999, a community-service job paid $11,168 a year. See
DeParle, Opal Caples, supra note 213. Once food stamps and tax credits are added in, and
co-payments for child care and health care are taken out, a minimum-wage job netted
$16,524, a wage above the poverty line of $13,330 a year. See id.
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ents, they need a variety of services that help them prepare for, locate,
and hold down jobs. And, of course, they need jobs-jobs that will pay
well enough to support themselves and their children.
Viewed from this perspective, the best welfare-to-work programs
push in the direction of a more expansive set of social programs that
guarantee and support a right to work for everyone. If work is to provide
the foundation for citizenship (as welfare-to-work programs imply), then
everyone must have access to a suitable job, as well as the training and
education needed to do thejob. There is no reason to find or create jobs
exclusively for people who have drawn on welfare, when so many others
are struggling to find jobs, often under fiercely competitive conditions.
The goal should be to ensure that everyone-mothers on welfare, fathers
struggling to pay child support, poor women and men without children,
people with disabilities, middle-class homemakers or divorcees, people in
temporary jobs who want steady employment, older people, youth who
are trying to finance continuing education, and, yes, even well-educated
displaced workers-has work.
Yet, it is not simply a lack ofjobs, but a lack ofjobs that pay a decent
wage that discourages many people.2 19 As we pursue welfare-to-work
strategies and other policies that remove work disincentives for various
groups of people who have not traditionally held steady employment, we
must find ways to counteract the even greater downward pressure on
wages that will come as increasing numbers of low-skill workers enter the
labor market. The old craft unionism strategy of excluding the disfa-
vored as a way of keeping wages high is no longer viable; we can no
longer afford to raise wages for some by excluding others.2 20 Like the
Milwaukee program, some welfare-to-work programs subsidize the wages
of clients who find jobs in an effort to bring them up to a level that no
longer discourages, but instead actively encourages, steady employ-
ment.221 But, we cannot raise wages only for people who have drawn on
welfare, when so many others face jobs with pay so low that they cannot
support themselves-let alone their children. We must ensure that every-
one has a pathway to sustaining work.
219. See Edmund S. Phelps, Rewarding Work: How to Restore Participation and Self-
Support to Free Enterprise 14-15 (1997).
220. I am grateful to Stanley Aronowitz for this point. Stanley Aronowitz, Remarks at
Workplace Theory and Policy workshop at Yale Law School (Mar. 1, 2000). Traditionally,
mothers have been one of the main groups upon whose exclusion strategies for full
employment have been based. Barbara Bergmann has powerfully described how sexism
allows us to feel that we are helping welfare recipients by justifying their exclusion from the
labor market when we protest job-based strategies by saying, "There are no jobs out there
for these people." Bergmann, Saving Our Children, supra note 69, at 133. As Bergmann
points out, nobody says, "We can't allow the current crop of high school seniors to
graduate because there are no jobs out there for them." Id.
221. See DeParle, Opal Caples, supra note 213; DeParle, Symbol of Welfare Reform,
supra note 217.
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
In addition to decent-paying jobs, people must have access to all the
services that facilitate finding and keeping employment that. We cannot
provide these sought-after services only to people on welfare without re-
creating some of the same unfairness and resentment that led to the call
to change the welfare system in the first place. As anthropologist Kathe-
rine Newman has observed, providing such things as health care and cov-
eted child care slots to welfare recipients may be a worthy goal, but it
"leaves the working poor, whose lives have little impact on [cities'] bot-
tom line, out in the cold."2 22 We all need health care, for ourselves and
our children. And, in an age of dual-career couples and single-parent
households, almost everyone needs high-quality, affordable child care in
order to work effectively. The Americans with Disabilities Act 223 and the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 224 move us in the right direction,
but not nearly far enough. The only answer is a massive public invest-
ment in day-care, preschool, and after-school programs, which in turn
could create many newjobs for other people as this form of housework is
collectivized and turned into paid employment.
To even imagine a society that enables everyone to participate
equally in working life, we will have to think seriously about how to struc-
ture work and the workweek so that everyone can combine a genuine
commitment to work with an active involvement in family and civic life.
Family life makes constant demands: One single parent working forty
hours a week, or even two parents doing so, simply cannot get everything
done. Parents need scheduling flexibility to attend to day-to-day commit-
ments: We also need leaves from ourjobs from time to time to attend to
long-term issues in our families, communities, and our lives. Some peo-
ple advocate unpaid leave or more part-time jobs, especially for women,
to allow us to balance "our" family responsibilities with working. 225 But
these family-wage-based strategies further entrench patterns of gender
segregation and class bias. Only people with partners who earn enough
222. Newman, supra note 205, at 58.
223. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, discussed supra notes 198-202 and accompanying
text.
224. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at
5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-6387 & 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994)). For a recent critique of this
approach, see Selmi, supra note 39, at 759-68.
225. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender
Discrimination, Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 Yale L.J. 595, 602, 626, 653, 671
(1993) (arguing for the repeal of statutory equal pay provisions and the adoption of tax
reforms designed to make more flexible, part-time job opportunities available to women).
McCaffery even blames Title VII for achieving progress that has made women unhappy:
Women do not necessarily need more money. They do not necessarily need
more education. . . . The terms of traditional regulatory intervention are
themselves influenced by a patriarchic social order, so that the antidiscrimination
laws may even be consciously trying to squeeze women into a male pattern of
work and family life-Title VII may actually be a cause of the paradox of better




to support the family can take advantage of them. They benefit middle-
class women in traditional marriages, but exclude the single parents and
caregivers, and even the higher-earning husbands and nontraditional
wives and partners, who should be able to take advantage of such re-
forms. If we want to help everyone, we cannot limit ourselves to ap-
proaches such as unpaid leaves, or the expansion of part-time "mommy-
track" jobs that can be used only by those who have access to a breadwin-
ner's wage.
226
For these reasons, those of us who believe in gender integration
must call for reforms that encourage men and women to work similar-
and saner-hours that will allow both to participate more fully in all life's
experiences. 227 People who have children or others to care for need
shorter hours, but not in the form of stigmatizing special accommoda-
tions. In fact, there is no reason to limit collective policy solutions to
parenting or other family demands, when there is so much important
community work to be done. Once again, we are pushed to consider
universal structural solutions, such as a reduced workweek for everyone
and paid sabbaticals to cover both caregiving commitments and commu-
nity service projects.
Notice that something remarkable has happened: To underscore
the importance of paid work as a political and cultural ideal, I began
talking about how many different people, from many different walks of
life have been demanding equal access to work. I drew from examples of
groups who have sought to use anti-discrimination law as a wedge into the
mainstream of work. Yet, as I began discussing these people's demands
for equal participation in working life, the discussion moved in a more
inclusive direction. The effort to enable those who traditionally have
been excluded from the workforce to participate on equal terms led to
broader proposals that would transform the social landscape for every-
one. In the process, the conversation shifted from one that emphasized
work-related rights for some people as members of particular demographic
groups (racial and ethnic minorities, women, the elderly, gays and lesbi-
ans, people with disabilities, welfare mothers, the working poor, and so
on) into one that emphasized work-related rights for all people as mem-
226. See Fraser, supra note 76, at 57-62 (arguing against a model that creates flexible
jobs for women on the ground that it promotes gender inequality); Jerry A. Jacobs &
Kathleen Gerson, Toward a Family-Friendly, Gender-Equitable Work Week, 1 U. Pa. J. Lab.
& Employment L. 457, 465-66 (1998) [hereinafter Jacobs & Gerson, Gender-Equitable
Work Week] (pointing out problems with reforms aimed at achieving flexibility for
women, such as unpaid leave and nonstandard jobs).
227. See infra notes 299-306 and accompanying text; see also Kathryn Abrams, Cross-
Dressing in the Master's Clothes, 109 Yale L.J. 745, 759 (2000) (criticizing Joan Williams
for proposing reforms designed to alleviate work/family conflict for women that buy into




bers of the broad community of citizens. This transformation powerfully
conveys how a focus on work can unite us across differences and provide
a common foundation for equal citizenship for all.
Employment discrimination law has allowed us to change working
life in the name of "women," or "African-Americans," or "people with dis-
abilities." This body of law is tremendously important. It has prompted
employers to restructure labor markets, firms, and jobs in ways that per-
mitted many of us to aspire to become workers-and people-we never
imagined we could be. The difference between the life my mother had
available to her and the one I now have is a difference worth dying for.
The difference turns, in large part, on the different types of work to
which we could aspire (and the differences in political, cultural, and fam-
ily-based power that flowed from our opportunities).
But the world is changing, and a new set of conditions confronts us
all. The employment discrimination laws are not capable of generating
the structural transformations necessary to create the conditions in which
work can provide equal citizenship for all. It is time to pull together the
efforts so many people have made through anti-discrimination law into a
broad, inclusive campaign to make the benefits of work available to every-
one. We must remake our laws-indeed, all our social institutions-to
create a world in which everyone has the right to participate in paid work,
with all the social support that is necessary to make that possible; we must
also demand the conditions for work that are sustainable over the course
of a lifetime. In addition to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, it is
time to insist: We have the right to pursue a life's work.
Providing universal access to a life's work is a revolutionary project
that has never been realized in this country:2 28 Someone has always been
excluded from the labor market in order to benefit someone else. Paid
work has the potential to become the universal platform for equal citizen-
ship it has traditionally been imagined to be, but only by attending to the
specific needs of various social groups and individuals to ensure participa-
tion parity. A universal approach does not mean we can, or should, pre-
tend that everyone is the same. If we are to make sure everyone can par-
ticipate in work, we cannot reduce anyone down to the lowest common
denominator-an abstract dehumanized category of "worker." To do so
calls to mind a history to which we should not want to return, a history in
which "worker" meant "man," an equation that suppressed the rich diver-
sity of working people. 229 Instead, we must strive to invest the meaning of
"worker" with all the demographic and individual diversity real working
people embody, along axes we have acknowledged (such as race, gender,
age, disability, and sexual orientation) and others to which we have not
228. It bears repeating that a universal set of rights to work has been imagined, and
fought for, at various times in our history. See supra note 15.
229. See Kessler-Harris, supra note 6, at 7-12; Scott, supra note 59, at 71-79; Joan
Acker, Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations, 4 Gender & Soc'y
139, 150 (1990).
1938 [Vol. 100:1881
devoted our attention or perhaps even discovered (such as socioeco-
nomic class, educational history, mental health, appearance, and less visi-
ble forms of "outsiderness").
In my vision, paid work should serve as a foundation that secures to
women and men from all walks of life a source of equal citizenship, eco-
nomic wherewithal, social ties, and personal identity. Everyone would
have a right to train for and pursue work of their own choosing, and each
of us would earn a living wage by doing that work (our wages supple-
mented by the state, if necessary). Individual adults, rather than families
(however defined), would be the unit of analysis for purposes of wages
and other state subsidies, guaranteeing that no adult would have to de-
pend on another for basic economic support. No one would have to
work the death-and-disability-dealing hours that many of us do now. Eve-
ryone would work saner, and more similar hours, so that all of us would
have an opportunity to participate fully in family, friendship, politics, and
civic life. Following current trends, a great deal of housework and
caregiving would be converted into bundles of services that some people
would do for a living-and a living wage. Most of us would continue to
do a fair amount of housework and caregiving on our own, both in house-
holds that are not necessarily heterosexual or even nuclear in form, as
well as in collective, community-based arrangements with friends, neigh-
bors, and newcomers. To supplement such private initiatives, we would
create and publicly finance a variety of different child care arrange-
ments-including well-respected, state-financed child care programs that
are so good for children that everyone, including the middle-classes-
would use them. 230 In addition to child care, all adults would have access
to the basic services they need to engage in suitable work, including
health care, transportation, and continuing training. We would also have
periodic sabbaticals, in which some portion of our wages is paid by the
state, to allow us to fulfill our caregiving commitments and to perform
public service work needed by the community or nation. Because every-
one-men and women alike-would have access to work that provides
economic security, social ties, and a strong source of selfhood, no one
would be forced to stay in an intimate relationship that is not supportive
or satisfying. Over time, the family would be reconstituted as a primarily
affective realm in which adults come (and stay) together mainly for love
rather than economic need.
23 1
230. For a description of the French system, see Bergmann, Saving our Children,
supra note 72, at 27-44; cf. id. at 108-14 (describing the "disjointed and miserly qualities
of U.S. child care efforts" in comparison to the French system).
231. Here, I mean to invoke a feminist tradition that is not drawn upon very often in
the contemporary feminist legal literature-that of feminist free love advocates from the
early twentieth century. See generally Cott, supra note 124, at 23-50 (1987) (describing
the origins of modem feminism in women's movements that emerged in the 1910s and
emphasized the link between women's freedom to pursue equal work and sexual freedom
and intimacy). For a fascinating history of feminist radicals and other fellow travelers who
congregated in Greenwich Village in the early twentieth century, see Stansell, supra note
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This, to me, is a forward-thinking vision that builds on current trends
and age-old aspirations to enable women and men of all walks of life to
become full citizens-and fuller human beings-in the twenty-first cen-
tury. This is what it means to secure the right to pursue a life's work.
This project will require a more ambitious reimagining of the rela-
tionship between the state and the market-and a more expansive set of
politics-than feminists sometimes propose. By securing the right to pur-
sue a life's work, I do not mean to suggest that we should create a consti-
tutionally-enforceable right to a paid job. Like others who have consid-
ered the issue, I do not believe a judicially-enforced guarantee of
employment is a realistic or even an ideal approach. 232 Instead, I envi-
sion an affirmative set of legislatively-created rights that build upon the
fundamental premise that every adult citizen is entitled to safe employ-
ment that pays her or him a living wage, and to the basic social support
necessary to pursue such employment. Such a program does not necessa-
rily entail more state intervention than we have now, but it does require a
different type of intervention.
In my view, the government should harness the power of firms and
labor markets to create work that our society finds valuable. Markets can
be powerful engines of creativity and change, and we should take advan-
tage of those dynamics. But the state must step in to ensure the adequacy
of market outcomes. Our traditional employment discrimination-cen-
tered approach takes such things as the number and quality of jobs and
job-holding services, wage levels, and working conditions the market pro-
duces as a neutral baseline. The government's role is to ensure that no
one is denied access to that baseline because of identity-based discrimina-
tion. To achieve universal access to life-sustaining work, however, the
124. As Stansell makes clear, these feminists linked economic independence and sexual
liberty with freedom of expression. They pursued careers (often in the male-dominated
arts), staged and supported labor struggles, promoted and practiced free speech
(particularly sexual speech), and sought love and sex outside the confines of marriage. Id.
at 120-44, 225-72. Then, as now, there were barriers to realizing such a vision. Yet, in my
view, it is still a vision to which we should aspire, rather than one that deserves feminist
condemnation. But see Hirshman & Larson, supra note 60, at 223-303 (condemning
those who advocate such a vision as sexual libertines).
232. For scholars who have rejected pursuing a judicially-created constitutional right
to employment in favor of creating an affirmative set of legislative programs to ensure a
"right" to paid work, see Harvey, supra note 15, at 1-8 (building upon the uncompleted
New Deal agenda to propose an ambitious "employment assurance program" and
analyzing its economic, administrative, and political feasibility); Forbath, Rights Talk, supra
note 184, at 1790-92 (arguing for Congress, rather than the courts, to recognize a
constitutional right to work, and providing a powerful description of the moral force and
sophistication of those who advocated such a right in the nineteenth century); Karst, supra
note 5, at 553-59 (providing a detailed analysis of why a constitutional right to work would
not be judicially-enforceable, and following Forbath in calling for a legislatively-created
and morally-recognized right instead). For a contrasting view, see Jon Elster, Is There (or
Should There Be) a Right to Work?, in Democracy and the Welfare State 53, 77 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1988) (concluding that "any right to work that could feasibly be created is
not a right to work that is worth having").
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state must become more proactively engaged in bringing what the market
produces up to a more adequate baseline for everyone. This would
mean, at a minimum, that the state sustains suitable work for everyone:
providing jobs, guaranteeing a living wage, cultivating empowering work-
ing conditions and relations, restructuring working time, and providing
the job-holding services necessary to allow people to pursue paid work
along with broader care commitments and civic activities. Such measures
need not always be accomplished through employer mandates (such as a
minimum wage); much of the time, the government could instead sup-
plement what employers provide (through such measures as wage subsi-
dies). 23 3 Nonetheless, accomplishing such goals will be difficult. It re-
quires an expansive new politics to mobilize popular support strong
enough to overcome many concentrated interests. 23 4 For feminists, it
means moving beyond forms of identity politics that press for essentialist
forms of recognition 23 5 and reevaluating "women's experience."2 36 Femi-
nists must join forces with the labor movement and with a broad array of
other groups-including white middle-class heterosexual men-not sim-
ply to advance each other's interests, but to create a common interest in
remaking social life so that paid work becomes the cornerstone for our
best conceptions of citizenship and care.
This is a collective project of enormous scale and scope; I have
neither the space nor the imagination to elaborate it fully here. All I can
do here is suggest a general approach and sketch a few of the key ele-
ments in the hope that others will be inspired to pursue the project in
more detail.
233. This does not necessarily entail direct state command over what firms do. The
government can create incentives for firms to produce these desired results on their own;
it can change the resources or framework within which workers or others (such as
consumers) bargain for those results; or the state can simply supplement firms' end-
product. If the wages the market produces are too low, for example, the state can adopt
policies to stimulate the creation of higher-paying jobs; it can make it easier for workers to
organize and bargain collectively for higher wages; or, it can supplement wages itself
through such measures as the Earned Income Tax Credit. See Earned Income Tax Credit,
Rev. Proc. 97-57, 1997-2 C.B. Similarly, if the market does not produce decent working
conditions, the state can try to mandate them, it can create legal frameworks that empower
workers to be in a better position to obtain them, or it can foster the creation of alternative
institutions that provide models for what should be achieved.
234. For an analysis of the political roadblocks that confronted the Roosevelt
administration when it sought to implement a version of the right to work and of the
political impediments that would be encountered today, see Harvey, supra note 15, at
18-20, 99-117.
235. Cf. Fraser, supra note 76, at 28-31 (discussing problems with a cultural feminist
politics of seeking recognition for women's differences).
236. Cf. Scott, supra note 59, at 197 (arguing that feminists should problematize the
category of "women's experience" rather than treating it as a fixed phenomenon).
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A. Ensuring Everyone Employment
If work is to provide a cornerstone for equal citizenship, then every-
one must have access to ajob; or better yet, a range ofjobs from which to
choose. People also need education and training for suitable jobs (pref-
erably company-based training linked directly to the skills needed for a
particular job).23 7 For this reason, a number of concerned scholars and
policymakers have recommended measures to ensure full employment.
Some economists recommend ways to fine-tune the economy, to ensure
continued growth while producing a more adequate supply of decent
jobs.238 In addition, scholars and commentators from across the political
spectrum have proposed job creation and training measures designed to
ensure universal access to work. 239 While it is true that the national un-
employment rate has dropped to a new low in recent years, some areas
and some populations remain hard-hit. In some communities, there is
fierce competition even for low-skilljobs. 240 For these reasons, making a
national commitment to universal access to work makes sense, even in a
low-unemployment economy. Taking a universal approach does not
mean that localities and groups with particular needs cannot be served; to
the contrary, it means addressing such needs to ensure that no one who
wants a job is left without one.
B. Celebrating Work's Value
In addition to democratizing access to jobs, we must create a grass
roots language for expressing ordinary women's and men's understand-
ings of why paid work matters. We need a language that speaks to many
different audiences-political, corporate, union, academic, activist, and
average American. It takes courage: In some circles, to talk about the
value of work risks getting oneself labeled illiberal, anti-feminist, or right-
wing. Traditionally, in the name of facilitating choice, liberal discourse
237. See Richard B. Freeman, Lessons for the United States, in Working under
Different Rules 223, 225 (Richard B. Freeman ed., 1994) ("Evidence . . . suggests that
company-based training has a high payoff. . . because it is linked directly to the skills
needed at a particular workplace.").
238. See, e.g., Barry Bluestone & Bennett Harrison, Growing Prosperity: The Battle
for Growth with Equity in the Twenty-first Century 205-63 (2000) (proposing policies
designed to promote economic growth and foster greater income equality at the same
time).
239. See Blank, supra note 179, at 257; Harvey, supra note 15, at 11-20; Mickey Kaus,
The End of Equality 136-48 (1992); Wilson, supra note 16, at 232; Bergmann &
Hartmann, supra note 132, at 85.
240. In central Harlem, for example, there were 14 applicants per person hired for
fast foodjobs. See Newman, supra note 205, at 62. Even in the "red-hot" Boston economy
studied by economists Barry Bluestone and Mary Huff Stevenson, some people (notably
African-American and Latino men) had difficulty gaining access to more than sporadic
employment. As a result, their earnings fell far below that of other groups. See Barry
Bluestone & Mary Huff Stevenson, The Boston Renaissance: Race, Space, and Economic
Change in An American Metropolis 222-25 (2000).
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has focused on solutions that provide people income with few or no
strings attached.24 1 Unfortunately, all too often, these liberal strategies
ignore the need to reshape the underlying social institutions (like em-
ployment) that facilitate genuine choice and realize liberal freedoms.
2 42
In the name of valuing women's work, as we have seen, some prominent
strands of feminist thought focus on securing compensation for caregiv-
ing and homemaking. As previously discussed, however, some of these
proposals replicate gender-based and class-biased assumptions that are
the legacy of a family-wage system that no longer describes most Ameri-
cans' reality. Even more troubling, there is a history of conservative rhet-
oric that emphasizes the value of the work ethic without an accompany-
ing emphasis on ensuring the conditions under which people can form
and realize their ambitions equally;24 3 this is the tradition from which
those on the right who emphasize the need for poor people to take "per-
sonal responsibility" draw.
24 4
Yet, the presence of these alternative discourses cannot halt the en-
deavor. In my view, their presence makes all the more imperative the
task of creating a new forward-thinking feminist politics by articulating
why work matters so much to women as well as to men. This vision must
convey the most poorly-paid, low-status workers' understanding that all
work has intrinsic value.2 4 5 We should reject the idea that a job must
satisfy some substantive criteria of meaningfulness if it is to confer respect
on its occupant.246 All too often, those who are engaged in high-status,
241. See generally Ackerman & Alstott, supra note 187, at 207-09 (arguing against
wage subsidies in favor of a universal cash grant on the ground that the grant better
promotes individual freedom); Forbath, Equal Citizenship, supra note 9, at 12-15
(describing Sunstein and Michelman as favoring welfare entitlements over rights to work
for this reason); see also Kronman, supra note 4, at 4 (acknowledging that modern liberal
theories of distributive justice do not focus on work in its normative dimension but instead
"focus mainly on the fairness of the distribution of resources that work produces-on who
gets what share of the fruits of the work process-and tend, as a result, to view this process
itself in an instrumental light").
242. For a similar critique, see Forbath, Equal Citizenship, supra note 9, at 89-91
(stating that the arguments behind liberal constitutional strategies support a broader
concept of equality than that enshrined in law).
243. See Glickstein, supra note 125, at 220-22, 257-58.
244. See, e.g., Bryan Sierra, House Passes GOP Welfare Plan, United Press Int'l, Mar.
24, 1995, at 1-2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wire Service Stories file (describing the
1995 passage of the Personal Responsibility Act, a series of punitive welfare measures that
were part of the GOP's Contract with America engineered by Newt Gingrich).
245. See Newman, supra note 205, at xv ("[Less-affluent Americans] work hard at jobs
the rest of us would not want because they believe in the dignity of work."); see Terkel,
supra note 30, at xii (quoting a waitress who remarked: "When someone says, 'How come
you're just a waitress?' I say 'Don't you think you deserve being served by me?'").
246. See Kronman, supra note 4, at 6-7, 31-34. Kronman traces these attitudes to the
tradition of aristocratic professionalism, which treats professional work as inherently
meaningful and distinguishes it sharply from instrumental forms of labor, which it regards
as necessarily deadening or degrading. See id. at 32. According to Kronman, the
meaningful/instrumental distinction rests, in turn, on a higher valuation of mental as
opposed to manual labor:
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creative endeavors they love claim that only theirjobs are meaningful (or
even that their jobs do not involve "working"). But simply because peo-
ple are lucky enough to do for pay what they would want to do even in
their off-hours does not mean that what they do is not work, or that only
work that is not performed for instrumental reasons can be valuable.
Such a view implies that work done out of necessity is necessarily deaden-
ing or degrading, an elitist view. Even forms of work that some privileged
people consider menial require much more skill and yield more satisfac-
tion than people who have never done them realize.
247
To combat the elitist view that manual labor is degrading,248 we
should revitalize the radical labor tradition that emphasizes the inherent
dignity of all forms of work.2 49 Accepting this proposition in no way com-
mits us to preserving low-paid jobs in their present form. To the con-
trary, it provides leverage for organizing the job in a way that promotes
the autonomy and control of those who do it, since they are entitled to
respect. Cleaning up after others, whether in public settings or private
homes, is work that confers dignity. So is work in factories and on farms.
Any work that serves the larger community makes a contribution. As
Mike LeFevre, a Chicago steelworker, so eloquently expressed it,
Somebody built the pyramids.... Pyramids, Empire State Build-
ing-these things just don't happen. There's hard work behind
it. I would like to see a building, say, the Empire State, I would
like to see on one side of it a foot-wide strip from top to bottom
with the name of every bricklayer, the name of every electrician,
with all the names. So when a guy walked by, he could take his
son and say, "See, that's me over there on the forty-fifth floor, I
The assembly line worker who makes shoes or automobiles is more likely to be
stunted than developed by the repetitive and unchallenging tasks he performs.
By contrast, the work of doctors and lawyers and teachers-which is not only
varied but requires a constant flow of subtle judgments about human beings and
their requirements-promotes the development of skills, capacities, etc., which
more routine and thoughtless forms of labor do not.
Id. at 33-34. Understood in this context, the class bias embedded in the notion that those
of us who do what we love for a living are not really "working" becomes obvious. Carol
Sanger suggested to me that some intellectuals' resistance to honoring all forms of paid
work-however "low-skilled" from our vantage point-may reflect a subconscious desire to
maintain the privileged view of our own work. I am grateful to her for this insight.
247. See, e.g., Carol Stack, Address at Workplace Theory and Policy Seminar at Yale
Law School (Feb. 5, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(showing that fast-food jobs demand skills that may not be obvious, but which come to be
appreciated by most who do them).
248. See generally Glickstein, supra note 125, at 95-96 (describing antebellum view
that "[manual] work itself must lack dignity for anyone qualified by native attributes or
social circumstances for more civilized activities").
249. See generally Forbath, Equal Citizenship, supra note 9, at 19-20 (discussing early
labor movements' emphasis on the dignity of working people); James Gray Pope, Labor's
Constitution of Freedom, 106 Yale L.J. 941, 968 (1997) (describing Kansas United Mine
Workers leader Alexander Howat's conception of the "'miner's freedom,' a work culture
of autonomy, dignity and solidarity").
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put the steel beam in." Picasso can point to a painting, what can
I point to? A writer can point to a book. Everybody should have
something to point to.
250
C. Earning a Living Wage
Aside from the rewards gained from serving others, people benefit
from the sense of autonomy and pride that comes from "being paid an
earned reward for one's labor."25 1 This is one reason working for a living
is important to people, and why paid work differs from volunteer activi-
ties and time spent caring for one's own family or friends. We may wish it
weren't so, but in a market economy, people who are paid for what they
do receive more respect from others, have more bargaining power in
their relationships, and have a stronger sense of their value and place in
the world than those who are not paid. This is part of the historical leg-
acy of emphasizing "independence" as a source of citizenship and charac-
ter; as we have seen, making citizenship available to people through paid
work was a democratizing move that created more opportunity for prop-
ertyless white men. This same vision can and should be expanded to ex-
tend the benefits of equal work to men of color, women of all races, and
everyone else who has been excluded or marginalized.
Market forces shape our world more profoundly than ever before,
and with that marketization comes an even greater emphasis on wage
work, money, and other fonns of exchange. It seems unlikely that we
could reverse the trend toward marketization even if we wanted to; so why
not build on the tradition that emphasizes the virtues of wage-earning as
a foundation for independence by demanding that every citizen who
works for a living earn wages-coupled with appropriate wage subsidies if
250. Terkel, supra note 30, at xxxii. Publicly recognizing work's value can also be
powerfully important to a child, as a wonderful essay (despite the sexism of the time she is
describing) by Candy Schulman conveys:
Growing up in Brooklyn in the 1950s, I relished my trips to Manhattan to visit the
Planetarium and the adjoining Museum of Natural History. But there was
something even more exciting than the dinosaurs or the chance to weigh myself
on the moon. The highlight was standing outside and watching my mother point
to the Planetarium's green dome. Each time she'd proudly tell me, "Your father
built that."
Not singlehandedly of course. But my father was an engineer on the team
that designed the dome, under which we'd later sit, necks arched to the sky, and
travel to faraway galaxies....
My father left engineering for a civil servant's job before I was born. In
kindergarten, my teacher asked each of us what our fathers did for a living.
Everyone boasted of interesting careers-doctor, lawyer, Indian chief kind of
professions-but I meekly said, "My father works in an office in the city."
"What kind of office?" the teacher prodded.
I shrugged, embarrassed. "But," I added eagerly, "he also built the dome of
the Planetarium!" "Really?" the children echoed. "Wow!"
Candy Schulman, Daddy's Dome, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1997, at C15.
251. Shklar, supra note 7, at 1-3; see Karst, supra note 5, at 530-38.
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necessary-that allow her to meet life's material needs on her own? It
resonates deeply with most Americans' sense of fairness and justice that,
if people work for a living, they should earn enough to pull themselves
and their children out of poverty. 252 The growing gap between rich and
poor threatens democracy. It is no answer to say, "Let them acquire
human capital." Although we should expand people's ability to acquire
the education and training they need to do the work to which they aspire,
not everyone will have the inclination to pursue higher education. That
alone is no cause for alarm: In a service economy, we will always need
people to perform services that do not require higher forms of training.
Nonetheless, if work is to provide a foundation for citizenship, then all
who work must have social recognition and economic security. Without
such a guarantee, our emphasis on work becomes empty (even shameful)
rhetoric.
We must do more than simply make paid work more available; we
must ensure also all jobs a decent wage. As Edmund Phelps and Philip
Harvey have argued, it isn't simply a lack of jobs, but a lack of jobs that
pay enough to live on that plagues many poor communities. 2 53 In recog-
nition of this fact, a variety of efforts are underway to increase wages for
the working poor. The Clinton administration has passed sizable mini-
mum wage increases and expanded the Earned Income Tax Credit.254 At
the grass-roots level, municipal workers around the country have
launched campaigns for a "living wage," and have succeeded in passing
living wage ordinances in several localities. 2 55 In addition, the labor
movement is placing emphasis on organizing low-paid service workers,
who stand to benefit most from the wage increases that trade unions tra-
ditionally have been able to win.
2 5 6
Yet even some of these laudable approaches raise concerns we have
seen before: Why should we increase wages only for municipal or union-
ized workers, when so many others face jobs with pay so low that they
cannot support themselves or their children? Increasing the minimum
252. See generally Zasloff, supra note 203, at 261-62 nn.118-123 (documenting
Americans' support for social programs supporting, or even guaranteeing, a right to
employment); see also Harvey, supra note 15, at 4-5 (showing similar support during the
Roosevelt and Reagan eras).
253. See Phelps, supra note 219, at 103-04; Harvey, supra note 15, at 16-24.
254. See Rev. Proc. 97-57, 1997-2 C.B. 586; see also Rebecca M. Blank et al., Financial
Incentives for Increasing Work and Income Among Low-Income Families, 34-35, 42
(National Bureau of Research Working Paper No. 6998, Mar. 1999) (visited Sept. 9, 2000)
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w6998> (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that
the 1994 increases to the Earned Income Tax Credit make it the largest federal
expenditure for any supplemental income program).
255. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 39, at 776 & n.253 (describing efforts by various
municipalities to require all city contractors to pay a living wage).
256. As noted previously, the recent victory of 75,000 California home health care
workers in organizing themselves into the Service Employees International Union (SEIU),
for example, holds promise for upgrading-and highlighting-the value of such work.
See Schodolski, supra note 65, at 3.
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wage is a more universal strategy, but some economists worry that doing
so will dampen job creation and harm the very low-skill workers the wage
increase aims to help.257 For this reason, many policymakers prefer fur-
ther expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)-a tax credit
that operates as a refund for families with children who earn less than a
certain guaranteed amount. But because it is based on family rather than
individual earnings, the EITC raises concerns of its own. Although it is
said to encourage labor force participation-and it does among single
parents-there is evidence that the EITC actually reduces low-income
married women's labor force participation. 258 In effect, one pair of re-
searchers concluded, the EITC subsidizes married mothers to stay at
home-a result that is counterproductive to the goal of breaking down
the gender-based division of labor and perhaps also that of alleviating
poverty, if they could earn more by working. For this reason, some re-
searchers have suggested that the EITC should be based on individual as
opposed to family earnings. 259 Historically, the credit has been available
only to people with dependent children, 260 which means that many low-
income people-childless young women, men who lack the earnings to
support children, and older men and women whose children have left
home, for example-were excluded.
To alleviate these problems, Edmund Phelps has proposed an ambi-
tious but simple program of graduated wage subsidies for individual low-
wage workers. 261 His goal is to recognize that working yields a social divi-
dend-beyond the benefit to the firm-reflected in a market wage. In
his plan, the government would supplement the hourly wage provided by
employers to bring workers up to an established rate, with the subsidy
declining as the hourly wage increases. 262 Phelps' plan pays the subsidy
to employers, who then pass it along to workers. Although there are dis-
advantages to this design (the risk of employer fraud and churning, for
example),263 there is no reason why the same graduated wage subsidy
could not be paid directly to workers. 264 Experts in institutional design
257. See Alstott, supra note 188, at 1008. But see David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Myth
and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage 21 (1995) (suggesting that
minimum-wage increases in New Jersey and Texas restaurants actually spurred job
creation).
258. See Nada Eissa & Hilary Williamson Hoynes, The Earned Income Tax Credit and
the Labor Supply of Married Couples 55-56 (University of Wisconsin-Madison Inst. for
Research on Poverty Discussion Paper No. 1194-99, 1999).
259. See id.
260. See Phelps, supra note 219, at 133-34; Eissa & Hoynes, supra note 258, at 55-56.
261. Phelps, supra note 219, at 103-21.
262. Specifically, people earning $4.00 an hour would be brought up to $7.00; those
earning $6.00 an hour would be brought up to $7.65, and so on, with subsidies ending at
$12.06-a wage well above the $10 an hour that was the median wage for full-time workers
at the time of Phelps' proposal. See id. at 113.
263. See Alstott, supra note 188, at 1043-45.
264. For a different proposal that guarantees everyone ajob at an above-poverty-level
wage, see Harvey, supra note 15, at 11-20. Harvey's book contains a detailed analysis of
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could work out the details, but the point is to agree on the need to sup-
plement low wages. Like Bergmann and Hartmann, I believe such poli-
cies should be designed to eliminate the current incentives for gender
segregation and inequality. Wage subsidies should be structured to per-
mit women (as well as men) to combine parenting with work that pays a
living wage on terms that do not lead to women's marginalization.
265
D. Cultivating Empowering Work Conditions and Relations
Work is important not simply because it gives people a vehicle for
serving society and for earning their own keep, but also because it allows
diverse groups of people to come together with others to pursue com-
mon goals, under conditions that are at least partly of their own choosing
and which allow for some measure of self-realization.
26 6
This is a tall order and I cannot say much about it here. At a mini-
mum, we should protect working people from harassment and abuse at
the hands of their supervisors and co-workers. These forms of hostility
poison the workplace and undermine one of the major motivations for
working, which is the feeling of being connected to others through
shared experiences. 267 We must also look for creative, systematic ways to
encourage workers to relate to one another empathetically across race,
gender, age, and other demographic categories. We should, of course,
pay attention to structural features of workgroups such as numerical bal-
ance: Research suggests that when women are fully integrated into jobs
at all different levels of authority, they are less likely to experience their
the economic effects and administrative feasibility of such a program. See id. at 21-50,
66-78.
265. Like Bergmann & Hartmann, I lean toward the view that this benefit should be
aimed at those who work full-time. See Bergmann & Hartmann, supra note 132, at 86.
But, as stated below, I support measures designed to eliminate the distinction between full-
time and part-time work by reducing the standard workweek substantially for everyone.
See infra notes 302-304 and accompanying text. Unlike Phelps, however, my reason for
doing so is to not to promote a greater breadwinning capacity by men so that they can
resume head-of-household status, but rather to avoid yet another incentive for employers
to create substandard part-time and temporary jobs to be filled disproportionately by
women. See Phelps, supra note 219, at 96.
266. See Elster, supra note 232, at 62-63 (discussing self-realization through work);
see also Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 753, 893-904
(1994) (discussing the noninstrumental benefits of work).
267. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 18-25 (1988) (describing
the ways in which women and minority employees are mistreated or harassed at work); cf.
Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of
Workplace Harassment, 88 Geo. L.J. 1, 16-22 (1999) (discussing the dignitary harm
resulting from workplace harassment). See generally Schultz, Reconceptualizing
Harassment, supra note 55, at 1687-89 (describing how gender-based harassment excludes
and marginalizes women in debilitating ways).
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workplaces as hostile or alienating. 268 We should also look for ways to
reward members of dominant groups who reach across boundaries of
race, gender, or other difference to support newcomers in solidarity and
friendship-such as white men who oppose harassment and discrimina-
tion against women and people of color.
2 69
But it is not only members of historically-disadvantaged groups, but
all workers who deserve empowering working conditions. Although there
has been far too little systematic research on how new forms of work or-
ganization are actually operating in American workplaces, 270 some com-
mentators have suggested ways to implement the new collaborative forms
of work so that diverse groups of workers-and not simply manage-
ment-will reap the benefits. Law professor Susan Sturm argues that
structural features of workplace organizations determine the quality of
intermediate-level worker interactions. By paying attention to those
structures, firms can control the pressures toward in-group preference
and discrimination that flow from the increased salience of interpersonal
dynamics in team-based decisionmaking. 2 71 To deal with such pressures,
she argues, organizations must craft structures that offer constructive
methods for resolving conflict, create processes that develop workable
goals and standards, and adopt mechanisms of accountability that allow
the firm to experiment and learn from mistakes. 272 Sturm's approach
finds support in the sociological literature, which has long emphasized
the need for structures of accountability to counteract the discriminatory
dynamics of discretionary employment systems.
2 73
268. See Barbara A. Gutek, Sex and the Workplace: The Impact of Sexual Behavior
and Harassment on Women, Men, and Organizations 143 (1985); Kanter, Men and
Women, supra note 21, at 242, 281-84; Schultz, Reconceptualizing Harassment, supra note
55, at 1759.
269. For illuminating analyses of how anti-discrimination law treats the distribution of
resources as a zero-sum game in a way that divides, rather than uniting Americans across
the boundaries of race, gender, and other differences, see Clark Freshman, Whatever
Happened to Anti-Semitism?: How Social Science Theories Identify Discrimination and
Promote Coalitions Between "Different" Minorities, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 313, 333-59,
410-26 (2000); Noah Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for
Inter-group Solidarity (Dec. 21, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia
Law Review). Zatz proposes a new cause of action that would permit whites, men or others
who occupy privileged positions in the workplace to claim that they have been
discriminated against when they are required to participate or acquiesce in harassment or
discrimination against others. The theory is intended to allow privileged workers to claim
identities as whites or men that do not depend on excluding others.
270. See Appelbaum & Batt, supra note 148, at 58.
271. See Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and the Law in the Twenty-First Century
Workplace: Some Preliminary Observations, 1 U. Pa.J. Lab. & Employment L. 639, 663-65
(1998).
272. See id. at 647.
273. See generally Barbara Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment
Discrimination, 29 Contemp. Soc. 319, 325 (2000) (arguing that the impact of stereotypes
and other cognitive distortions on evaluative judgments are reduced when decisionmakers
know they will be held accountable for the criteria they use).
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Like Sturm, law professor Mark Barenberg seeks to harness the posi-
tive potential in new collaborative work forms. He focuses less on en-
hancing organizational effectiveness and resolving ingroup/outgroup
problems among workers, and more on developing the potential for
workers as a whole to become more actively involved in production and
governance issues in ways that will enhance their autonomy and self-reali-
zation. 274 Barenberg emphasizes that ground-up initiatives will yield
more effective worker participation. According to Barenberg, the emerg-
ing theoretical and empirical literatures suggest that the most important
feature of organizations that are relatively free of "structural coercion,
distorted communication, and psychological manipulation" is the combi-
nation of "effective team participation and strategic labor representa-
tion."2 7 5 Indeed, he says, these two processes are synergistic and are mu-
tually reinforcing.
2 76
Such research suggests that along with teams and other coordinated
forms of work that are proliferating, we should make it a priority to create
mechanisms that promote employer accountability and employee repre-
sentation. For those who doubt that employees really care about their
roles as workers, 27 7 there is recent, systematic evidence to the contrary.
In the most extensive analysis of U.S. workers' attitudes toward workplace
relationships in more than twenty years, Richard Freeman and Joel Rog-
ers have found that most Americans want significantly more influence
over, and input into, their work roles.2 78 The desire for increased influ-
ence over workplace decisions is shared equally by diverse groups of em-
ployees-"[m]en and women, union and nonunion workers, profession-
als and laborers" alike. 279 Employees feel that increased participation will
both improve the quality of their own working lives and increase work-
place efficiency. Interestingly, many managers agree that problems
would be solved more effectively if employees had more input.280 Many
274. See Barenberg, supra note 266, at 893-96.
275. Id. at 921.
276. See id. According to Barenberg: "[M] eaningful representation . .. frees workers
to contribute continuous improvements and creative initiative with the assurance that the
costs and benefits will be fairly distributed among stakeholders." Id. at 923. Yet it is not
simply management that front-line workers need to hold responsible-it is also their own
representatives. Employee participation in high-discretion teams helps on this front,
according to Barenberg, because "[e]mployee representatives are more likely to be held
accountable by rank and file employees who have broad knowledge of the sociotechnical
system and who feel challenged to participate actively in workplace problem-solving." Id.
at 925-26.
277. See, e.g., Ackerman & Alstott, supra note 187, at 207 (noting that most
Americans see themselves as citizens and not workers).
278. An overwhelming 63% of all workers surveyed say they want more influence at
the workplace, while only 35% want to keep things as they are. See Richard B. Freeman &
Joel Rogers, What Workers Want 41-42 (1999).
279. Id. at 52.
280. For example, 87% of employees say they would like theirjobs better if they had
more authority over decisions about production and operations. In addition, 79% of the
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companies employ some sort of employee-involvement program, but the
vast majority of participant workers believe that the programs would be
more effective if employees had more say, and many managers agree.
28 1
Although organized workers support their unions (and about one-third
of nonunion workers would support a union if given the opportunity),
most workers prefer cooperative management-labor relations in which
management participates and workers retain strong levels of influence.
According to Freeman and Rogers, "[t]he majority of workers.., want an
institutional form that does not effectively exist in the United States:
joint employee-management committees that discuss and resolve work-
place problems."
28 2
Democratic principles demand that people have more input into
how their work is structured. I have argued that all forms of work deserve
dignity, even the most routinized. But this recognition does not require
blinding ourselves to the fact that many people do work that can dull the
mind or wreck the body and spirit. To the extent that the workplace can
be structured efficiently in more than one fashion (which is often the
case), we should create mechanisms that allow workers to arrange their
work in a way that maximizes their sense of challenge and their intrinsic
satisfaction. 2 83 As Nora Watson, an editor, explained:
Jobs are not big enough for people. It's not just the assembly
line worker whose job is too small for his spirit, you know? ...
Here .... where I had expected to put the energy and enthusi-
asm and gifts that I may have to work-it isn't happening. They
expect less than you can offer .... It's so demeaning to be here
and not be challenged.
284
Some jobs will remain tedious or onerous in content. But even those
jobs can be structured in more satisfying ways by giving workers more
autonomy and a greater sense of control over the pace, rhythms, or social
possibilities of the job. It is one thing to pick up trash in a demeaning
uniform, working under an autocratic supervisor's nose, or on a piece-
work system that forces one to rush constantly in order to survive. It may
be quite another thing to do the same work dressed in comfortable cloth-
ing of one's choice, working at a reasonable pace alongside a colleague
whose companionship one enjoys, and earning a living wage.
employees believed that the quality of the firm's product or services would improve if they
made more decisions about production and operations. See id. at 42-43. 58% of all
managers agreed. See id. at 42.
281. See id. at 43.
282. Id. at 152; see also Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the
Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 149, 187-90 (1993) (arguing
for establishing joint employee-management committees to address workplace concerns if
such committees are endorsed by the majority through secret ballots).
283. In the Freeman and Rogers survey, the one area in which workers most want
more influence is input into how to do their jobs and organize their work: 76% of all
workers said this was important to them. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 278, at 48-49.
284. Terkel, supra note 30, at 521, 523.
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To the extent that some work cannot be reorganized along more
satisfying, healthful lines, we should create clear paths for moving up-
ward, sideways, and even out-and elsewhere-before lasting damage is
done. As Dave Stribling, a steelworker, put it,
Where you have to eat all that dust and smoke, you can't work
hard and live a long life. You shouldn't be made to work till
sixty-two or sixty-five to reap any benefit. We're paying social
security, and most of us will never realize a penny from it.
That's why they should give it to him at a younger age to let him
enjoy a few years of the life he ruined workin' in the factory.
285
People are now living longer, with better health. If we allowed peo-
ple who do damaging work that benefits the rest of us to leave with pen-
sions before they destroy their health, they could use the money to re-
train themselves for different employment or to support themselves while
engaging in the civic work that many younger people no longer have time
to do. Indeed, such retraining rights may prove to be necessary for al-
most everyone in the new economy, where the fast pace of technology
renders many jobs obsolete in a few years time. To give everyone access
to a life's work, we must create retraining and retirement options that
sustain rather than destroy life, and that allow people to reshape their
skills to meet life's evolving demands.
E. Positioning Work As a Cornerstone for Family and Civic Life
We must do still more. As I suggested earlier, we must rethink the
relationship between working life and family and civic life. Our existing
models are woefully inadequate. On the one hand, we have "production-
ist" models in which work, harnessed to the end of productivity, overtakes
everything else. As an alternative, we have only gendered "accomodation-
ist" models in which the job remains the realm of men, but the family
retains the fealty of women.
From the right end of the spectrum, productionist models depict
working life and working people exclusively in narrow efficiency terms.
28 6
In these models, firms appear only as rational, task-oriented institutions
with definable rules and procedures that harness all human drive to the
end of productivity. Managers and the firm are considered the reposito-
ries of rationality, while employees-as the embodiment of the "outside"
world of affective life-are seen as the repositories of emotion. Manage-
ment's goal is to drive out of the organization the nonrational, "emo-
tional" side of life that cannot be subordinated to production. Working
people are a threat, precisely because they represent that messy, "outside"
285. Terkel, supra note 30, at 720.
286. See Kanter, Men and Women, supra note 21, at 18-23 (discussing the history of
management theory, which developed rationality and efficiency as the driving forces of
organizational life); Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, On the Non-Work Aspects of Work, 49 Antioch
Rev. 46, 47-50 (1991) (discussing efficiency-based models in similar terms) [hereinafter,
Epstein, Non-Work Aspects of Work].
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stuff of life-sex, reproduction, disability, disease, even playfulness and
passion-and threaten to bring it into, and thereby corrupt, the firm. To
contain the threat, the "worker" must be conceptualized as an abstract
category-an "input" of production that is efficient only to the extent
that he or she is stripped of the layers of experience that do not serve the
production function. Taylor's scientific management was an early exam-
ple of such an approach: By separating mental from manual labor,
Taylorism justified management control over workers, whose physicality
was to be disciplined through task specialization and machinery in order
to serve the ends of production.
28 7
The human capital model provides another example of a produc-
tionist approach. In an analogy to machines (physical capital), working
people are valued for (and even referred to as) human capital, a term
describing the investments people make in acquiring education or skills
that will make money for the firm. In this model, workers are paid in
accordance with their productivity, which is thought to correspond to
their education and training and, in Becker's more recent model, the
stocks of "energy" they invest in their jobs.288 These investments are
viewed as exogenous "inputs" to the production process; that is, they are
acquired outside the workplace, which is conceived as a self-contained
sphere. Thus, in human capital theory, inequality within the workplace is
rationalized as a product of what happens outside it-most notably, in
the mythical white middle-class heterosexual family, where women alleg-
edly choose their roles as happy homemakers.2 89 In human capital the-
ory, therefore, the fact that women earn less and have less desirable jobs
than men is a product of their encumbrances in these "other" spheres of
life, which leaves them looking less like the tooled-up, high-energy ma-
chines that the model envisions as the essence of a competent worker.
287. For a description of Taylorism and its historical development, see Stone, supra
note 164, at 7-11. For a stunning biography of Taylor himself, see Robert Kanigel, The
One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency (1997).
288. See Becker, Human Capital, supra note 38, at 25-26; supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
289. In my view, this is parallel to neo-conservative reasoning that attributes African-
Americans' and other disadvantaged racial minorities' lower status within the labor market
to what happens outside it. Here, as black feminists have pointed out, the myth is that
poor single mothers of color raise their children to lack the work ethic and initiative
needed to succeed in neutral, competitive labor markets. See, e.g., Patricia Hill Collins, A
Comparison of Two Works on Black Family Life, 14 Signs 875, 875-78 (1989) (criticizing
Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Bill Moyers for attributing black poverty to pathological
culture created by female-headed households, as opposed to racism and classism in larger
structural forces); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist
Politics, in Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender 57, 71-72 (Katharine T.
Bartlett & Roseanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (criticizing Bill Moyers for blaming black poverty
on female-headed households and arguing that William Julius Wilson's analysis is
incomplete because it "incorporates no analysis of the way the structure of the economy




Like Taylorism, human capital theory is a rationalizing model, which
reduces work to its flattest dimensions, while at the same time legitimat-
ing inequality.
In these productionist models, work has a narrow definition that re-
lates exclusively to serving the ends of production. There is no room for
the concept of work as a vocation or a life's project, something to which
people can commit their hearts and souls. There is no room for the con-
cept of work as community, the glue that holds people together as they
struggle to accomplish common ends. There is no room for integrating
working life with family and civic life in a multi-faceted, meaningful way.
The sole purpose of work is making profit for the firm. Life experiences
like parenting, aging, sickness, sexuality, or even solidarity are simply not
conceived as part of the workplace landscape.
2 90
To the apparent left of productionist models, we have "accommoda-
tionist" models that turn out to be no more than the gendered comple-
ments of their productionist counterparts: As we have seen, important
strands of contemporary feminism replicate the gender-based division of
labor by assuming a productionist model for men while positing precisely
the opposite for women. Men are imagined to be the workers firms want
them to be; women are assumed to be paragons of domesticity, who un-
dertake paid work only insofar as it comports with their family roles.
Joint property proposals assume that men are breadwinners-domestic ab-
sentees while women are primary caretaker-secondary earners. Welfare
approaches assume women will engage in full-time or near full-time
homemaking and caregiving. To paraphrase sociologists Roslyn Feldberg
and Evelyn Glenn, such strategies envision a 'job model" for men and a
"gender model" for women.2 9 1
Work-family accommodation models build on similar conceptual
foundations. Accommodationists assume that women are more commit-
ted to family relations than men, so if we want to ensure that women can
participate in the workplace, we must acknowledge this difference and
provide special accommodation for women's domestic roles. Accom-
modationists therefore typically seek policies that make work more "flexi-
ble"-such as maternity leave, family leave, more part-time or temporary
jobs, and tax and benefit reforms designed to encourage such intermit-
tent workplace participation 292 -in order to allow women to balance
290. See, e.g., Epstein, Non-Work Aspects of Work, supra note 286, at 47-50
(criticizing productionist models of work for excluding such experiences as well as the
non-instrumental aspects of work itself).
291. See Roslyn L. Feldberg & Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Male and Female: Job Versus
Gender Models in the Sociology of Work, 26 Soc. Probs. 524, 524-27 (1979) (criticizing
earlier sociology of work tradition for assuming a "job model" for men, who are primarily
committed to paid work, while positing a "gender model" for women, who are presumed to
be primarily committed to family life).
292. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 225, at 602, 626, 653, 671 (arguing for the repeal
of Title VII and the adoption of reforms that allow women to shape different work/family
patterns from men's).
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paid work with "our" family responsibilities. Like joint property propo-
nents, accommodationists appear to be relatively untroubled by the segre-
gationist implications of this line of thought.29 3 It would not concern
them greatly if women ended up holding part-time, or even temporary or
contingent jobs, more frequently than men. In fact, feminists from this
tradition sometimes deride long working hours, unhampered by family
constraints, as a "male model" that they believe women should reject.
29 4
Yet, there is rarely an attempt to question whether overwork is harm-
ful to men too, or whether most men have chosen such long hours. Nor
is there an effort to examine whether some women would prefer or bene-
fit from a deeper connection to paid work, in which case the "male" work
pattern might turn out to harbor deep female longings.295 Often, there
is even a failure to come to terms with a realistic appraisal of what these
forms of accommodation might mean for women. Part-time jobs and
other nonstandard forms of employment have well-known disadvantages,
including lower pay, lack of benefits, and less promotional opportu-
nity;29 6 and at least so long as they are part of a segregated "mommy
track," such arrangements are also deeply stigmatizing, even to highly-
paid professional workers.
29 7
Contrary to productionist and accommodationist views, work isn't
just something people do to service corporations or even to serve our
families. We need a new model that envisions the deep connections be-
tween work and other realms of life, without conflating them. We need
an anti-productionist, beyond-accommodationist vision that treats work as
a cornerstone-but not a substitute-for family, politics, and civic life. As
Nancy Fraser puts it: "The trick is to imagine a social world in which
citizens' lives integrate wage earning, caregiving, community activism, po-
litical participation, and involvement in the associational life of civil soci-
ety-while also leaving time for some fun."29 8
Not only must we renew our efforts to dismantle sex- and race-based
segregation and hierarchy on the job through vigorous anti-discrimina-
tion, affirmative action, anti-harassment, and pay equity measures: We
293. See, e.g., Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts, supra note 60, at 98 n.122 (arguing that
"the unequal division of labor within the home cannot be said to be inherently
problematic or unproblematic without accounting for many differences among women,"
and what is "problematic is the disparate legal treatment of labor inside versus outside the
home").
294. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal L. Rev
1279, 1292 (1987) (criticizing "assimilation" models which "[insist] that women who enter
time-demanding professions such as the practice of law sacrifice relationships (especially
with their children) to the same extent that male lawyers have been forced to do").
295. See Arlie Russel Hochschild, The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and
Home Becomes Work 12 (1997).
296. See Kalleberg et al., supra note 92, at 6; Arne L. Kalleberg & Barbara F. Reskin,
Gender Differences in Promotion in the United States and Norway, 14 Res. Soc.
Stratification & Mobility 237, 255 (1995).
297. See Epstein, Part-Time Paradox, supra note 145, at 29-37.
298. Fraser, supra note 76, at 62.
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must also restructure working time so as to eliminate the gender disparity
associated with full-time and nonstandard work. This means abandoning
proposals to create part-time or other nonstandard jobs for women, and
redefining what is "standard" in a way that will encourage men and women
from all walks of life to work at a livable pace. In this regard, it is useful to
consider class, as well as gender, to better understand current patterns of
working time. As sociologists Jerry Jacobs and Kathleen Gerson have
shown, the labor market is currently stratified: Managerial and profes-
sional employees typically work very long hours at a single job, while less-
skilled workers often have trouble finding one job that will provide them
with enough hours to make a living.
299
Jacobs and Gerson propose legal reforms they hope will alleviate
both problems at once. They advocate requiring employers to pay pro-
portional benefits. Under such a system, all workers would receive bene-
fits (such as pension contributions) that vary with the number of hours
they work. To deal with the problem of substandard jobs, they would
include those who work less than full-time in their proposal. By forcing
employers to pay benefits tagged to the number of hours worked in such
jobs, they hope to remove the current incentive for employers to create
part-time and other nonstandard jobs simply to avoid paying benefits to
full-time workers; instead, they hope, firms would create nonstandard
jobs only when there are genuine efficiency reasons for doing so. At the
other end of the spectrum, Jacobs and Gerson would also include those
who work overtime in their proposal, including managerial and profes-
sional workers. By doing so, they hope to remove the current incentive
for employers to require overly long hours from their current employ-
ees-rather than hiring new workers-simply to avoid paying the benefits
they would pay newly hired workers. Again, firms should require long
hours from incumbents only when there are efficiency reasons for doing
so. Ultimately, by making both part-time and overtime jobs more costly
compared to those in the current regime, Jacobs and Gerson hope to
stimulate convergence toward a new mean in which most employees work
neither too little nor too long.
300
But our current mean is too high. As I argued above, and as numer-
ous other scholars have urged, we must consider legislative measures to
299. See Jacobs & Gerson, Gender-Equitable Work Week, supra note 226, at 462
("While well-educated and highly trained employees who are paid on a salaried basis . . .
may be facing increased pressure to put in long hours at the office, those with less secure
jobs... may have a difficult time getting the amount of work they desire."); Jerry A. Jacobs
& Kathleen Gerson, The Endless Day or the Flexible Office?, Report to the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation 12-16 (June 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Jacobs & Gerson, Endless Day] (providing evidence that such a
bifurcated pattern of working time has occurred).
300. See Jacobs & Gerson, Gender-Equitable Work Week, supra note 226, at 466-67;
Jacobs & Gerson, Endless Day, supra note 299, at 45-46.
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reduce the standard full-time workweek for everyone.30 1 American men
and women work at paid jobs among the longest hours in the industrial
world.3 0 2 On average, men work forty-five hours per week, while women
work forty hours per week at their jobs. Contrary to some popular expla-
nations, these long hours are not always chosen: Almost half of each
group say they would like to work fewer hours than they do. 30 3 That most
Americans would prefer to work fewer hours is not surprising, given the
prevalence of single-parent and dual-earner families and the fast pace of
contemporary life. In the face of these trends, we should consider
amending the Fair Labor Standards Act to reduce the standard workweek
to thirty-five or even thirty hours per week for everyone-including the
upper-level workers who are currently exempted-as a way to create a
new cultural ideal that would allow both women and men more time for
home, community, and nation.30 4 A reduced workweek should alleviate
work-family conflict for everyone and help promote greater sharing of
employment and housework among men and women. 30 5 It also encour-
ages work-sharing in a way that furthers the goal of making standard jobs
available to everyone,30 6 while mitigating the downward pressure on
wages.
This is not simply a utopian-but wildly unrealistic-proposal.
Among industry and the intelligentsia, especially in the international
arena, there has been a dramatic surge of interest in working time. A
number of European nations have reduced the standard workweek in an
effort to promote work-sharing. France, for example, currently mandates
a thirty-five-hour workweek;3 0 7 Germany has also reduced the standard
workweek.3 08 Although such programs have had mixed success at reduc-
ing unemployment levels in Europe, there is evidence that national legis-
301. See also Jacobs & Gerson, Gender-Equitable Work Week, supra note 226, at
468-69 (urging a 35-hour workweek); Jerry A. Jacobs & Kathleen Gerson, Who Are the
Overworked Americans?, 56 Rev. Soc. Econ. 442, 457 (1998) [hereinafterJacobs & Gerson,
Overworked Americans] (same).
302. See Jacobs & Gerson, Overworked Americans, supra note 301, at 448-50.
303. See id. at 452.
304. See id. at 457; see also Fraser, supra note 76, at 62 (noting the need for men and
women to have time to integrate all aspects of life).
305. For example, instead of one spouse working 60 hours a week while the other
stays at home to care for the house and children, or one person working 40 hours a week
while her domestic partner combines a 20-hour-a-week job with after-school care of the
children, changing the workweek-and the definition of "full time"-to 30 hours could
help create a new norm in which each partner worked a standard, 30-hour job and divided
the household labor equally.
306. For a historical examination of the original Fair Labor Standards Act that
describes work-spreading as one of its central purposes, see Deborah C. Malamud,
Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in the New Deal Hours Legislation,
96 Mich. L. Rev. 2212, 2285-86 (1998).
307. See David Woodruff, In France, Working Long Hours Becomes A Crime:
Inspectors Enforce Shorter Workweek, Wall St. J., June 15, 1999, at A15.
308. SeeJennifer Hunt, Has Work-Sharing Worked in Germany?, 114 Q.J. Econ. 117,
119-21 (1999). According to Kathryn Abrams, a 30-hour standard workweek has also been
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lation can change norms around working time in the United States.
When the forty-hour workweek was first implemented, the proportion of
men and women working in retail and wholesale trade more than forty
hours a week declined substantially in the North and by even greater
amounts in the South (where the greater effectiveness of minimum wage
laws precluded employers from avoiding overtime penalties by adjusting
straight-time wages).309 More recently, some states have begun to revive
these sorts of historical initiatives: Maine enacted a law that limits the
amount of overtime employers can demand.3 1 0 Some trade unions have
bargained for private sector reductions in working hours-such as the
deal struck at IG Metall, which reduced the workweek to thirty-five hours
in exchange for the employer's power to allocate hours more flexibly.3 11
Some firms have even begun to reduce the workweek voluntarily, in re-
sponse to high turnover costs and low productivity rates caused by worker
burnout.3 12 Some economists have voiced concerns that many profes-
sionals' long, intense hours reduce welfare and merit correction.3 13
Communitarians too should support the reduction of the workweek, in
the hope of freeing Americans to participate more actively in civic life.3 14
Just as we must create conditions under which all people can work
without sacrificing other important activities, so too must we create work-
related organizations that can incorporate the full range of people's ex-
periences and emotional lives. Sexuality and reproduction are a part of
life, for example, as are disability and aging. The workplace is not her-
metically sealed from these foundational courses of life, and we should
actively advanced in Sweden by both feminists in the Social Democratic Party and by two
smaller parties. See Abrams, supra note 227, at 759 n.61 (internal citation omitted).
309. See Dora L. Costa, Hours of Work and the Fair Labor Standards Act: A Study of
Retail and Wholesale Trade, 1938-1950, 54 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. (forthcoming 2000)
(manuscript at 2, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining that the proportionate
decline was 18% for both men and women in the North, and-owing to more effective
minimum wage laws-23% for men and 43% for women in the South).
310. Maine recently enacted legislation limiting the amount of mandatory overtime
worked by most private and public employees to not more than 80 hours in any
consecutive two-week period. See 2000 Me. Legis. Serv. 750 (West). I am grateful to
Jennifer Wriggins for pointing out this legislation to me.
311. See Richard B. Freeman, Work-Sharing to Full Employment: Serious Option or
Populist Fallacy, in Generating Jobs: How to Increase Demand for Less-Skilled Workers
195, 209 (Richard B. Freeman & Peter Gottschalk eds., 1998).
312. SAS Institute Inc., a computer firm in North Carolina, has successfully reduced
its workweek to 35 hours, and Sun Microsystems has even gone so far as hiring counselors
to advise their employees how to "get a life" beyond the job. See Leslie Kaufman, Some
Companies Derail the 'Burnout' Track, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1999, at Al.
313. See, e.g., Fredrik Andersson, Career Concerns, Contracts, and Effort Distortions
(Oct. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (contending
that many professionals' long hours and extreme hard work represent a market
distortion).
314. Cf. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community 15-28 (2000) (documenting Americans' widespread withdrawal from civic
life).
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not seek to make it so; such a strategy only lends legitimacy to the
Taylorist insistence that we suspend our humanity while we are at work.
Sex harassment law offers one opportunity for such an inclusive ap-
proach. Instead of conceptualizing the workplace as a sex-free zone, we
should strive to create the space in which women, sexual minorities, and
our allies have the power to insist that sex, solidarity, and competence
coexist-a world in which neither the demands of production nor politi-
cal correctness outstrip the aspiration to combine work and citizenship
with the practice of being fully human.A
15
Perhaps most essentially, a rejection of Taylorism means acknowledg-
ing that people are enriched and rejuvenated at work when they are able
to participate fully and deeply in other spheres of life and vice versa.
Broad experience in family and civic affairs enhances people's ability to
contribute to organizational life, rather than detracting from it. We rec-
ognize that this is true for some professionals, such as teachers, lawyers,
police officers, even college presidents. We have also tended to believe it
is true for middle-class women. But particularly in a service economy, the
same could be said for almost all workers. Women and men alike could
benefit from participating in family and civic life in order to bring
breadth of learning, extra-work social connections, and relational skills to
the work-a-day world.
By the same token, it is not only men, but also women who need to
participate in working life to expand ourselves in our roles as family
members and citizens. Instead of seeing the family as the primary sphere
of importance and identity (at least for women), and advocating that
315. I have argued elsewhere that sexual harassment law should not aim to banish
sexual conduct from the workplace. The mere presence of sexual activity in the workplace
does not inherently discriminate against or disadvantage women. See Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Harassment, supra note 55, at 1794 & n.568. Indeed, in sex-integrated
settings where men and women work alongside each other in equal roles, there is evidence
that flirting and other sexual conduct continues, but it is not experienced as harassment.
See Gutek, supra note 268, at 143 tbl.2. The attempt to purge sexuality from the workplace
can have drastic harmful consequences for sexual minorities, however. See Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Harassment, supra note 55, at 1785 (showing that some lower courts
have held gay supervisors' sexual advances toward other men as actionable harassment,
while simultaneously refusing to protect gay men from sex-based harassment at the hands
of men perceived to be heterosexual); id. at 1789 (predicting that courts will be more
likely to suppress benign sexual expression that does not undermine gender equality
where the sexuality involved is perceived as deviant); cf. Janet E. Halley, Sexuality
Harassment 2-4 (Jan. 13, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (criticizing conventional sexual harassment theories from a queer theory
perspective). Gay men and lesbians, bisexuals, transsexuals, and other sexual minorities
must be free to express their identities in a workplace culture that invites support rather
than disapproval-let alone sexual harassment claims. See Fair v. Guiding Eyes for the
Blind, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 151, 152-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (involving a sex harassment claim
against a gay male supervisor for simply talking about homosexuality in a way that offended
a heterosexual woman who worked in the office). For a discussion of Fair and other
worrisome harassment claims targeted at gays and lesbians, see Schultz, Reconceptualizing
Harassment, supra note 55, at 1790, 1793.
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work be shrunk or made more flexible so that preconceived family roles
can be fulfilled, we should recognize the fluidity of experience and con-
sciousness that occurs across these and other realms. Work is not inher-
ently in conflict with family or civic life. In fact, working can make us
better parents and citizens by expanding the knowledge and experience
we bring to those roles.
There is research suggesting, for example, that women who work for
a living are more likely to believe that women are entitled to be equal
citizens-and perhaps even better able to marshal support for this posi-
tion-than are women who are not employed. Sociologist Myra Marx
Ferree found in 1980, for example, that working-class, married women
who work for a living were more likely to hold feminist attitudes than
those who did not work. 31 6 This was true even of women who worked at
least partly out of economic necessity, rather than free choice. Although
the employed women and the homemakers were almost equally likely to
report that their husbands favored egalitarian sex roles, the majority of
the employed women married to men with traditional views nonetheless
held gender-egalitarian attitudes, while only one-third of the housewives
married to traditional-minded men held views that differed from their
husbands' opinions.
3 17
Ferree's findings comport with a larger literature that suggests that
women who work for a living are more likely than full-time homemakers
to support egalitarian gender roles. In her classic study of the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA), for example, Jane Mansbridge found that in
the 1974 to 1982 period, women in the labor force were significantly
more likely than homemakers to favor the ERA, were more approving of
interracial marriage, abortion, sex education, and birth control for teen-
agers, and were less willing to condemn homosexuality as always
wrong.31 8 Working women were also more likely to approve of a married
woman earning money in business or industry even if she has a husband
capable of supporting her, and were less likely to believe that "[m]ost
men are better suited for politics than most women" or that "[w]omen
should take care of running their homes and leave running the country
up to men."
3 19
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Taken as a whole, 320 this literature suggests that there is something
about the experience of working that transforms consciousness, and en-
larges the way one sees oneself-and one's rights-as a citizen (and prob-
ably also how one is seen by others). Perhaps this is why early Second
Wave feminists fought so hard for the full inclusion of women in working
life.3 2 1 Independence from a husband's economic support, and the day-
to-day experience of struggle and triumph in the work-a-day world, bring
a sense of inclusion and entitlement that can profoundly affect women's
consciousness (and the way others see us).
If working enlarges the way we see ourselves as citizens, it can also
enrich the way we define ourselves and our obligations as parents. Most
of us work to provide better opportunities for our children than we had
for ourselves. This of course includes economic opportunities-working
to pay for decent clothing, secure housing, good schools, or even a col-
lege education. But it also means much more: It means working to cre-
ate a world in which one's children-and other people's children-will
have better life chances. For many parents, just going to work each day
and holding down ajob that promises some measure of economic stabil-
ity is a powerful gift to their children. Surely Michelle Crawford repre-
sented many poor mothers who have made the transition from welfare to
work when she explained how this shift had transformed her life: "To-
day, I'm working as a machine operator, [earning $8.20 an hour], provid-
ing for my family. Now, I tell my kids that this is what you get when you
do your homework."3 22 Even amidst the toil and trouble that her life still
entails, Ms. Crawford has found comfort in going to work: "I like getting
up in the morning, going to my job. I just feel good about myself," she
said.3 23 Ms. Crawford emphasizes the role-modeling effect, but she also
hints of something more, the gift of having a mother who takes care of
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herself. "I thought I would always be on welfare," she said, but now "my
kids see a difference in me."
3 24
If parents like Michelle Crawford feel that they are doing something
positive for their children by working, there is evidence that their chil-
dren see things the same way as they come of age. One of the most mov-
ing experiences I have had recently was reading a story about Barnard
College's contest for high school girls to write essays on the topic, "A
Woman I Admire." 2 5 A substantial number of the contestants, many of
whom were the daughters of immigrants, wrote about their own mothers'
work:
It used to anger Po Lin Ho that her mother had to sit hunched
over a sewing machine 12 hours a day, 6 days a week, in a dimly
lighted factory in Chinatown. As Po Lin, 16, ajunior ... on the
Lower East Side, put it, the family had an easier time in Hong
Kong. Now, after six years in New York City, Po Lin says she is
proud and grateful for her mother's work....
"One day, sometime last year," she wrote, "I overhear my
mom talking on the phone with my grandmother. Mom is cry-
ing. 'Oh, how I wish I didn't leave Hong Kong,' she tells my
grandmother. 'I miss you so much. But I wanted what is best for
my children. I know that in Hong Kong it would be almost im-
possible for them to get into college. But they hate it here, espe-
cially Po Lin. Not a day goes by that she doesn't berate me for
leaving Hong Kong. Was I so wrong to want the best for my
children?'
"At that moment I understand why we had to come to
America. Mom just wants the best for my brothers and me....
The things she's done for me are so great."
3 26
Another young student, Selena, wrote about her mother, a 54-year-
old farm worker from Alabama who has worked in New York as a house-
keeper, and then as a foster parent: "I'm proud that my mother uses her
time to try to help homeless children gain some equanimity in their
lives."
3 27
These young women are writing about different values that their
mothers' work conveyed to them: love, discipline, and self-sacrifice, but
also self-respect and agency, the sense that their mothers (and by exam-
ple, their daughters) could act to create a better world, for themselves,
for their own children, and perhaps for others, too. It isn't just poor
young immigrant women who testify to such gifts. In a recent interview,
Mary Travers, a singer in the famed folk trio Peter, Paul, and Mary,
credited her mother with being the person who had influenced her life
the most. When asked why, she said:
324. Id.






My mother was a marvelous woman: bright, beautiful, dry wit.
She was the head of public relations at Danbury Hospital for
years. She wrote a couple of books. One was on Margaret
Sanger for children, a cookbook, one about the children's
crusades....
I was surrounded by a very committed community growing
up in Greenwich Village. Most of my mother's friends were writ-
ers and artists, people who by nature are committed and, also
many of them were committed in what I call the ethical-political
sense. So I grew up listening to Paul Robeson and Pete Seeger,
believing that inequality was an evil, that women had the right to
be anything they want to be and should work.
Feminism wasn't something I discovered in the 60's. It was
something I had generational input into. The women who had
been the most vibrant in my life all worked. And were responsi-
ble for themselves as well as for and to other people.
328
V. REPRISE
Lately I have begun to reflect on how, as my generation enters mid-
dle age, our work begins to call forth all the parts of our lives and our
selves, pulling from every sphere of our existence, going all the way back
to our experiences as children. This is a deep calling, one that demands
our attention, even as we may wish to turn away from the difficult and
often painful confrontations between past and present, inner and outer,
work and worth, family and fear, diligence and disability that it evokes.
But there comes a point, for some of us, when we must explore these
things-we must expose them to the light of consciousness, somehow-
or we cannot go on, we cannot do our work.
Part of my work is writing. Lately, I find that I cannot write well,
perhaps I cannot do my work at all, unless I wade through my dead
mother's work-her life-and examine what it means to be the child of
this vibrant, smart, outspoken, beautiful, energetic woman; a woman mar-
ried at sixteen, with a child at seventeen and another at twenty-one; a
teenage bride who moved far away from her family, who waited tables and
did hair and sold service contracts over the phone, for me; a woman who
was fired from her final job by an employer who couldn't appreciate her
strength, and who, in her middle fifties, couldn't find another one that
would begin to use her talents and energies. Increasingly, I find that I
cannot write well, perhaps I cannot do my work at all, unless I begin to
sift through what my mother's life and my own life mean for my daugh-
ter, my fiercely independent four-year old who is the image of my
mother, a girl who loves insects with a passion equal only to her adoration
of her father, who speaks in full paragraphs and feeds her stuffed-animal
"children" every day before she heads off to her "work," a girl who refers
328. Nancy Polk, When Life Is a Song, and Also a Cause, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1999,
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to Yale as "your Law School" even on the days when I feel that the place is
anything but mine.
As I have tried to suggest, this is not just my story. And it is not just
the story of people, like me, who are privileged enough to work at writ-
ing, or teaching, or the arts, or something else that our society sees as a
medium for expressing the whole person. That's an elitist view. For ever-
ywoman and everyman, from all walks of life, work calls us to incorporate
all the strands of our experience, to reach across time and place, into the
depths of our hearts and psyches, for the self-understanding that will en-
able us to love and work more fully, to do whatever it is we are on earth to
do. This is the meaning of a life's work.
